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THE IMPLICATIONS OF U.S.-CHINA MILITARY COOPERATION

A WORKSHOP

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"The Implications of United States/China Military Cooperation"

A WORKSHOP SPONSORED BY THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE—OCTOBER 28–29, 1981

Sino-American relations have reached a new stage as Americans have moved beyond discussion of normalization of political and economic ties to consider the possible implications of closer U.S. military cooperation with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Attention has focused recently on the question of whether or not the United States should take what some see as the next logical step forward in developing Sino-American relations: the sale of weapons and weapons-related technology to China.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced during a visit to Peking in June 1981 that the United States is now willing to consider the sale of weapons to China on a case-by-case basis. Secretary Haig did not, however, formally commit the United States to sell any particular weapons to China. Subsequently, reported Chinese uneasiness over U.S. policy regarding the possible sale of advanced U.S. fighter aircraft to Taiwan has apparently resulted in Peking's delay in sending a military delegation to the United States to discuss United States-People's Republic of China arms deals.

The questions of whether and how to proceed with such sales are not only of military significance. They have broad political importance for the United States as well. In particular, they have a direct impact on a central question in American foreign policy—how far should the United States go in trying to move closer to China in order to improve the American international position against the Soviet Union. Some Americans—such as former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance—have judged that the United States has already gone too far in establishing military ties with China. Others generally have been satisfied with the current policy but have been hesitant to undertake further development, at least for the near future. Still others have favored a gradual increase in U.S. arms transfers to China as an important step leading to the formation of a Sino-American mutual security arrangement against the Soviet Union.

Congressional interest in this issue has been strong, in particular because present law, notably the Arms Export Control Act, would make certain sales of arms and other military equipment to China subject to restrictions requiring congressional involvement in the decisionmaking.

In order to examine thoroughly the possible implications of United States-China security ties, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee requested that the Congressional Research Service join with it to conduct a three-part workshop on the issue. Twelve experts of differing backgrounds and divergent points of view were brought together to examine salient questions in the emerging security relationship and to offer recommendations for American policy. Each spoke in his or her individual capacity. Views expressed are not necessarily those of the institutions with which participants are affiliated.

—Four focused primarily on China's military capabilities;
—Four looked specifically at possible scenarios of United States-China military cooperation; and
—Four assessed the implications of United States-China military cooperation for broader U.S. foreign policy interests.

There was general agreement among the 12 participants endorsing a U.S. policy to sell on a limited basis carefully selected items of military equipment and arms (e.g., antitank missiles) to China.—It was judged that the possible risks of such sales to broader U.S. interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and American allies and friends in Asia were not excessive, at least for the time being. On the other hand, refusal to sell any arms to China would likely be seen in Peking as a striking reversal in American intentions toward the People's Republic of China, carrying serious negative implications for future U.S. relations with China.

Agreement on this issue was tempered by near unanimity among the participants that the United States must be extremely wary in developing extensive military ties with China.—It must guard against possible changes in the complex mix of international factors which currently make limited ties appear to be in American interests. There was also general accord that the United States should not expect its sales to have any but a relatively minor impact on the development of China's military power over the near term.

CHINA'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The four participants tasked with assessing China's military capabilities generally discounted any major improvements in China's military strength over the next 10 years, with or without limited U.S. arms sales.

Growth in China's military capabilities remains hampered by a host of problems including low investment by a Chinese leadership whose attention remains focused on the civilian economy, leadership differences over the proper way to modernize China's military, and the absence of an adequate base of scientific and technically competent personnel. As a result, Chinese ability to purchase and absorb large amounts of technically complicated American military equipment is seriously limited. Moreover, Peking, for its own political reasons, is likely to avoid becoming heavily dependent on any one foreign military supplier—a policy further complicating the development of United States-China military interchange.

These factors would seem to reduce—at least for the time being—the risk that a militarily strong China would substantially complicate the interests of the United States or its friends and

allies around China's periphery. It also means, however, that the United States cannot realistically expect China to narrow appreciably the growing gap in capabilities of Sino-Soviet forces along China's northern frontier.

Of course, military modernization remains only one element in China's security planning, which also places heavy emphasis on the maintenance of internal political stability, economic development and the exploitation of international trends useful in dealing with the Soviet Union. Several experts saw the United States playing an important and possibly growing role in these People's Republic of China calculations—both as the linchpin of the emerging Chinese view of an international united front against Soviet expansion, and as a supplier of economic and technical goods and services needed in China's internal development.

Several participants doubted, however, whether U.S. prominence in China's security calculations would automatically give the United States much leverage over People's Republic of China decisionmaking. China's reported reluctance to develop an arms sales relationship with the United States until United States-People's Republic of China differences over American sales to Taiwan are resolved was cited as the latest and most clear sign that the United States cannot expect the growing compatibility in Sino-American security ties to offset bilateral differences in other areas.

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

Three of the four participants who examined possible scenarios for future development in United States-China security ties generally viewed a slow and incremental approach as a realistic American policy over the near term. (The fourth participant argued that Soviet pressure against American and Chinese interests had already reached a point where the two states might consider steady movement toward a formal and structured security relationship. No other participant endorsed this view.) Some judged that the United States and China were already participating in a low-key security relationship through such diverse activities as intelligence sharing, keeping one another informed on the situations in Southwest and Southeast Asia, and exchanges of delegations from one another's military establishments. Other undertakings could include exchanges of delegations involved in training and military education, consultations on military planning, and visits of active duty forces (e.g., ship calls). Some participants portrayed slow forward movement in these latter areas—devoid of formally structured military ties—as helping to consolidate American relations with China while avoiding an immediately hostile or counter-productive response from the Soviet Union or other interested parties in the region.

IMPLICATIONS FOR BROADER U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The four participants tasked with examining whether or not developing security ties with China is compatible with broader U.S. foreign policy interests also called for prudence in developing security ties. They noted the negative impact of a large transfer of sophisticated U.S. weapons to China on American interests in

Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia, as well as possible negative Soviet counteractions, but concluded that carefully limited sales under current circumstances would be acceptable.

It is important to note that some participants and people in the audience arrived at this judgment reluctantly. They would have preferred to have avoided developing a U.S. arms sales relationship with China; but they judged that official U.S. visitors to China had already given the Chinese the impression that some sales would be forthcoming and thus the United States should follow through in order to avoid disillusionment and reversal in United States-China relations.

Several warned of the United States beginning to slide down the "slippery slope" of incremental development in United States-China military ties that eventually would prompt strong countermeasures by the Soviet Union and other Asian countries that would be detrimental to American interests.

Also, it was generally agreed that Americans must be aware that factors influencing current American security policy toward China could change fairly quickly. In particular, there is no guarantee that China will continue its current pragmatic economic program, moderate posture toward its non-Communist neighbors, strong opposition to the U.S.S.R. and close ties with the United States. Future Soviet behavior is also hard to gauge, especially as the mix of paranoia and realism in Soviet policy toward China is translated into specific measures against growing United States-China security ties. And there is no assurance that U.S. officials can or will manage U.S. Asian policies in ways compatible with developing Sino-United States security ties—the example of the recent Sino-American controversy over the issue of U.S. fighter aircraft sales to Taiwan is a clear case in point.

Perhaps the strongest arguments for caution in American arms sales to China were those which pointed to potentially important but only vaguely understood factors that currently affect U.S. security policy toward China. Thus, there was no agreement as to how the United States might stop or reverse an arms sales relationship with China, once it gets underway. Indeed, it was noted that such ties sometimes gain a life of their own—devoid of other considerations—in American foreign policy. There was no accord as to where or when the Soviet Union would see growing United States-China military ties as a threat that would require sharp counteraction. And, there was no agreement on what effect—positive or negative—U.S. arms sales and military ties would likely have on China's behavior in Asian and world affairs. In particular, it was noted that while U.S. supplies could help Chinese defense against the U.S.S.R., they might also serve to increase People's Republic of China ability to use force against other neighbors. Also by providing conventional weapons, the United States might indirectly free up domestic People's Republic of China resources to strengthen China's intercontinental strategic weapons programs. There was little discussion of the methods by which arms sales would be carried out—through commercial sales, government-to-government sales, or sales subsidized by U.S. military aid.

Pending a solution to these and other questions, it was judged that American leaders should approach China warily in the realm

of security ties. The United States should avoid formalized agreements that would "lock in" the United States to a particular set of responses in the event of challenges to China's interests from the U.S.S.R. or elsewhere. It should also avoid reliance on China's power as a possible safeguard for American interests in East Asia. While China will remain a major impediment to Soviet expansion in Asia, there is no guarantee that it will automatically back U.S. interests in the region under all or even most circumstances.

It seems clear that the elements of doubt and potential discord in United States-China relations, which argue against closer United States-China security ties, will not disappear overnight. Barring a major increase in Soviet pressure against the interests of the United States and China, there appears to be little good substitute for the passage of time that would allow the United States and China to establish greater mutual trust, to perceive more clearly where they have common ground, and to develop more cooperative strategies and security ties. In the interim, some workshop participants stressed, U.S. leaders should constantly reassess the pros and cons of developing security ties with China, and avoid rhetoric or other actions that could mislead China and other interested parties over U.S. intentions in this sensitive area.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

China's Military Capabilities

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Advantages and Disadvantages of Closer United States-China Military Ties

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The committee owes a debt of gratitude to the participants for their time, effort, and contributions to the success of the seminar. The committee also thanks Dr. Robert Sutter of the Congressional Research Service staff, Lindley Sloan of Senator Hayakawa's personal staff, and Broadus Bailey and Mary Locke of the committee staff.

CHARLES H. PERCY,
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Foreign Relations Committee.

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Chairman, Subcommittee on East Asian
and Pacific Affairs.

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THE IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED STATES-CHINA MILITARY COOPERATION

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1981

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
Washington, D.C.

The workshop convened in room 457, Russell Senate Office Building, at 9:05 a.m., Hon. S. I. Hayakawa (chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations) presiding.

Senators present: Senators Percy and Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Good morning.

I wish to extend a warm welcome to our workshop, entitled the Implications of United States-China Military Cooperation. We are looking forward to a lively day and a half of discussion on this very important topic.

We are addressing this issue at the beginning of what I hope will become an extensive public debate. It is important to have on the public record the facts and an unbiased analysis of noted experts in the field. This group can provide the assistance at this crucial time, when views are being formulated and decisions are still being made.

The topic is one of widespread interest, to judge from the extensive response to our invitations. We have in this room, in addition to our participants and the congressional staff who will be advising their members on this issue, representatives from the State Department, the Defense Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Atlantic Council, the Asia Society, George Washington University, and Johns Hopkins University, the War Colleges, the National Security Council, and other distinguished guests.

As you have seen from our letter of invitation, the workshop will be divided into three sessions. This morning we shall discuss China's military capabilities. This afternoon, we will look at alternative strategies in United States-China military relations and explore the question of U.S. options in its relationship to China. Tomorrow morning we will delve into the question of whether any military supply relationship is a good idea.

Our procedure throughout the three sessions will be to ask each of the discussants to summarize his or her paper at the beginning of the session. We will then ask for comments from the other discussants. We shall try to leave time for questions and comments from the floor.

I shall not be able to stay for the entire session, and have asked Dr. Bob Sutter of the Congressional Research Service to moderate the sessions in my absence.

The proceedings will be published by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

This morning we will be looking at China's military capabilities today and what they could be in the future. The debate on arms sales to China so far has seemed to take place on an etherea! or abstract level. This morning we get down literally to the nuts and bolts. What could we sell China that China would want, and what could she pay for? And how would this affect China's military capability?

We are fortunate to have with us this morning four distinguished professionals who have studied China's military capabilities. They are June Teufel Dreyer, from the University of Miami, Sidney Jammes, of the Central Intelligence Agency, John J. Sloan, from the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Roy Werner from Aerojet General Corp., of California.

Dr. Dreyer, perhaps you would like to begin.

STATEMENT OF JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, DIRECTOR, EAST ASIAN PROGRAMS, PROFESSOR OF POLITICS, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, CORAL GABLES, FLA.

Ms. DREYER. I understand that I am supposed to talk for about 10 minutes.

Senator HAYAKAWA. That is right.

Ms. DREYER. First, I think China's chief military advantage is in its manpower. The PLA [People's Liberation Army] numbers approximately 4.5 million people. A second military asset that the Chinese have is their nuclear deterrent.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Would you be kind enough to use the microphone?

Ms. DREYER. Certainly.

China's nuclear arsenal is small in size but its missiles are well hidden, and an adversary couldn't be sure of getting all of them in a first strike.

Beyond this, however, I think China's military capabilities have a good many debits. For example, Chinese weapons are mostly copies of older Soviet models. Chinese technology is estimated to be 20 to 30 years behind the state of the art. The country's infrastructure is weak. The economy is fragile. The army lacks mobility. The navy is basically a coastal defense force, and does not have much blue water capability, and the air force would probably have difficulty in holding the skies even against an adversary such as Taiwan, Vietnam, or India, much less the Soviet Union.

The result is a military capability that cannot be projected far beyond the PRC's own borders; it is best suited to the defense of the territory of China proper.

The strategy by which the Chinese plan to defend their territory is and remains people's war, plus the addition of the above mentioned nuclear deterrent capability. However, we now have what is called people's war under modern conditions. This contains some significant emendations to the original concept of the people's war.

There are plans to include much more modern weaponry in the PLA's arsenal and to upgrade training methods and techniques. A good deal more attention is being given to positional warfare as opposed to mobile warfare, and there also has been a modification of the concept of luring the enemy in deep. What we are talking about here is a somewhat more forward defense than had previously been the case.

I think this strategy makes good use of the PRC's limited financial and technological resources. It is, however, my judgment that China could not do very well in defending itself against a Soviet attack with limited goals, i.e., a Soviet attack which does not aim at conquering all of China—a "teach China a lesson" kind of scenario.

Both Xinjiang in China's northwest and Manchuria in China's northeast are exposed salients. In both, the PLA would lack a firm flank for any position that it might succeed in establishing. In Manchuria, of course, the PLA's task would be a little easier than it would be in Xinjiang, where China lacks sufficient rail capability to get the troops around, and where the population contains a number of elements hostile to the Han Chinese. Many of these are Turkic Muslims whose kinfolk live in the Soviet Union. In Manchuria, by contrast, the population is overwhelmingly Han Chinese, and the economic system there is much better developed than in Xinjiang.

However, even though the PLA will have a less difficult time in defending Manchuria than in defending Xinjiang, the Soviet Union probably will be able to capture it nonetheless and possibly the Beijing-Tianjin area as well. Indications are that the Chinese also have taken into consideration that they may have to surrender the capital city, Beijing, under certain circumstances.

Once having made the decision to invade China, I believe that if the Soviet Union finds itself in difficulty carrying out the conflict by conventional means, it is unlikely that it would shrink from employing ABC techniques. The Chinese have made preparations against such an attack, but they are quite limited in scope, and I do not believe that they will be likely to prove adequate against such techniques.

If the attacking Soviet forces withdrew after teaching China a lesson, I do not believe that China would continue the conflict. Indeed, it probably could not continue the conflict at any meaningful level. If a Soviet attack were to attempt to destroy the ecology of China's three major river basins which comprise the country's agricultural heartland, I expect that China's military capability and China's economic capability in general would be crippled for many centuries.

If the Soviet Union were to try to hold significant amounts of territory along the Sino-Soviet border, the Chinese probably would mount harassment operations and guerrilla warfare. This, however, might not be true if the amounts of land involved were fairly small, and if China's capacity to mount a counterattack had been greatly reduced by the Soviet invasion.

As a case in point, in 1978, the Chinese revealed that the Soviets had occupied 2,800 square kilometers of Xinjiang province since 1972, and that there really had been no Chinese efforts to get it

back. This, in sum, is my assessment of Chinese military capabilities against the Soviet Union.

As for Chinese capabilities against Vietnam, the Chinese attempt to teach Vietnam a lesson in 1979 ended with each side teaching the other side a lesson. Both sides have learned from those lessons. The result, I believe, is that the capabilities of each on the border have been increased, but probably the balance of strength between the Vietnamese and the Chinese has not changed markedly since 1979.

Taiwan, of course, is another question. Clearly, the PRC has overwhelming numerical advantage in troops, approximately 4.5 million to 500,000, but the Chinese navy has very little sealift capability, and the Chinese air force would have a hard time holding its own against the much smaller Taiwan force.

This concludes my assessment of present Chinese military capabilities, leaving us with the question of Chinese military capabilities at the end of the decade. Clearly, the Chinese are making efforts to improve their military capabilities. I believe, however, that the prognosis is not very good. There are a number of reasons for this.

First, military modernization occupies fourth and last place in the PRC's Four Modernizations' program. Second, there have been marked cutbacks on the Chinese military budget since that program was announced. Third, there are a number of factors within the military and in its relationships with the Government and with the people that inhibit progress.

First, there are disagreements between the military and the civilian leadership on basic decisions affecting military modernization. There are a number of debates centering on the proper size of the PLA's budget, and on what items it should be spent. Much disagreement also exists on the question of whether to reinstitute ranks in the PLA. They were abolished in 1965.

Second, there are tensions between the Chinese military and the Chinese civilian population. You probably remember seeing newspaper articles in late 1979 reporting a demonstration by several thousand university students in order to get the military to leave the campus. A number of variations on this incident have occurred recently.

Third, there is a lack of consensus within the Chinese army on how to structure the defense modernization process. There are a number of facets that fit in here. One example concerns the annoyance among certain segments of the military on how to treat the legacy of Mao Zedong, and, in particular, on which of his military principles are applicable to modern-day warfare.

I believe when you examine these factors carefully, you will see that although the Chinese leadership is making real efforts to deal with dissatisfaction in the military—the recent military exercises and parades being one example—the outlook is not good for a significant upgrading of Chinese military capabilities by the end of this decade. Indeed, unless the present leadership manages to move the PRC's economy out of its present difficulties, the gap between China's military capabilities and that of other states may actually widen.

I will leave the question of what we, the United States, might do to help the PRC out of this situation to other people whose topic more closely approximates that subject. However, some considerations, I think, ought to be pondered by this group. These would include, first of all, the possibility that United States transfers of defense-related weapons and technology would either genuinely upset the Soviet Union or else provide it with an excuse for aggressive action on the grounds that the Soviet Union has to react to this latest example of American warmongering.

A second consideration to ponder should the United States decide to give China substantial amounts of military aid is that, although this military aid is unlikely to change significantly the disparity between Chinese and Soviet military capabilities—current cost estimates for that run in the $41 to $53 billion range for weapons alone—this increased capability, although not really helping against the Soviet Union, might be used by China to upset regional power balances, such as against the ASEAN states, or Taiwan, or to settle by force the ownership of disputed oil-bearing lands on the continental shelf.

Third, we should consider the possibility of leadership instability within China. I applaud Professor Whiting for his October 25 letter to the New York Times. I do not think the Chinese leadership is presently very unstable, but it is a possibility well worth taking into consideration. A future leadership might well resent American military aid to China and criticize the present leadership on the grounds that it allowed itself to be used as a pawn in superpower machinations to the detriment of solving China's real problems of poverty and economic underdevelopment.

A subsequent leadership could well turn away from partnership with the United States or initiate other policies which would run counter to American interests, and of course at the extreme edge of probability, the United States can't rule out totally a rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union. That, of course, is an extreme possibility.

Fourth, we must consider the possibility that military aid to China is going to come at the expense of America's own defense needs. Given the constraints on China's financial situation, China's military procurement is bound to be at least partially subsidized by the United States, and this would add to the strain of financing the buildup of America's military capabilities at a time when, as we have noticed during the last couple of weeks, defense appropriations must compete with domestic social programs for priority.

Thank you.

[Ms. Dreyer's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JUNE TEUFEL DREYER*

I. SIZE AND STATUS OF FORCES

Consonant with its status as the world's most populous country, the People's Republic of China (PRC) maintains the world's largest armed force, estimated at 4.5 million persons. Collectively known as the People's Liberation Army (PLA), this force is divided into army, navy, and air forces. The overwhelming majority of its

*Prepared for presentation at the Workshop on China's Military Power and Its Implications for the United States jointly sponsored by the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate and the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., October 28–29, 1981.

members, 3.6 million, belong to the army, although China's 360,000-strong navy and 490,000 person air force rank third in size after those of the Soviet Union and the United States.[1] The PLA is backed by an armed militia estimated at between twelve and fifteen million.[2]

China's numerical superiority over potential adversaries must, however, be balanced against its technological weaknesses. Weapons are mainly copies of much older Soviet models. While some updating has been done, Chinese equipment is estimated at between 20 and 30 years behind the state-of-the-art.[3] The country's infrastructure remains weak, and its economy is fragile. China's ground forces are hampered by a lack of mobility, and much of the country's artillery is hauled by draft animals rather than being self-propelled. There is also a shortage of armor.[4]

The PRC's navy is mainly a coastal defense force. Its guided missile patrol boats, though large in numbers, are vulnerable to electronic countermeasures, and its submarines, to antisubmarine warfare. Chinese warships and submarines rarely venture beyond the PRC's territorial waters. The air force possesses large numbers of combat aircraft, although the obsolescent avionics with which most are equipped would make fighting at night or in poor weather conditions very difficult. Most navigation is visual.[5] Design problems have thus far plagued the development of aircraft capable of achieving supersonic speeds. The PRC's ground-based air defense system, despite considerable upgrading during the United States-Vietnam war, has serious weaknesses. The PLA air force has been judged relatively weaker during the 1970's than it was in the 1950's.[6]

The PRC possesses a modest nuclear capability. China successfully tested an ICBM, designated the CSS-X-4, in May 1980, though its deployment is believed to be several years in the future.[7] IRBMs were deployed in the mid-1970's, giving China the capability of striking targets throughout the Soviet Union and much of Asia. China is not capable of launching a successful first strike against the Soviet Union or the United States. Conversely, however, China's own missile sites are well-concealed, and an adversary is unlikely to succeed in a preemptive strike against China.[8]

II. PRESENT CAPABILITIES AGAINST LIKELY ADVERSARIES

A. The Soviet Union

As may be inferred from the above, the Chinese military as currently constituted is best suited to the defense of the PRC's own territory. In keeping with its insistence that China is a peace-loving country, the PRC media have spoken solely of defensive strategy. Since the Soviet Union is the only country capable of, and likely to consider, a large-scale invasion of the PRC, the following comments should be read with the U.S.S.R. as probable referent.

Official Chinese statements indicate that the military strategy of the late Chairman Mao, and specifically his concept of people's war, continue to be the cornerstone of Chinese doctrine. Although these statements do not elaborate to any great extent on the specific content of people's war, the classic components thereof include:

1. Mobilization of the entire population to resist enemy incursion.
2. Absence of a fixed line of battle, or of a sharp demarcation between front and rear areas.
3. Decentralization, including the building of base areas able to fight independently of one another.
4. Luring the enemy deep into Chinese territory.

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[1] A summary of the Chinese military system and its equipment may be found in The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance, 1980-1981," London, IISS, 1981, pp. 62-64, which appears in the appendix of this paper.

[2] The ordinary and basic categories of militia have been excluded from consideration since their military training is minimal. Estimates for all categories of the militia are highly speculative. See Dreyer, "Citizen Soldiers and Civil-Military Relations in China." Armed Forces and Society, Summer 1982 (forthcoming) for a fuller discussion of these points.

[3] Scott James, "PRC Military Electronic Systems Evaluated," Defense Electronics June 1980, p. 77.

[4] Harvey W. Nelsen, The Chinese Military System, 2nd edition, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1981, p. 66.

[5] Nelsen, p. 165; James, pp. 69-77.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Tunghsiang (Hong Kong) No. 22 July 16, 1980, in U.S. National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China, 1980, issue 145, page U1; hereafter cited as FBIS-CHI-80-145: U/1.

[8] Paul H. B. Godwin, "China's Defense Modernization," paper delivered at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Washington, D.C., August 29, 1980, p. 30.

5. A three-in-one fighting force combining field armies, regional armies, and militia.
6. Mobile warfare and active defense.
7. Guerrilla warfare.
8. Protracted warfare.
9. Precedence of people over weapons.

Although the value of people's war has been, and continues to be, stressed, the years since Deng Xiaoping's rehabilitation have seen considerable reinterpretation of its doctrines. These emendations are justified by arguing that "Mao Zedong's military thinking has not put an end to the truth, but has opened up the way to recognize the truth continuously." [9] Among the modifications made in order to adapt people's war to modern conditions is that of luring deep. One obvious difficulty in utilizing this strategy is that if a Soviet invasion occurs, a prime target thereof will be northeastern China, an exposed salient which contains many large cities, the nation's best developed road and railway grid, and an important part of the PRC's heavy industry. As stated by the president of the PLA's military academy, Xiao Ke, "To follow the method of 'luring the enemy in deep' used by the Red Army during the Jiangxi period and to apply it mechanically today would be absurd. At that time we occupied no cities and had no modern industry." [10]

Although Chinese main forces in all four military regions facing the U.S.S.R. are deployed considerable distances, ranging from 150 to 300 km, back from the border, border guards are expected to serve a trip-wire function. There is also believed to be extensive anti-tank ditching at likely points of Soviet entry to China. Rather than luring deep, Chinese strategy seems to aim at channelling Soviet troops to battlefields of the Chinese' own choosing.

A further modification involves substitution of positional warfare for mobile warfare under certain conditions. A recent article in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s theoretical journal Red Flag asserted that—

". . . during the first stage of a war, we should mainly use positional defensive warfare, with powerful support and coordination of mobile warfare in order to gradually consume and annihilate the enemy's strength." [11]

Plans have been made for the defense of certain key cities, with civilians and military admonished to turn them into "Stalingrads."

During the past few years, Chinese sources have stressed the need to improve training methods [12] in ways that would have been criticized as bourgeois only a short while ago. Particular attention has been paid to the theory of strategic offensive, and that of coordination of fighting among different types of arms and services.[13] The new PRC leadership also appears to have decided that the people's war tenet of precedence of people over weapons does not preclude the acquisition of more modern arms, explaining that "the world's best fighters should be equipped with the world's best weapons." This acquisition will be achieved through a combination of indigenous development and borrowed foreign technology.

In the present environment, the likelihood of a Soviet invasion of China seems remote. Circumstances that might conceivably provoke such an attack include:

1. The accession to power of a new Soviet leadership that is significantly more militant than the Brezhnev group.
2. Soviet perception that a United States-China alliance is becoming too powerful and constitutes a threat to the defense of the U.S.S.R.
3. Escalation from a Chinese confrontation with a Soviet client such as Vietnam.

Although none of these scenarios seems probable or imminent, the Chinese public position remains convinced of the likelihood of war.

The Chinese expect that an armed confrontation with the U.S.S.R. is likely to involve a surprise attack, heavy use of tanks, night fighting, and atomic, biological and chemical warfare (ABC). Planning has thus included measures to cope with these tactics, comprising not only regular army units but militia groups as well. ABC preparations are evidence that the Chinese do not exclude the possibility of tactical nuclear weapons being used by the Soviet Union. Extensive underground shelters were constructed in most major cities considered to be likely targets of

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[9] Song Shilun, "Mao Zedong's Military Thinking Is the Guide to Our Army's Victories," Red Flag (RF) August 16, 1981 in FBIS–CHI–81–180: K/22.
[10] Beijing Radio Station (BJRS) September 9, 1979 in FBIS–CHI–79–176: L/15.
[11] Song, p. K/21.
[12] BJRS January 2, 1980 in FBIS–CHI–80–5: R/3–R/4. See also William R. Heaton, Jr., "Professional Military Education in China: A Visit To The Military Academy of the People's Liberation Army," The China Quarterly March 1980, pp. 122–128.
[13] Song, p. K/22.

Soviet attack, but recently most have been abandoned as foolishly conceived and constituting inadequate protection against nuclear attack.[14]

Major problems the Soviet Union would face in carrying out a conventional attack on China include:

1. A manpower disparity. There are believed to be approximately 1.5 million PLA troops in the four military regions facing the Soviet Union, as against less than 500,000 Red Army troops in the four Soviet military districts bordering the PRC. The latter, with its much larger population, has many more potential recruits than the Soviet Union.

2. The Chinese advantage of fighting on familiar terrain and being supported by the local population.

3. An inadequate field logistical system which may necessitate long pauses for resupply before the offensive can resume.

4. Passage of lines: the command and control, fire support, and occupation of territory problems that occur when a decision is made to pull one division out of a line of combat and replace it with a second echelon division.

5. A paucity of lines of communication. This author believes that the vulnerability of the Trans-Siberian Railway to Chinese interdiction has been overestimated. There are relatively few places where the Trans-Sib runs close to the PRTC border, and to interdict it even there would require a major Chinese river-crossing operation. Particularly since most Chinese troops are deployed well behind the border, this would prove difficult to execute. If the PLA succeeded in sabotaging the route, highly skilled Soviet railway troops should be able to return the line to operation quickly.

Nontheless, the Trans-Sib has a finite capacity to resupply the Manchurian front. The completion of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) will improve Soviet resupply capabilities only marginally unless the capabilities of the two present north-south lines connecting BAM with the Trans-Sib are also improved.

As opposed to these difficulties, however, the Soviet troops will possess much more sophisticated weapons than the Chinese, and will have received better training in the use thereof. The U.S.S.R. is believed to have large quantities of prepositioned materiel stockpiled near the border to reduce the risk of supply problems, and would certainly further augment these stockpiles prior to launching an invasion.

Despite its technological weaknesses, a country the size of China would have a high capacity to resist an all-out attack aimed at conquering the entire country. This sort of attack is, however, virtually unthinkable. A Soviet conventional attack with the intent of "teaching China a lesson" would be a far more likely scenario. It is this author's opinion that, given this limited attack scenario, and unless the Soviet Union badly overextends its supply lines or makes some other major mistake, China will have a very difficult time defending itself.

Chinese troops will be fighting on difficult terrain and, given the PLA's relative lack of mobility, are also, like the Soviet Union, apt to face difficult supply problems. The defense of the northwest, including Xinjiang and Gansu provinces, will be nearly impossible. Xinjiang's sole rail line ends at the provincial capital, Urumqi, leaving areas to the north vulnerable. The province's road system is far from ideal, posing difficulties in moving troops and supplies. Interdiction of the northwestern rail net at its nexus in Lanzhou, capital of Gansu province would effectively sever the connection between northwest and northeast China, prevent Chinese forces in this area from reinforcing the defense of the more important northeast, and deny the Chinese the use of strategically valuable facilities within the area. These include the Chinese nuclear testing site at Lop Nor in Xinjiang, and a missile test site, oil fields, and a petroleum refinery in Gansu.

Manchuria is, like Xinjiang, and exposed salient and here, as in the northwest, the PLA will lack a firm left flank for any position it may succeed in establishing. The Soviet Union will face a more difficult challenge here, since northeast China is more densely populated and possesses a far better infrastructure. Still, it is likely that the U.S.S.R. will capture all of Manchuria and possibly the Beijing-Tianjin area as well. PLA deputy minister of defense Su Yu's comments in an army day speech in 1977 praising the wisdom of the CCP's 1947 decision to surrender its capital to

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[14] See e.g. Hsin Wan Pao (Hong Kong) July 4, 1980 in NTIS, Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) 76092, July 28, 1980, p. 49, in which it is stated that:

"While 'digging tunnels deep' during the Cultural Revolution, China wasted a lot of money and manpower on certain 'tunnels' and some people were even killed. A lot of rubbish was produced with no actual military defensive use and in particular of no use in an antinuclear role. All this was a grievous waste of time. The underground works at Yuexiushi in Guangzhou have now been turned into an 'underground restaurant' and people with patriotic feelings who drink beer in there find the taste more bitter than herb tea."

Goumindang forces[15] may have been intended to prepare public opinion for this eventuality.

Once having made the decision to invade China, should the Soviet Union find itself facing difficulties in carrying out the conflict by conventional means, it is unlikely that the U.S.S.R. would shrink from employing ABC techniques. The limited preparation China has made against these sorts of attack would almost certainly prove inadequate.

If attacking forces withdrew after administering such punishment to China, this author believes that China would probably not continue conflict with the U.S.S.R. Indeed, it would probably not be able to do so. Although some proportion of the population of the PRC would certainly survive a Soviet attack, either conventional or nuclear, the question becomes less one of sheer survival than one of determining at what level the PRC as a nation could continue to function. Certainly China's ability to mount any meaningful counterattack would have been destroyed. A Soviet attack that destroyed the ecology of China's three largest river basins, which constitute the country's agricultural heartland, could cripple the PRC for many centuries.

Should the Soviet Union attempt to hold significant amounts of territory along the Sino-Soviet border, the PRC would probably mount harrassement operations and guerrilla warfare. This may not be true if the amounts of land involved are fairly small and if the Chinese capacity to mount a counter-attack has been greatly reduced by the Soviet invasion. As a case in point, late in 1978 the PRC revealed that the Soviets had been allowed to occupy 2,800 kilometers of Xinjiang since 1972,[16] with no obvious Chinese attempts at retaliation.

In short, China's capabilities against a Soviet attack, either conventional or nuclear, are not impressive. The PRC has, however, taken those steps which are within its means to ensure that an invasion will be made as expensive as possible for the Soviet Union.

B. Vietnam

The PRC's military capabilities against Vietnam are best seen in its February 1979 invasion of that country.[17] China's "self-defense counterattack" against its southern neighbor was conceived as a lightning war similar to that carried out against India in 1962. Political objectives included:

1. Punishing the Vietnam Government for its alleged mistreatment of the country's Hoa (Chinese) minority.
2. Relieving pressure on the PRC's Khmer Rouge ally by forcing Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Kampuchea in order to defend Vietnam itself.
3. Proving that China was not bluffing in its threats against Vietnam.
4. Demonstrating that Vietnam's protector, the Soviet Union, was an unreliable ally.

Military objectives included the destruction of Vietnamese gun emplacements and installations that might conceivably be used against China, and to test the PLA, whose combat capabilities have remained essentially unused since the above mentioned war with India in 1962.

China's attack did indeed punish Vietnam, although the PRC itself absorbed considerable punishment in the process. While demonstrating to the world that China intended to back up its threats, China did not thereby enhance its world image. The attack had a cooling effect on Sino-Japanese relations, and revived many smaller Asian powers' fears of Chinese invasion. It also caused considerable embarrassment in Washington, where the Sino-United States normalization agreement had just been formalized. The fact that Deng Xiaoping had been in the United States only a few days before the attack began seemed to lend credence to Soviet allegations that the United States and China had colluded in the invasion. China's attack did not relieve pressure on the Khmer Rouge. And Chinese claims that they had "touched the [Soviet Union's] behind" with impunity notwithstanding, the evidence indicates otherwise. The Soviet Union's value as an ally of Vietnam was not seriously called into question, since the Vietnamese handled the PLA adequately by themselves. The U.S.S.R. provided some aid to Vietnam, while exercising restraint in not attacking China, thus arguably enhancing its world image. And the Chinese attack unequivocally strengthened Vietnam's ties with the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. now enjoys increased access to naval and air facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang, which will make future Chinese forays against Vietnam more

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[15] Sy Yu, "Great Victory For Chairman Mao's Guideline On War," People's Daily August 6, 1977 in FBIS-CHI-77-152: E/20.

[16] Agence France Presse (AFP) Urumqi, October 10, 1978, in FBIS-CHI-78-197: A/7-A/8.

[17] Summaries of this invasion and its political, military, and diplomatic ramifications may be found in Harlan Jencks, "China's Punitive War" Asian Survey August 1979 and William Tow, "Chinese Strategic Thought: Evolution Toward Reality" Asian Affairs March-April 1980.

difficult. Moreover, the expense of the expedition adversely affected China's economic development plans.

These mixed results to China's political objectives mirror the military situation. The Chinese succeeded in destroying Vietnamese border installations and captured five provincial capitals. The last of these to fall, Lang Son, controls access to the economically and strategically important Red River delta, and had been heavily fortified. Nonetheless, these objectives were attained with greater difficulty and higher casualties than anticipated. Although each side claimed to have inflicted far higher casualties than admitted by the other, a report prepared for high-ranking Chinese leaders at the end of the incursion allegedly said that Chinese and Vietnamese losses had been approximately equal, and that the PLA had not been able to fight a modern war.[18] Although the Vietnamese were outnumbered and were mainly border troops and militia rather than main force units, their performance impressed observers. The PLA's performance, however, revealed some serious problems in firepower and command, control, and communications. As pointed out by Harlan Jencks, the PLA failed to establish control in the areas between their main lines of advance, allowing Vietnamese troops to attack inside China during their advance.[19] In addition, logistical support limitations alone would probably have prevented the PLA from advancing further into Vietnam.[20]

Although publicly claiming a stunning victory, Chinese leaders are well aware of the deficiencies in the PLA's performance. Deng Xiaoping, in a major report dealing with the conflict, allegedly gave a favorable assessment of its political and diplomatic aspects, while admitting that "the actual military side of the operation had not gone so well."[21] And Yang Dezhi, then deputy commander of the Vietnam campaign and subequently promoted to chief of the PLA's general staff, is quoted as saying—

"This battle has brought up a number of new questions for our military, political and logistical work, and also provided us with new experiences. All of these will have a profound influence on the revolutionization and modernization of our army."[22]

One cannot necessarily conclude that the PLA's performance against Vietnam at present would be the same as that of February 1979. Presumably the Chinese have carefully studied the lessons of Vietnam and have taken precautions against making similar mistakes in the future. Yet Vietnam has done so as well. Vietnamese troop levels on the border have been increased, as have their training activities. Main force units now augment border guards and militia contingents. The installations destroyed by China have been replaced by better and more numerous facilities. Overall, this author believes that the balance of strength between the two sides has not changed greatly over the past two and one-half years.

C. Taiwan

Though having the advantage of overwhelming numbers in any confrontation with Taiwan, PRC leaders must surely worry that to storm Taiwan by force would belie its claims to wish to satisfy the heartfelt wishes of Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits to return to the bosom of the ancestral land. Taiwan deploys more modern weaponry than does the PRC, and its troops receive far better training. The PRC does not at present have the necessary sealift capacity to transport large numbers of troops to Taiwan quickly, and its air force would have a difficult time against the smaller but more modern ROC force.[23]

D. India

Following its devastating defeat by China in 1962, India instituted major reforms in its defense programs. Although its armed forces are far smaller than those of the PRC, India deploys more advanced weapons systems and equipment. Indian defense industries import foreign technologies under license, and they manufacture military equipment superior to that presently produced in China.[24] The PLA's air force is considered inferior to that of India, although it has the advantage of larger numbers of planes.[25] China's logistical system is also inferior to that of India. By contrast,

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[18] Cited by John Fraser, Christian Science Monitor March 7, 1979, p. 12.
[19] Jencks, p. 813.
[20] *Ibid*, p. 809.
[21] Reuter (London) March 20, 1979 in FBIS-CHI-79-55: L/1.
[22] BJRS May 16, 1979, in FBIS-CHI-79-97: Q/2.
[23] Nelsen, p. 166.
[24] Godwin, p. 36; Onkar Marwah, "India's Military Power and Policy," in Onkar Marwah and Jonathan D. Pollack, eds., Military Power and Policy in Asian States, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1980, pp. 101-146.
[25] Nelsen, p. 166.

however, China's nuclear weapons and delivery systems are judged far superior to India's.

India thus appears to have a slight edge over China in a conventional confrontation, though lagging considerably behind the PRC in nuclear capabilities.

E. Others

It is certainly within the military capabilities of the PRC to seize the five Vietnamese-held islands in the Spratly group which both Hanoi and Beijing claim, and which are chiefly valuable for their oil.[26] The PRC would, however, have to carefully weigh the gains accruing from this seizure against possible Vietnamese and Soviet retaliatory moves. Similarly, seizure of the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Islands would have adverse consequences for relations with Japan, whose technology and trade are much desired by the PRC.

China should have little difficulty in besting any Southeast Asian nation on its borders save for Vietnam. This would, however, be more difficult in the case of Thailand than that of Burma.

III. CHINA'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES AT THE END OF THE DECADE

A. Present Difficulties in Defense Modernization

To predict military capabilities at any point in the future necessitates making assumptions as to leadership stability and continuity of policies, the overall state of China's economy, and the priority given to defense within the nation's budget. All, of course, are subject to sudden and unexpected change, with concomitant damage to one's predictions. Bearing this caveat in mind, however, there exist certain constraints within which any Chinese leadership must operate, and certain practical limits within which the Chinese economy and the PRC's defense budget may be expected to function. Moreover, since the organizational and technological changes that determine a nation's military capabilities typically take many years to implement, a look at these plans may yield insights not so much into what these capabilities may be, but to point to what they will probably not be.

The PLA's modernization process is presently inhibited by a number of factors, which may for the sake of convenience be roughly divided into three categories:

1. Disagreements between the military and China's leadership on basic decisions affecting military modernization.
2. Tensions between the PRC military and its civilian population.
3. Lack of consensus within the army on how to structure the defense modernization process.

1. Disagreements between the military and civilian leadership

The most important problem between China's military and its governing elite is financial. It is also apt to prove the most enduring constraint on China's military modernization, Defense was originally given third priority when the PRC announced its Four Modernizations program in 1978. It was soon downgraded to fourth and last place, presumably as the result of a decision that the modernization of defense must depend upon the overall modernization of the economy. When attempts to implement the ambitious plans of the Four Modernizations caused economic imbalances, inflationary pressures, and large deficits in the PRC's budget, China's leadership embarked on a program of readjustment, which at this writing has been extended to 5 years. This retrenchment involves a good deal of budget-cutting, with consequent adverse effects on the modernization of defense.

It is difficult to determine exactly what the Chinese military budget is, since many items intended for military use are known to be disguised under other categories of the budget. Publicly-released figures are, however, indicative of general trends. In 1979, the PRC's military budget was augmented by US $2.1 billion, to US $12.64 billion. This 20 percent increase largely reflected the costs of the war with Vietnam.[27] The 1980 budget was cut by approximately 13 percent, and the original 1981 budget, as proposed in August 1980, called for further reductions. Commenting on the reduction of 2.94 billion yuan (nearly US $2 billion), chief of the general staff Yang Dezhi and ranking member of the CCP's Military Commission Xu Shiyou pleaded for the understanding of army personnel in such a manner as to convince Western analysts that there was substantial PLA discontent over the budget cuts.[28]

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[26] David Jenkins, "Trouble Over Oil and Waters," Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) August 7, 1981, p. 26.

[27] The New York Times (NYT) June 30, 1979, p. 5.

[28] BJRS September 1, 1980 in FBIS-CHI-80-171: L/29.

Subsequently, in March 1981, the State Planning Commission announced a further, unspecified, cut in defense spending.[29]

These cuts are expected to fall more heavily on personnel than on weapons allocations, although the latter will be curtailed as well. An August 1981 new release noted that budgetary restrictions will "temporarily affect" China's efforts to build warships,[30] and the PRC's ability to purchase arms from the West will of course be further restricted.

In addition, the austerity in that part of the military budget devoted to personnel costs has also had adverse repercussions on the morale of the PLA. Military personnel have been upset by such matters as the poor condition of their barracks and diet, and by curtailment of certain privileges traditionally extended to their dependents. Some of the latter category of cuts have apparently resulted in real hardships for the families involved. Since little money is available for the manufacture of new weapons, or for inspecting and repairing weapons in present use, soldiers must sometimes make do with substandard equipment that is apt to malfunction.[31] Many PLA personnel demobilized recently in an effort to create a younger, more cost-efficient military force find themselves unemployed and are angry. One thousand such disgruntled servicemen reportedly demonstrated on Hainan Island this past winter, demanding jobs.[32] And the 1981 draft has, for the first time, announced problems in obtaining high-quality recruits.[33]

Apart from PLA dissatisfaction over its share of the budget, there are serious tensions between the military and political leadership over such issues as the treatment of Mao Zedong's legacy, the implementation of new economic policies, and the fate of military personnel who were associated with the late defense minister Lin Biao. Broadly referred to as "leftism within the army," these problems have received a good deal of media attention over the past several years. A meeting of military cadres of the Nanjing Military Region was told that the "main trouble of a considerable number of cadres" stemmed from "their erroneous concept that to emancipate their minds means to chop off Chairman Mao's banner."[34] And military cadres attending a similar meeting held three weeks later were told—

". . . We could be defeated in battle if we cherished and retained outmoded concepts . . . we should apply Chairman Mao's thinking in a flexible way, emancipate our thinking, dare to break away from old conventions, study the new situation, and solve new problems."[35]

There is also considerable sentiment within the military against economic policies which are regarded as insufficiently socialistic, such as the systems of linking production output with distribution of income, and of setting production quotas on a group or household basis.[36] The government's decision to try five elderly high-ranking soldiers who were purged at the time Lin Biao fell from power along with the notorious Gang of Four seemed to many military people to be a further insult to the PLA.[37] It also sparked rumors of a possible massive purge involving the estimated two-fifths of today's PLA who are alleged to have fallen under Lin Biao's influence. This group is thought to include several high-ranking military leaders who were promoted during the years of the Cultural Revolution.[38] And anger at Deng Xiaoping's efforts to remove Hua Guofeng as Party chairman reportedly caused a PLA unit located in the Beijing Military Region to plan a rebellion. Though actual rebellion was prevented, fears that this may prove the precursor of other PLA moves against the government persist.[39]

2. Tensions between the military and the civilian population

While tensions between military and civilians are not as important a hindrance to the modernization of the PLA as many of the other issues dealt with above, they have markedly tarnished popular support for the fighting forces of a country that believes "the army is the fish and the people are the water" and its corollary, that without the support of the water the fish could not continue to exist. To many civilians, it seemed that the military had garnered excessive privileges.

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[29] Frost and Sullivan, "World Political Risk Forecasts" New York, August 1981, p. G 2-1.
[30] Wen Wei Pao (Hong Kong) August 6, 1981, in FBIS-CH-81-154: W/5.
[31] The Soviet-sponsored clandestine Ba Yi (meaning August 1, Army Day) Radio has charged that use of such substandard equipment has led to malfunctions causing increased numbers of death and injuries. Ba Yi Radio April 13, 1981 in JPRS 77925 April 24, 1981, p. 48.
[32] Koyodo (Tokyo February 20, 1981 in FBIS-CHI-81-34: L/3.
[33] See, e.g. Changsha Radio Station September 23, September 1981 in FBIS-CHI-81-186: P/2.
[34] Nanjing Radio Station (NJRS) August 30, 1979 in FBIS-CHI-79-175: 0/16.
[35] NJRS September 19, 1979 in FBIS-CHI-79-185: 0/1.
[36] Tunghsiang (Hong Kong) No. 31 April 16, 1981 in FBIS–CHI–81–75: W/2.
[37] "In Retreat," The Economist (London) December 13–19, 1980, p. 34.
[38] Kyodo (Tokyo) February 20, 1981 in FBIS–CHI–81–34: L/3.
[39] Ming Pao (Hong Kong) April 10, 1981 in FBIS–CHI–81–71: W5/6.

The PLA's privileged position is to a significant degree the result of the Cultural Revolution. The army proved the only force capable of restoring order during that chaotic period, and emerged from Cultural Revolution in a stronger position within Chinese society. PLA units were, for example, ordered into factories and schools to quell factional fighting, and in some cases never vacated the premises. Given China's chronic housing shortage, this did not endear them to civilians who were dispossessed in the process. The army's power over civilians was further increased during the brief period of democratization introduced by Deng Xiaoping in late 1978. When excessive exercise of the privileges accorded therein led to breakdowns in social order that local public security forces and militia were unable to cope with, army troops were ordered to patrol the major cities of China. They were thus resented by those who sought to make use of newly-granted rights and, when the almost inevitable instances of excesses of PLA authority occurred, by the population at large as well.[40]

Resentment took many forms, from the literary to the violent. Poetry criticized corruption and extravagance within the PLA elite, and a controversial Shanghai play portrayed the evils of excessive military privilege.[41] In Beijing, over 2,000 students shouting "down with militarism" protested the army's refusal to end its decade-long occupation of several campus buildings.[42] In Guangzhou, the army was persuaded to vacate premises it had taken over 15 years before, and that had been claimed by the provincial People's Congress.[43]

For its part, the army cannot have been happy to abandon its accustomed quarters, particularly since equivalent alternative facilities are unlikely to be available. The military's perception of its relationship to the civilian population is surely not enhanced by the knowledge that, for the past several years, many PLA factories have been turning out goods for the civilian sector.[44] Other resentments seem closer to the surface. For example, PLA construction and engineering corps that have been ordered to construct buildings for civilian use have had to be prodded to complete the tasks.[45] And, perhaps more importantly, the fact that PLA factories and construction and engineering corps are devoting their energies to serving civilian needs means that they are doing little to enhance the PLA's future military capabilities.

3. Lack of consensus within the military on how to structure the defense modernization process

While the majority of the PLA appears to accept the need for modernization of both strategic doctrine and weapons technology, substantial disagreements exist on how best to accomplish these goals. One of the clearest indications of dissensus to become public recently concerns the desirability of reinstituting military ranks, which were abolished in 1965. Yang Dezhi, chief of the PLA's general staff, declared in an August 1981 speech that—

". . . in order to strengthen the modernization program in the army, we are planning to reinstate a system of military ranks."[46]

The statement was broadcast in this form by the Chinese language transmission of the official Xinhua news agency, but deleted from an otherwise identical English language translation of Yang's speech that Xinhua broadcast a few hours later. It was also omitted from a "corrected" Chinese version issued the next day.

Other disagreements are evident in perceptions of external threat and the concomitant allocation of resources to different geographical areas of China. A controversy on what priority the defense of the PRC's northwestern-most province of Xinjiang should command relative to that accorded coastal defense has continued for several years. Most recently it has been carried out in the form of allegorical articles purporting to deal with a superficially similar-sounding debate between 19th century officials Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang.[47] And, while most PLA commanders can agree on the need to adapt Mao Zedong's military strength to modern conditions, there exist many differences on which particular concepts should be modified and in what ways they should be changed. For example, some military leaders doubt the wisdom of replacing the strategy of luring enemies deep

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[40] See Dreyer, "Limits of the Permissible in China," Problems of Communism November-December 1980, pp. 48-65 for a description of these events.

[41] "The Heroes' Last Stand" FEER April 17, 1981, p. 18.

[42] Fox Butterfield, "2000 Students in Beijing Protest Army's Use of Campus" NYT October 11, 1979, p. A-2.

[43] Guangzhou Radio Station July 31, 1981 in FBIS-CHI-81-150: P/1.

[44] See, e.g. BJRS July 30, 1979 in FBIS-CHI-79-149: L/2 and BJRS March 31, 1981 in FBIS-CHI-81-63: K/15.

[45] BJRS August 9, 1981 in FBIS-CHI-81-153: K/6-7.

[46] BJRS August 21, 1981 in FBIS-CHI-81-166: U/1-2.

[47] See, e.g,. Guangming Ribao (Beijing) February 10, 1981, in FBIS-CHI-81-43:L/3-7.

into China with one involving a more forward defense, fearing that PLA troops will be surrounded and destroyed.

Apart from the issues cited above, difference of opinion may be expected to exist on a wide spectrum of other military options. As enumerated by Godwin, these include command, control and communications (C^3) equipment, target acquisition and fire control systems, strategic and tactical reconnaissance systems, anti-ABC systems, logistical support and mobility, and the entire range of modern battlefield support systems.[48] Such differences can, of course, be resolved. But in the present Chinese environment, resolution is likely to prove difficult, long-term, and accompanied by complex factional fighting. All are conducive to slowing down the process of military modernization.

B. Attempts To Resolve Problems Inhibiting Military Modernization

China's leaders are well aware of the problems facing the PLA and the military modernization process, and have sought to deal with them in a variety of ways. In an apparent attempt to strengthen central leadership and reduce tendencies toward regional military independence, Deng Xiaoping transferred the commanders of nine of China's eleven military regions during late 1979 and early 1980, and engineered a series of other changes in the upper echelons of the PLA as well. Deng also succeeded in having his personal choice, Geng Biao, appointed minister of defense, although opposition from within the PLA apparently delayed the appointment by a full 6 months.[49] Meanwhile, newspaper articles and discussion sessions enjoined the military to " . . . avoid endless quibbling over matters of the past . . . observe discipline, and consciously defend the Party's unity "[50]

During the summer of 1981, the PLA's General Political Department issued a 14-point document designed to improve relationships between the military, the government, and civilians. Among its strictures were directives forbidding the military to construct unauthorized buildings, and admonishing PLA personnel on guard duty to be polite to civilians.[51] The need for better relations between the army and the people formed a major focus of Army Day speeches this August 1st, whereas traditionally the theme of army-civilian ties has been emphasized only at the time of the spring festival.

Other measures were aimed at softening the army leadership's reputation for arrogance. In a ritual show of humility, army leaders were publicized doing hard physical labor "in an effort to perform good services for the people."[52] Commanders have also been ordered to take public trains or car pool to their meetings rather than, as in the past, forming majestic convoys with one officer per military vehicle.[53]

At the other end of the military hierarchy, efforts are being made to alleviate some of the difficulties facing the rank-and-file. In several instances, measures have been taken to improve the worst of longstanding problems among certain units, including such basic issues as improperly constructed barracks, the lack of fresh drinking water, and inadequate food supplies.[54] Plans have also been announced to transport demobilized soldiers and, where possible, new recruits, via passenger train rather than in boxcars as had been the case heretofore.[55] And at least one area has instituted courses to prepare demobilized army cadres for jobs in civilian life.[56]

In a further move to improve military morale, large parades were held in honor of Army Day, the first of their kind since, 1959.[57] During the following month, military exercises, said to be the largest held since the founding of the PRC, were conducted near Beijing. Heavily publicized and lavishly praised by the media, they were reviewed by virtually all of the PRC's top party, government, and military leaders.[58] An accompanying article in the official army newspaper stressed that " . . . the army must be regularized in order to be modernized,"[59] and, for the first time, army, navy, and air force units were identified separately rather than collectively referred to as the PLA.[60]

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[48] Godwin, p. 2.
[49] Tunghsiang (Hong Kong) No. 31 April 16, 1981 in FBIS–CHI–81–75: W/3.
[50] Banyue Tan (Beijing) No. 15 August 10, 1981 in FBIS–CHI–81–165: K/20.
[51] BJRS August 2, 1981 in FBIS–CHI–81–149: K/2.
[52] BJRS September 30, 1981 in FBIS–CHI–81–190: K/8.
[53] BJRS September 21, 1981 in FBIS–CHI–81–186: S/4–5.
[54] BJRS September 16, 1981 in FBIS–CHI–81–181: Q/1–2.
[55] BJRS September 25, 1981 in FBIS–CHI–81–187: K/17.
[56] Hefei Radio Station August 16, 1981 in FBIS–CHI–81–153: O/1.
[57] Xinhua (Beijing) English, August 1, 1981 in FBIS–CHI–81–148: K/1.
[58] Except, apparently, Marshal Ye Jianying, whose opposition to Deng's reforms seems implicable. See the guestlist announced by BJRS September 26, 1981 in FBIS–CHI–81–187: K/1–10.
[59] Quoted in Ibid, K/2.
[60] I am indebted to Professor Paul Godwin of the Air War College for this insight.

C. CONCLUSIONS

China's leaders have devised these and other well-conceived schemes to reduce dissension, create harmony, and alleviate problems to the maximum degree possible given minimal available funds. However, their effect on actual battlefield performance is apt to be marginal, and it is unlikely that there will be a significant improvement of the PRC's military capabilities before the end of the decade. One analyst, writing in the winter of 1979–80, before the magnitude of the military budget cuts became obvious, stated that, even with substantial Western help, the chances were not good that weapons systems and defense technologies could be incorporated soon enough to meet the PRC's pressing security needs. He predicted that it could be the late 1980's or even beyond before the technology of the early mid-1970's could be adequately introduced into the Chinese armed forces. Even assuming that it is, since the potential for xenophobic backlash is always present, "the qualitative gaps between indigenous output and the state-of-the-art will remain at least ten years."[61]

The array of problems facing military modernization has become greater since this best-case scenario was written. Although some improvement in the PLA's training methods and technical proficiencies should result from the palliative measures discussed above, it is entirely likely that the gap between Chinese military capabilities and those of the Soviet Union will widen rather than narrow by the end of the decade. Much will depend on the leadership's ability to achieve levels of economic growth high enough to enable a gradual rise in civilian living standards while expanding China's industrial base and easing the pressure on the PRC's military budget. Given such factors as the population-land ratio, the less-than enthusiastic mood of the population, and the existence of considerable disagreement within the leadership on how to proceed, it seems unlikely that China can succeed in achieving high enough economic growth rates to permit an escape from this impasse in military modernization.

What role the United States might play in helping the PRC out of this situation is beyond the scope of this paper. But some considerations to ponder might be—

1. The possibility that United States transfers of defense-related weapons and technology will either genuinely upset the Soviet Union or provide the U.S.S.R. with an excuse for aggressive action on grounds that it must respond with a countermove to this latest example of American warmongering.

2. The possibility that such American aid, though unlikely to significantly change the disparity between Chinese and Soviet military capabilities—for which current cost estimates fall in the U.S. $41–53 billion range for weapons alone—might be used by China to upset regional power balances. The PRC could employ its newly strengthened military capabilities against ASEAN states or Taiwan, or to settle by force the ownership of disputed oil-bearing areas on the continental shelf.

3. The possibility of leadership instability in the PRC. A future leadership might well resent American military aid to China, criticizing the present leadership for having allowed the PRC to be used as a pawn in its superpower machinations to the detriment of solving China's much more important problems of poverty and underdevelopment. A new leadership might also turn away from the partnership with the United States, or initiate other policy changes that could run counter to American interests. At the extreme range of possibility, the United States cannot with confidence rule out a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China.

4. The possibility that military aid to China will come at the expense of America's own defense needs. Given the constraints of the PRC's financial situation, China's military procurement is bound to be at least partially subsidized by the United States. This will add to the strain of financing the buildup of America's military capabilities at a time when defense appropriations must compete with domestic social programs for priority.

APPENDIX

CHINA

Population: 1,024,890,000.

Military Service: [1] selective. Army 3 years, Air and Army technicians 4 years, Navy 5 years. (Technicians may volunteer for 15 years.)

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[61] David L. Shambaugh, "China's Defense Industries: Indigenous Development And Foreign Procurement," paper delivered at the Association for Asian Studies annual meeting, Washington, D.C., March 21, 1980, p. 49.

[1] The People's Liberation Army is one service; naval and air components are listed separately for purposes of comparison.

Total regular forces; 4,450,000 (including railway construction corps troops).
GNP and defence expenditure—see note on p. 64.

Strategic forces
Offensive

(a) *Second Artillery:*
ICBM: 4 CSS-3 (range 3,200-3,800 nm/6,000-7,000km) 1-3 MT.[2]
IRBM: 65-85 CSS-2 (range 2,500 km) 1-3 MT.
MRBM: Some 50 CSS-1 (range 1,800 km) 15 KT.
(b) *Aircraft:*
3 regts with 90 Tu-16 med bbrs.

Defensive

(a) Ballistic missle EW phased-array radar complex (West China).
(b) Air Force AD system, capable of limited defense of key urban and industrial areas, military installations and weapon complexes, with up to 4,000 naval and air force fighters, about 85 CSA-1 (SA-2) SAM and over 10,000 AA guns.
(c) A civil defense shelter and evacuation system exists in Beijing and other key cities.

Army: 3,600,000.

Main Forces (Field Army):
Some 35 armies, each normally of 3 divs; comprising: 11 armd divs.; 118 inf divs.; 40 field, anti-tank and AA arty divs.; 16 railway and construction engr divs. and 150 indep regts, under central control.
Local Forces (29 provinces, 2-3 divs each):
85 inf divs.
130 indep regts (incl Border Guard).
11,000 Sov IS-2 hy, T-34 and domestic Type 59 med, 600 Types 60/63 (PT-76) amph and Type 62 lt tks; 2,000 K-63, Types 55/56 (BTR-40/-152) APC; 16,000 76mm, 85mm, 100mm, 122mm, 130mm and 152mm guns/how, incl SU-76/-85/-100, Type-54 122mm, ISU-122 and SU-152 SP arty; *FROG*-type SSM; 32,000 60mm, 82mm, 120mm and 160mm mor; 3,500 40mm, 107mm, 132mm and 140mm RL; 57mm, 75mm, 82mm RCL; 76mm, 85mm, 100mm ATK guns; AT-3 *Sagger/Sagger*-type ATGW; Types 58/56 14.5mm, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm, 100mm AA guns.

Deployment

China is divided into 11 Military Regions (MR), in turn divided into 29 Military Districts (MD). Main Force (MF) divs are administered by MR, but may still be controlled centrally. Divs may be 'class A' (first line), 'class B' (with fewer tks and partly horse-drawn tpt) or 'class C' (with fewer tks, arty, eqpt and personnel). Local Force (LF) divs are class C.
Distribution of MF and LF divs, excluding arty and engrs, may be:
North-east: Shenyang MR (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning MD): 3 armd, 18 inf; 17 LF.[3]
North: Beijing MR (Hebei, Shanxi MD): 5 armd, 28 inf; 12 LF.
A new MD, Nei Monggol (Inner Mongolia), believed to be forming; allocation of forces from present MD unknown.
North-west: Lanzhou MR (Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi MD): 1 armd, 8 inf; 4 LF.[3]
West: Ürümqi MR (East, North and South Xinjiang MD): 6 inf; 8 LF.[3]
South-West: Chengdu MR (Sichuan, Xizang MD): 9 inf; 6 LF.[3]
South: Kunming MR (Guizhou, Yunnan MD): 6 inf; 5 LF. Guangzhou MR (Guangdong, Guanxi, Hainan, Hinan MD): 12 inf; 11 LF.[3]
Centre: Wuhan MR (Henan, Hubei MD): 11 inf, 3 AB (Air Force); 7 LF.
East: Jinan MR (Shandong MD): 1 armd, 8 inf; 3 LF. Nanjing MR (Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang MD): 1 armd, 6 inf; 6 LF. Fuzhou MR (Fujian, Jiangxi MD): 6 inf; 6 LF.

Navy: 360,000 incl 38,000 Naval Air Force and 38,000 Coast Defense Forces; 38 major surface combat ships, 97 attack subs.

1 *Han* SSN (a second is on trials).
1 G-class submarine with SLBM tubes.[4]
97 subs (74 R-, 21 W-class, 2 *Ming*).[5]

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[2] A new ICBM, the CSS-4, with an estimated range of 7,000nm (13,000 km) and a warhead of 5-10 MT, is believed to be in production.
[3] There are 2-3 divs worth of border tps in each of these MR.
[4] China is not known to have any missiles for this sub, which may be fitted with six tubes.
[5] Incl training vessels.

Source: "The Military Balance 1980-1981" International Institute For Strategic Studies, London, pp. 62-64.

12 destroyers with CSS-N-1 (*Styx*-type)/*Styx* SSM: 8 *Lüda* (*Kotlin*-type) (more building), 4 *Anshan* (ex-Sov *Gordy*).

17 frigates: 8 with CSS-N-1 SSM (3 *Kiang Hu*, 5 *Chieng Tu* (ex-Sov *Riga*)), 4 *Kiang Tung* with SAM, 5 *Kiang nan* (*Riga*-type).

9 patrol escorts (1 ex-Japanese, 2 ex-Br, 1 ex-Aus).

181 FAC(M) with *Styx*-type SSM: 91 *Hola/Osa*, 90 *Hoku/Komar*<.

21 large patrol craft: 20 *Kronshtadt*, 1 ex-US Type 173.

25 *hainan* FAC(P).

398 FAC(G): 15 *Shanghai* I, 350 *Shanghai* II, 6 *Hai Kou*, 25 *Swatow*<, 2 *Shantung* hydrofoils<.

225 FAC(T)<: 70 P-6, 130 *Hu Chwan*, 25 P-4 (40 more in reserve).

About 100 coastal and river patrol craft.

17 T-43 ocean minesweepers.

15 ex-US 511-1152 LST, 13 LSM, 16 inf landing ships, some 300 LCU, 150 LCM.

500 coast and river defence craft (most<).

Deployment and bases

North Sea Fleet: about 500 vessels (over half<); incl 2 sub sqns, deployed from the Yalu River to south of Lianyungang. Qingdao (HQ), Lüda, Lüshun, Huludao, Weihai, Chengshan.

East Sea Fleet: about 750 vessels (about 400<); deployed from south of Lianyungang to Dongshan with air, AD and coastal missile units. Ningbo (HQ), Zhoushan, Taohua Dao, Haimen, Wenzhou, Fuzhou.

South Sea Fleet: about 600 vessels (perhaps half<); deployed from Dongshan to the Vietnamese frontier with 1 sub sqn. Zhanjiang (HQ), Shantou, Guangzhou, Haikou, Yulin, Beihai.

Naval Air Force: 38,000; about 800 shore-based combat aircraft, organized in 3 bbr and 6 fighter divs. Incl about 150 B(Hong)-5 torpedo-carrying and ex-Sov Tu-2 lt bbrs; some 600 fighters, incl (F(Jian)-4/-6/-7, ex-Sov MiG-19 interceptors; F-6 recce and 20 ex-Sov Be-6 MR ac; 40 H(Zhi)-5 hel; some 60 lt tpt ac. Naval fighters are integrated into the AD system.

Air Force: 490,000, incl strategic forces and 220,000 AD personnel; some 5,200 combat ac.

10 Military Air Regions, HQ Beijing; organized into air divs, each with 3 regts of 3 sqns.

Med bbrs: 95 B(Hong)-6/Tu-16 *Badger*, a few ex-Sov Tu-4 *Bull*.

Lt bbrs: about 450 B-5, some 100 ex-Sov Tu-2.

FGA: about 500 F-2 and A(Qiang)-5 (F-6 bis).

Fighters: about 3,900 F(Jian)-4/-5/-6/-7, some F-12.

Recce: Some 130 F-6, B-5.

Tpts: Some 550 fixed-wing, incl some 300 Y(Yun)-5/An-2, about 100 ex-Sov (Li-2, 50 Il-14/-18, some An-12/-24/-26), 18 *Trident*, C-46. (These could be supplemented by about 500 ac from the Civil Aviation Administration, with about 150 large tpts.)

Hel: 350, incl H(Zhi)-5/-6, 13 *Super Frelon*.

Trainers: incl BT-5, BT-6, TF-2, TF-4, TF-6.

AAM: AA-2 *Atoll/Atoll*-type.

Airborne tps: 2 divs.

Para-Military Forces: There are two classes of Militia. The Basic Militia (ages 16-30) comprises men who have, or will have, military service, grouped in the Armed Militia; up to 5 million organized into about 75 cadre divisions and 2,000 regts. The Ordinary Militia (ages 17-48); several million, including the Urban Militia, receive some basic training but are generally unarmed. Some play a local AD role.

The Civilian Production and Construction Corps; some 4 million, organized into military-style units, serve in border areas.

Gross National Product and Defence Expenditure

Gross national product

There are no official Chinese figures for GNP or National Income. Western estimates have varied greatly, and it is difficult to choose from a range of figures, variously defined and calculated. The CIA has estimated GNP for 1977 to be $373 bn, while a recent British estimate for 1980 is $628 bn.

Defence expenditure

The official Chinese defence expenditure figure, released in 1979 for the first time, at 20,320 yuan ($12.9 bn) was 18 percent of planned government expenditure. This figure is not, however, comparable to Western defence estimates, since it excludes a number of items, notably pay and allowances for the troops. Chinese pricing practices are not known in detail, but they are certainly different from those in the

West. The official budget figure, then, may not reflect the opportunity costs of even those elements it does cover, which are principally weapons and equipment.

Estimating how much it would cost to produce and man the equivalent of the Chinese defence effort in the US is speculative. A figure of roughly 10 percent of GNP, or about $40.6 bn in 1978, is generally accepted in the West. This is not unreasonable when it is considered that the American defence budget, catering for more highly capital-intensive forces, only allocates 26 percent of its resources to procurement. If China's allocations were similarly distributed, her total defence budget would be nearly $50 bn. A recent British estimate for 1980 is $56.9 bn.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Dr. Dreyer.

Next we will hear from Mr. Sydney Jammes, of the Central Intelligence Agency.

STATEMENT OF SYDNEY H. JAMMES, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. JAMMES. China's defense modernization program, a two-decade effort aimed at improving the PLA and the defense industries, has far to go. The Chinese themselves have consistently described modernization of the PLA as a process of gradual force improvement based upon self-reliance that will require many years to accomplish.

In China, the term "force modernization" implies making fundamental institutional changes in the PLA and the military industrial base, instilling new thought patterns and skills in PLA commanders and troops, and finally, and eventually, introducing new weapons and equipment.

China's pursuit of military modernization in its present context springs from an extreme concern over Soviet military intentions in Asia. The Chinese have viewed with increasing anxiety the marked growth over the past decade in the Soviet Union's strategic and conventional military power, particularly in the forces along the Sino-Soviet border.

Despite such concerns, China evidently views the Soviet Union as a long-term threat rather than an immediate danger, and defense modernization probably will continue to hold the lowest priority of the four modernizations.

Civilian modernizers in leadership evidently have made a strong case that defense modernization cannot proceed far without broad progress in agriculture, industry, and scientific affairs. Accordingly, the Chinese themselves expect early results in the defense modernization program to be few and unspectacular, and they prefer to stress over the next 20 years the building of an industrial base that only eventually will enable China to produce a wide range of modern weapons.

Even at this stage of modernization, however, China has the full range of military forces befitting a major power, the largest standing army in the world, a small strategic nuclear strike force, a large coastal defense navy that is gradually acquiring open ocean capabilities, and large air and air defense forces.

These forces, as pointed out by the previous speaker, however, are severely handicapped by the obsolescence of China's technological and industrial base. On the other hand, China has significant demographic and geographic assets: A population larger than the combined populations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and a terrain that is extensive and to a large degree defensible.

The centerpiece of China's defense posture are the ground forces, most of which is infantry. Much of the ground force's equipment, tanks, field artillery, and so on, is based on Soviet technology and designs of the late fifties. However, while obsolete by United States and Soviet standards, this ground force equipment generally is rugged, reliable, and for the most part still effective on the battlefield.

Though the ground forces have much of the equipment needed for wartime operations, several key deficiencies exist, chiefly in the equipment for antitank and air defense operations. The ground forces also suffer from very serious problems in logistics. China's air force is the service least capable of successfully performing its mission. It consists largely of air defense fighters capable of making intercepts only in good weather during daylight hours. The air force suffers severe deficiencies in avionics, missile systems, and jet engines. Moreover, it is the most difficult service to modernize, because the needed technologies are currently beyond China's grasp and are extremely expensive.

The Chinese navy has some deficiencies, but could effectively perform its primary mission in defending China's coast. The navy, however, has deficiencies in air defense, antisubmarine warfare, and antiship missiles. Moreover, the navy lacks the ships for transporting equipment and providing fire support for large amphibious operations.

Finally, China has a small number of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, primarily bombers and ballistic missiles, that can cover most targets in the Far East.

China's attempts to modernize its armed forces face several severe restraints. The first of these are human restraints. The defense industries and the broader industrial base face a prospect of a rapidly dwindling supply of trained researchers and engineers. Many were educated in the West in the thirties and forties and returned to build a new China in the fifties.

In addition, there is a pool of Soviet-trained engineers from the fifties and sixties. This group, however, is not as skilled as China's Western-educated engineers and scientists, and it is too small to fill Beijing's requirements for technically trained manpower.

The cultural revolution period from 1966 to 1976 virtually destroyed the system of higher education, and few trained engineers or technicians emerged during this lost decade.

The Chinese Government is fully aware of the crisis it faces in training large numbers of new technicians. Until China has sufficient engineers and technicians trained in modern methods and conversant in modern technology, staffing for most major weapons programs will include older engineers lacking needed design and production skills. Still, China can mobilize enough technical talent for selected high priority projects, on such things as strategic weapons, aircraft, and in the navy.

Growing numbers of young students will enter the defense industries in the next few years as the current emphasis in science and technology in the colleges and universities throughout China bears fruit. Several thousand engineering and technical students are currently taking advanced training abroad, and they, too, will be available in a few years.

Economic restraints

The relatively low priority currently being given to military modernization reflects the present Chinese leaders' recognition that they must correct fundamental weaknesses in the pattern and rate of economic development before they can undertake dramatic upgrading of defense capabilities.

Technical restraints

The ability of the industrial infrastructure to support modern weapons development and manufacturing is uneven. China produces most of the materials and basic types of machinery required for its current weapons production effort, but improvement in its military manufacturing process will require acquisition of a variety of modern industrial technologies.

Military industry restraints

Severe problems are apparent throughout Chinese defense industry, from basic research to the maintenance of finished products. The most critical shortcomings are in the design of technology and in manufacturing know-how. These particular shortcomings are furthered by an array of other problems that affect production and quality control methods, standardization procedures, and instrumentation and equipment.

Many defense plants suffer from poor layout and inefficient use of labor, while the unpredictable ebb and flow in the supply of raw materials, components, and electric power often slows production.

Institutional restraints

Deficiencies in the PLA itself constitute another major constraint to military modernization. The forces are not well organized, trained, or equipped to receive large numbers of new weapons systems. The absence of a modern logistics organization calls into question the PLA's ability to obtain spare parts when needed or to maintain and repair advanced weapons systems.

Despite these restraints, though, there are a number of assets that the Chinese possess for modernization of their forces. First is leadership assets. Since early 1977, the party leadership has been increasingly committed to the twin policies of economic modernization and diplomatic opening to the West. The leaders have carefully but persistently removed or weakened leaders opposed to those policies and successfully eliminated much opposition.

Serious economic and political problems remain, however, and the new leaders are under considerable pressure to show results and sustain the momentum of the modernization program.

Foreign assistance assets

China has an excellent credit rating, and many foreign governments are willing to sell to Beijing or to provide hard currency loans. Since 1976 many foreign firms have launched intensive efforts to sell large quantities of finished goods and whole plants.

To avoid dependence on foreign suppliers, however, the Chinese have emphasized obtaining technology rather than end items, and in essence have made no major purchases of defense goods.

The next asset is a favorable PLA attitude. The PLA high command generally has been eager to get on with the defense modernization. Large numbers of officers who possess few military skills and who advanced to the upper levels during the Cultural Revolution have been removed since 1975. Although promotions are still dominated by patronage and the "old boy" network, the idea of making promotions more dependent upon demonstrated skills and readiness to implement modernization programs is gaining acceptance.

Now, there are hints, however, that all is not well within the ranks, and the cutbacks in the defense budget do not mean that the military is completely pacified or completely with the program.

Last, indigenous weapons development program. For all their weaknesses, China's weapons development organizations represent far more than a zero base for future progress. Despite the disruptions of the great leap forward, cutoff of Soviet aid, and the cultural revolution, China succeeded in developing nuclear weapons and strategic missiles in the decade before the fall of Lin Biao.

Since that time, the Chinese have added a number of conventional weapons systems. These achievements suggest that some development and production of new weapons and equipment will continue to take place well before the completion of the industrial modernization program.

In sum, China's defense modernization program is still in an early stage and faces many severe tests, but the program is off to a fairly good start. Many aspects of the program are already bearing fruit, and others are well under way. If China remains politically stable and systematically assimilates foreign technology, it can achieve and maintain a steady pace of military modernization.

For the near term, the PLA will continue to emphasize low cost measures such as improved training designed to get more out of existing forces and equipment, and introduce only a few new weapons into the inventory. Although the combination of better training and increased defense output should result in improved capabilities for the middle of this decade, the PLA still will suffer from serious material deficiencies resulting in large part from weaknesses in defense industries.

Problems in the aviation industry will continue to hamper improvements in the air force, although a few new fighters may enter service by 1985. Weaknesses in China's electronics industry will prevent the widescale introduction of new radars, sonars, and other electronic equipment. Tactical mobility and logistical support will continue to be hampered by shortages of vehicles and by limited capacity for repair and maintenance.

Although new ground force equipment such as air defense and antitank missiles will appear in limited numbers, their production will fall far short of PLA needs.

After the middle of this decade, progress in the overall economic modernization program could result in marked improvements in force capabilities as the defense industries become able to more nearly meet PLA requirements for weapons and equipment. Emphasis on the ground forces will continue, and the numbers of modern weapons in the ground force inventory could increase substantially.

Mobility will improve through greater numbers of wheeled vehicles and some tracked armored vehicles. China's fleet of fighter and transport aircraft will grow, and improved radars and more electronic equipment will be deployed. An improved logistics system probably will begin to appear in the late eighties.

China's defensive capabilities will be significantly improved in the following decade if political stability, economic growth, and scientific industrial modernization continue unobstructed. Even with steady improvement in forces and defense industries over the next 15 years, however, China will not develop an offensive capability against the U.S.S.R. largely because of that country's vastly superior industrial base.

With a population that is expected to reach 1.3 billion by 1995, China is unlikely to develop forces based on technology and will continue in large part to base its defensive policy upon the large manpower at their disposal.

Thank you.

[Mr. Jammes' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SYDNEY H. JAMMES*

China's defense modernization program, a two-decade effort aimed at improving the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the defense industries, has far to go. The effort arises from deep-rooted apprehension over Soviet military capabilities and from the leadership's desire to "move China into the front rank of nations" by the year 2000. It will be successful only if the nation enjoys prolonged political stability, retains access to foreign capital and technology, avoids costly foreign military campaigns, and moves forward in higher priority efforts to modernize agriculture, industry, and science and technology.

BACKGROUND

The Chinese consistently describe modernization of the PLA as a process of gradual force improvement based on self-reliance that will require many years to accomplish. In China the term "force modernization" implies making fundamental institutional changes in the PLA and the military industrial base, instilling new thought patterns and skills in PLA commanders and troops, and—eventually—introducing new weapons and equipment.

China's pursuit of military modernization—in its present context—springs from extreme concern over Soviet military intentions in Asia. The Chinese have viewed with increasing anxiety the marked growth over the past decade in the U.S.S.R.'s strategic and conventional military power, particularly the strengthening of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet frontier.

Despite such concerns, China evidently views the Soviet Union as a long-term threat rather than as an immediate danger, and defense modernization probably will continue to hold the lowest priority among the Four Modernizations. Civilian "modernizers" in leadership make a strong case that defense modernization cannot proceed far without broad progress in agricultural, industrial, and scientific affairs. Accordingly, the Chinese themselves expect early results to be few and unspectacular, and they prefer to stress over the next 20 years the building of an industrial base that only eventually will enable China to produce a wide range of modern weapons.

Strengths and weaknesses of the forces

China has the full range of military forces befitting a major power: the largest standing army in the world; a small strategic nuclear strike force; a large coastal-defense navy that is gradually acquiring open-ocean capabilities; and large air and air defense forces. Nevertheless, the military forces and defense establishment are severely handicapped by the obsolescense of China's technological and industrial

* Mr. Jammes is a senior analyst with the National Foreign Assessment Center of the CIA. This paper has been reviewed by the CIA's Publications Review Board to assist the author in avoiding the unauthorized disclosure of classified information; however, neither the review nor the author's affiliation with CIA either constitutes or implies CIA authentication of factual material or endorsement of the author's views.

base, which produces weapon systems roughly a generation behind those of modern Western and Soviet forces. On the other hand, China has significant demographic and geographic assets: a population larger than the combined populations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and a terrain that is extensive and defensible.

The centerpiece of China's defense posture is its 3.5 million-man ground forces, most of which are infantry. The ground forces are organized according to the "Three-in-One" principle,[1] which calls for a defense in depth to contain a conventional attack by a militarily superior enemy. Most of the PLA's tanks, field artillery, antiaircraft artillery, antitank guns, and other equipment is based upon Soviet technology and designs of the late 1950's. Although some PLA equipment is obsolete by United States and Soviet standards, the ground forces equipment (see table 1) generally is rugged, reliable, and still effective on the battlefield.

TABLE 1.—*China's armed forces*

	Number
Ground forces: 3,500,000 men:	
Tanks	7,000
Other armored vehicles	1,500
Major artillery pieces	14,000
Air and air defense forces: 450,000 men:	
Fighters	4,500
Bombers and ground attack aircraft	1,000
Surface-to-air missile sites	100
Navy: 350,000 men:	
Major surface combatants	25
Minor surface combatants	500–1,000
Submarines	100
Strategic missile forces: 100,000 to 200,000 men:	
ICBM's	(1)
MRBM's and IRBM's	100

[1] A few.

Though the ground forces have much of the equipment needed for wartime operations, several key deficiencies exist, chiefly in equipment for antitank and air defense operations. The ground forces also suffer from serious problems in logistics. Inadequate roads and motor transport slow the movement of troops to the battlefield, hamper their redeployment to counter breakthroughs, and limit the movement of ammunition and other supplies.

China's 6,000-plane air force is the service least capable of successfully performing its mission. It consists largely of air defense fighters capable of making intercepts only in good weather during daylight hours. The air force lacks advanced avionics, missile systems, and jet engines. Moreover, it is the most difficult service to modernize because needed technologies currently are beyond China's grasp and are extremely expensive.

The PLA navy has some deficiencies but could effectively perform its primary mission of defending China's coast. A sizable force of diesel attack submarines serves as a first line of defense against approaching hostile fleets. This is backed by a small but growing force of major surface combatants and numerous missile and torpedo boats. The navy is deficient in air defense, antisubmarine warfare, and antiship missiles. Moreover, the navy lacks ships for transporting tanks and for providing fire support for large amphibious operation.

Finally China has a small number of nuclear weapons and delivery systems--bomber aircraft and ballistic missiles—that can cover most targets in the Far East. The strategic missile force's deterrent value has been increased by concealment and dispersal in remote areas.

Problems and prospects for force modernization

Restraints to modernization

China's military modernization is constrained by numerous fiscal, organizational, and technical factors, which the Chinese usually identify openly for Western observers.

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[1] The "Three-in-One" principle specifies that Chinese forces will be organized into main forces (maneuver units), regional forces (units that usually man fixed defensive positions), and militia (armed civilians trained to augment the other forces and defend local areas). Regional forces would attempt to slow an enemy's advance and channel his movements into terrain favoring defense. Maneuver units would seek to mount major defensive operations at times and places of advantage and—when possible—to counterattack. The militia would provide intelligence, logistical support, and replacement personnel to main and regional forces.

Human restraints.—The defense industries—and the broader industrial base—face the prospect of a rapidly dwindling supply of trained researchers and engineers. Many were educated in France, Germany, or the United States during the 1930's and 1940's and returned to build a "new China" is the 1950's. They now are in their seventies and eighties and no longer able to carry the burden of research. A pool of 40,000 to 50,000 Soviet-trained engineers exists, most of whom were trained between 1950 and 1960. This group, however, is not as skilled as China's Western-educated engineers and is too small to fill Beijing's requirements for technically trained manpower. The Cultural Revolution period from 1966 and 1976 virtually destroyed the system of higher education, and few trained engineers or technicians emerged during this "Lost Decade."

The government is fully aware of the crisis it faces in training large numbers of new technicians. Until China has sufficient engineers and technicians trained in modern methods and conversant in modern technology, staffing for most major weapons programs will include older engineers lacking needed design and production skills. Still, China can mobilize enough technical talent for selected, high-priority projects in the strategic weapons, aircraft, and naval fields. Growing numbers of young students will begin to enter the defense industries in the next few years as the current emphasis on science and technology in the colleges and universities throughout China bears fruit. Several thousand engineering and technical students are currently taking advanced training abroad, and they too will be available in a few years.

Economic.—The relatively low priority currently being given to military modernization reflects the present Chinese leaders' recognition that they must correct fundamental weaknesses in the pattern and rate of economic development before they can undertake any dramatic upgrading of defense capabilities. The long-term average annual rate of growth of the Chinese gross national product is estimated to have been about 6 percent—a figure many other nations would envy. It, however, masks a host of economic problems that constitute an immense impediment to the modernization of the PLA. The impetus for growth has come primarily from industry (9 percent per year), while agricultural growth has lagged behind (growing at about 2 percent annually). If population also has grown at approximately 2 percent per year as is generally accepted, then the amount of food available per capita has not changed significantly during the past 20 years.

Technical restraints.—The ability of the industrial infrastructure to support modern weapons development and manufacture is uneven. China produces most of the materials and basic types of machinery required for its current weapons production effort, but improvement in its military manufacturing process will require the acquisition of a variety of modern industrial technologies. The problems tend to cluster in the areas of materials, tooling, and electronics.

Military industry restraints.—Severe problems are apparent throughout Chinese defense industry from basic research to the maintenance of finished products. The most critical shortcomings are in the design of technology and manufacturing know-how. These particular shortcomings are exacerbated by an array of other problems which afflict production and quality control methods, standardization procedures, and instrumentation and equipment. Many defense plants suffer from poor layout and inefficient use of labor, while the unpredictable ebb and flow in the supply of raw materials, components, and electric power often slows production.

Institutional restraints.—Deficiencies in the PLA itself constitute another major constraint to military modernization. The forces are not well organized, trained, or equipped to receive new weapons. The absence of a modern logistics organization calls into question the PLA's ability to obtain spare parts when needed or to maintain and repair advanced weapon systems.

Assets to modernization

Despite the many restraints to military modernization, several noteworthy factors favor the program: the leadership is committed to modernization, foreign assistance is available, and Beijing has avoided expensive military entanglements since the Vietnam incursion. If China maintains these advantages over the next decade, it may well develop the foundation needed for eventually introducing large quantities of modern equipment and armament into the PLA.

Leadership assets.—Since early 1977 the party leadership has been increasingly committed to the twin policies of economic modernization and diplomatic opening to the West. Leadership reformers under Deng Xiaoping have carefully but persistently removed or weakened leaders opposed to these policies and have successfully eliminated much opposition. Serious economic and political problems remain, however, and newly appointed government and party leaders are under considerable pressure to show results and sustain the momentum of the modernization program.

Foreign assistance assets.—China has an excellent credit rating, and many foreign governments are eager to sell to Beijing or to provide hard-currency loans. Between 1976 and 1979, many foreign industrial firms launched intensive efforts to sell large quantities of finished goods and whole plants. Despite strong Soviet pressure, the French and British Governments announced their readiness to sell arms to Beijing, and Chinese arms delegations found generally receptive audiences among arms manufacturers in Western Europe and the United States. To avoid dependence on foreign suppliers, however, the Chinese prefer to obtain technology rather than end-items. The leaders are also wary of undue dependence on foreign banks and other creditors.

By early 1979, China was conducting negotiations for arms technology with several West European governments; by the end of the year, however the negotiations had slowed considerably. The slowdown probably was caused by China's reassessment of economic needs rather than by any European reluctance to sell. Additionally, China's leaders have begun to appreciate the difficulty of absorbing advanced foreign technologies into their weak technical base and have decided that exhaustive study is required before major purchases are made. Noting the high cost of modern weapon systems, they also may be weighing their cost-effectiveness, since they know that no single new conventional weapon system whether foreign or domestically-produced will markedly change the Sino-Soviet military balance or significantly increase China's ability to defeat a Soviet attack.

Favorable PLA attitude.—The PLA high command generally has been eager to get on with defense modernization. Large numbers of officers who possessed few military skills and who advanced to the upper levels of the PLA during the Cultural Revolution have been removed since 1975. Although promotions are still dominated by patronage and the old-boy network, the idea of making promotions more dependent upon demonstrated skills and readiness to implement modernization programs is gaining acceptance.

There are hints, however, that all is not well within the ranks. PLA Political Commissar Wei Guoging said in a recent speech that officers and soldiers who do not agree with the current party line on modernization would be given a period to adjust their thinking. Objections could be raised through proper channels, Wei said, but there must be "no expression of opposition whatsoever in their actions."

There are several reasons for military grumbling about the modernization program. Despite the leaders' stated commitment to defense modernization over the long-term, the PLA budget has been cut twice since 1979. This year, in an attempt to help reduce the national deficit, the military allocation was reduced by 6.4 billion renminbi. Perhaps even more worrying to the top echelons of the military is the potential political fallout from the trial of the Gang of Four and the five former military leaders who had been followers of the late defense minister Lin Biao. Public denunciation of the five did little to enhance morale in the PLA. Finally, although the current military leadership and many of the younger officers are in favor of modernization, there is some reluctance to embrace the modernization program among older officers who learned their trade under a different environment and would be forced to learn new skills and modes of operation.

Indigenous weapons development programs.—In establishing China's defense industry during the 1950's, the Soviet Union withheld (intentionally it seems) the expertise and means to develop new systems. When the Chinese were left on their own, therefore, they had to limit their research and development efforts to a few major projects. These generally have included one or two models in each major type of weapon system (such as aircraft, missiles, and ships). The systems now being developed show a substantial technological improvement over those currently being produced, but they are still based on weapons technology levels achieved by the Soviet Union in the early 1960's. Progress in general has been slow, and many projects that were begun in the late 1960's are still under development.

Nevertheless, for all their weaknesses, China's weapons development organizations represent far more than a zero base for future progress. Despite the disruptions of the Great Leap Forward, the cutoff of Soviet aid, and the Cultural Revolution, China succeeded in developing nuclear weapons and strategic missiles in the decade before the fall of Lin Biao. Since that time the Chinese have added a number of conventional weapons. These achievements suggest that some development and production of new weapons and equipment will take place well before completion of the industrial modernization program.

The PLA of the future

Although China's defense modernization is still in an early stage and undoubtedly faces severe tests, the program is off to a good start. Many aspects of the program are already bearing fruit and others are well under way. If China remains politically stable and systematically assimilates foreign technology, it can achieve and

maintain a steady pace of military modernization. For the near term, the PLA will continue to emphasize low-cost measures—such as improved training—designed to get more out of existing forces and equipment and introduce only a few new weapons into the inventory.

Under these conditions, military leaders may demand some sort of compensation as they get a progressively smaller share of the pie. The present—and any future—national leaders need the support of the military in their modernization program, and consequently are likely to make some spectacular—although chiefly symbolic—additions to the military forces. An example—and only an example, not a forecast—might be the purchase of a few wings of British Harrier VSTOL fighters. These aircraft could serve to remind the Chinese and their neighbors of China's determination to improve its military forces, and add prestige to the PLA without substantially changing the overall allocation of resources to defense.

Although the combination of better training and increased defense output should result in improved capabilities by the middle of this decade, the PLA still will suffer from serious materiel deficiencies resulting in large part from weaknesses in the defense industries. Problems in the aviation industry will continue to hamper improvements in the air force, although a few new fighters may enter into service by 1985. Weaknesses in China's electronics industry will prevent the wide-scale introduction of new radars, sonars, and other electronic equipment. Tactical mobility and logistical support will continue to be hampered by shortages of vehicles and by limited capacity for repair and maintenance. And although new ground force equipment such as air defense and antitank missiles will appear in limited numbers, their production will fall far short of PLA needs.

After 1985, progress in the overall economic modernization program should result in marked improvements in force capabilities as the defense industries become able to more nearly meet PLA requirements for weapons and equipment. Emphasis on the ground forces will continue, and the numbers of modern weapons in the ground force inventory will increase substantially. Mobility will improve through greater numbers of wheeled vehicles and some tracked armored vehicles. China's fleet of fighter and transport aircraft will grow, and improved radars and more electronic equipment will be deployed. An improved logistics system probably will begin appearing by the late 1980's.

China's defensive capabilities will be significantly improved by 1995 if political stability, economic growth, and scientific and industrial modernization continue unobstructed. Even with steady improvement in forces and defense industries over the next 15 years, however, China will not develop an offensive capability against the U.S.S.R. largely because of that country's vastly superior industrial base. With a population that is expected to reach 1.3 billion by 1995, China is unlikely to develop forces based on technology rather than manpower or to abandon its defensive doctrine "People's War Under Modern Conditions" which posits defeat of a technologically superior enemy by using overwhelming manpower to defend China's vast terrain.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Jammes.

The plan that we should follow is to hear the four people who have papers to present this morning, and then the participants who are giving papers will question these four and discuss the ideas presented after which the entire audience is invited to participate and make comments or questions as they wish.

Next I shall call upon John J. Sloan of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

STATEMENT OF JOHN J. SLOAN, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. SLOAN. I think we may be already on the verge of reaching a consensus. I think it might be useful to point out to the audience that none of the panelists here this morning collaborated in the preparation of these papers.

I wish to make clear that anything I say in the course of this workshop will not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or the Defense Intelligence Agency. I will be expressing my personal opinions.

As the United States continues to formulate its foreign policy and strategy for the 1980's, it is essential that they be based on realistic and balanced assessments of China's present and future military capabilities. The nature, pace, and direction of United States-China military relations in the coming decade will be determined not only by the extent to which Chinese and United States global strategic objectives coincide, but also by the extent to which United States and Chinese deterrence postures complement each other, and by the manner in which United States and Chinese leaders conceptualize their war-fighting strategies and capabilities.

Assessment of these factors is difficult, in part because the Chinese are not completely forthcoming. Nevertheless, we can infer somewhat how the Chinese think about them from an assessment of their military capabilities and their military modernization efforts.

Discussion of China's current and future military capabilities is filled with paradoxes. On the one hand, its overall military capabilities can be viewed as impressive. This is particularly true when the nation's level of economic development and the problems associated with adequately providing for the livelihood of about 1 billion people are considered. China, for example, is the only developing nation possessing a strategic missile system capable of reaching both superpowers.

On the other hand, China's armed forces possess many serious weaknesses which belie the strengths suggested by force numbers alone. Many of these weaknesses have become convincingly apparent or have been openly acknowledged only in relatively recent times. A combination of factors, including Chinese security practices, lack of access by Western observers, wishful thinking, and historical experience have contributed to the frequent overstatement of Chinese military strength or its potential.

We cannot know precisely China's assessment of its own level of force capability. We can, however, make general statements which probably are close to those held by China's own military leadership. In this regard, then, what can Chinese forces do?

They can successfully defend China against attack from any nation except the United States and the U.S.S.R. In the event of a Soviet nuclear attack, China would likely suffer devastating, possibly debilitating destruction, but the Soviet Union could not be sure that it, too, would not suffer some significant damage, possibly even to Moscow. This is a considerable and important Chinese military achievement.

In the event of a large-scale conventional Soviet attack on China, there can be no doubt that China would lose large portions of territory, but the capture of areas vital to Chinese security, for example, Beijing, probably could not be accomplished by forces presently deployed along China's border, more than 45 divisions. Even after substantial reinforcement, which probably would require transfer of forces committed to the NATO front, it is uncertain that Chinese penetration to Beijing could occur in quick order. The Chinese hope they would be able to make the cost of such an attack or the duration of the required effort so great as to work to the strategic disadvantage of Moscow, and hence deter its occurrence. This, too, is an impressive achievement.

China has demonstrated a capability for limited penetration of Vietnam, but the PLA's modest military objective was accomplished with difficulty. It is questionable whether an effort of larger scope or longer duration would have succeeded. Likewise, given Vietnam's likely upgraded defenses in the border area, a second lesson in the near term would have considerable uncertainty associated with its outcome.

The PLA, of course, can move into the Korean Peninsula.

What is it Chinese forces cannot do? They cannot invade the Soviet Union successfully. They probably cannot capture Hanoi without very large losses. They cannot move against India, Japan, or into noncontiguous Southeast Asian nations. They cannot project significant power outside Chinese borders with the exception of Indochina and Korea. Practically speaking, they cannot successfully invade Taiwan.

In short, China has barely adequate defenses against a Soviet conventional attack, and would suffer great damage were one to occur. A Soviet nuclear attack would be devastating. Second, the PLA has largely no capability to project power at long ranges.

There is good reason to doubt that the compensatory factors so long relied upon by Chinese leaders to achieve a satisfactory level of deterrence are any longer appropriate, and if they are, to wonder for how much longer? Major equipment categories are now 10 to 20 years out of date, or even nonexistent. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence of Chinese faltering in the establishment of a modern and efficient defense industry.

China today still faces the prospect of seeing the disparity of capabilities between itself and its major military threats growing even wider unless effective measures are taken quickly.

Beijing's major military requirements can be placed into the following categories, and I won't elaborate on them; I am sure you know them already: Improved weaponry; improved training/unit readiness/education—training inadequacies, for example, have undoubtedly affected readiness levels of many, but certainly not all critical combat units; improved doctrine and tactics; improved defense technology/production base; improved logistic system; improved organization/command and control.

There are efforts underway which address the needs enumerated above and which offer a sense of optimism regarding progress in the future. These include the basic attitudinal change of the post-Gang-of-Four era in which Chinese leaders are willing to discuss and criticize current military shortcomings in a more frank and realistic manner, and to willingly seek foreign knowledge and assistance. In this regard, Sino-United States military interaction has been particularly warm and beneficial to date.

Nevertheless, persistent problems are impeding forward momentum. A series of economic retrenchments have reduced defense spending levels, delaying, once again, a number of important military programs. Acquisition of critical foreign weapons systems and defense-related technologies has stalled for a variety of economic and/or political reasons. PLA morale has suffered in recent years. Finally, current and anticipated military leadership changes brought about by politics or age place additional strain on an organization in the midst of far-reaching change.

These problems are likely to persist well into the remainder of the decade and probably beyond.

The underscoring of impediments to rapid progress in force development does not imply, however, that no progress will occur. It is possible to speculate on the general nature of that progress throughout the remainder of the decade, and these improvements can be discussed in a Sino-Soviet, Sino-Vietnam, and PRC-Taiwan context.

Improvements in Chinese ground force fire power and maneuverability will be achieved through the introduction of, improvement of, or increased numbers of ATGM's [antitank guided missiles] self-propelled artillery, tactical SAM's [surface-to-air missiles] tactical nuclear missiles, tanks, APC's, and trucks in key combat and combat support units. These additions, coupled with introduction of an improved air defense aircraft and better ground attack capabilities, will enable the PLA to defend against a major Soviet attack at points increasingly forward of present main deployment areas, which as you know are well back from the border area, and perhaps with greater effectiveness.

But the Chinese will be unable to acquire sufficiently large numbers of improved weapons and to assimilate them rapidly into the force with significantly improved training programs, doctrine, and tactics, and tactical command and control capabilities. This means by the end of the decade overall Chinese capabilities against Soviet forces are unlikely to be greater than they are today unless the Soviets continue improvement of their own forces along the Chinese border at less than current rates.

The same types of improvements should result, however, in a comparative advantage for Chinese forces over those of Vietnam. The forces committed to the Vietnam front in 1989 will be significantly improved over those available for use in 1979 in terms of equipment, training levels, and tactics. The PLA's performance during the 1979 offensive must have been a shock and embarrassment to China's leaders, propaganda claims notwithstanding.

It is clear that a high priority subsequently has been placed on correcting deficiencies experienced, assessing future requirements, and on planning for their satisfaction. These plans included upgraded equipment, training and tactics for air, ground, and naval forces, emphasizing offensive as well as defensive operations.

Finally, projected PRC force enhancements will mean continuation of the already existent force imbalance in the Taiwan Strait area. This will not necessarily mean, however, a significant improvement over the current Chinese difficulty if not inability to successfully seize and hold Taiwan. China would have to begin years in advance to develop such a capability, and there is no credible evidence that this is occurring.

Furthermore, such a decision would probably undermine current PRC domestic development goals, given the expense and scope of effort required. Assuming Taiwan's continued access to required foreign military equipment—not necessarily the FX aircraft——

[Laughter.]

Mr. SLOAN [continuing]. And international constraints to a military assault on Taiwan, the island will probably be able to maintain its already credible level of deterrence.

Several implications for the United States can be derived from an assessment of Chinese military capabilities and modernization efforts. They relate to the theme put forth at the beginning of this paper regarding complementary Sino-United States deterrence postures and warfighting strategies, and I intend merely to identify some of them for later discussion.

First, China's modest force development is dependent on continued access to foreign capital, technology, and weaponry. Failure to acquire them will probably result in a further widening of the gap in relative capabilities between China and the Soviet Union. The role played by the United States in this regard will be a critical factor in determining the pace and scope of Chinese force improvements.

Second, if it is true that Chinese military modernization will proceed slowly, and only with very limited improvement possible by the end of the decade, the question of the amount of China's contribution to U.S. security interests arises. In essence, the question is, can China achieve more than a modest defensive capability against the Soviet Union? Probably not, and certainly not during this decade. Is this all the United States expects of China over the next 10 years? If so, is this adequately understood and acceptable in all U.S. policymaking circles?

If it is insufficient, are there specific measures which the United States can take to improve China's ability to counter Soviet military power? If there are, what are they, and what are their costs, and how would such initiatives coincide with Chinese strategic interests and intentions?

Third, it is important to bear in mind that Chinese force development depends probably most fundamentally on domestic stability, economic progress, and avoidance of major conflicts. To what extent does U.S. policy contribute to or detract from their achievement?

Finally, how would enhancement of capabilities significantly beyond those projected here, particularly if brought about through expanded Sino-United States military cooperation, be perceived by regional powers and by the Soviet Union?

Thank you.

[Mr. Sloan's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN J. SLOAN*

INTRODUCTION

As the United States continues to formulate its foreign policy and strategy for the 1980's, it is essential that they be based on realistic and balanced assessments of China's present and future military capabilities. The nature, pace, and direction of United States-China military relations in the coming decade will be determined not only by the extent to which Chinese and U.S. global strategic objectives coincide, but also by the extent to which United States and Chinese deterrence postures complement each other and by the manner in which United States and Chinese leaders conceptualize their warfighting strategies and capabilities. Assessment of these factors is difficult in part because the Chinese are not completely forthcoming. Nevertheless, we can infer somewhat how the Chinese think about these two issues from an assessment of their military capabilities and their military modernization efforts.

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*Paper prepared for a workshop on "China's Military Power and Its Implications for the United States," sponsored by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Congressional Research Service (28 and 29 October 1981).

Discussion of China's current and future military capabilities is filled with paradoxes. On the one hand, its overall military capabilities can be viewed as impressive. This is particularly true when the nation's level of economic development and the problems associated with adequately providing for the livelihood of about one billion people are considered. China is the only developing nation possessing a strategic missile system capable of reaching both superpowers. It possesses the world's largest standing army, an army equipped with large numbers of standard weapons, albeit not sufficiently modern. China's air force is the third largest in the world, and its navy includes more submarines and aircraft than any other, save the United States and the U.S.S.R. These large numbers of forces and unsophisticated weapons have often been creatively adapted and deployed to maximize their effectiveness for defense. The Chinese have also innovatively employed other assets available, such as geography, a large population, and political communication skills. Chinese military defense capabilities are better than at any point in modern history.

On the other hand, China's armed forces possess many serious weaknesses which belie the strengths suggested by force numbers alone. Many of these weaknesses have become convincingly apparent or have been openly acknowledged only in relatively recent times. A combination of factors including Chinese security practices, lack of access by western observers, wishful thinking, and historical experience have contributed to the frequent overstatement of Chinese military strength or its potential. As recently as 1977, when Hua Guofeng first put forth ambitious modernization goals for China, the question of China's military modernization prospects was a subject of some debate within China and by foreign observers.

It is generally acknowledged today, however, that China's military modernization is not the highest priority within the overall Four Modernizations program. Indeed, it cannot be if significant upgrading of agricultural, industrial, and technical capabilities are to be accomplished and if advances in personal livelihood are to be serviced in the near term.

Prospects of Chinese military modernization are keyed to success in programs for economic and institutional modernization. The problems associated with the latter make prospects for the military's significant improvement dim in the near term and uncertain during the latter part of the decade.

This paper briefly outlines current Chinese military capabilities, highlighting strengths and weaknesses against major adversaries. It identifies areas of critical military need and discusses near term efforts to satisfy those needs and issues affecting military modernization over the longer term. It speculates on areas of major force improvement during the 1980s and their likely impact on future military capabilities. Finally, several implications are derived.[1]

CURRENT MILITARY CAPABILITIES

China's security objectives in their broadest sense can be reduced to the deterrence of aggression, and should deterrence fail, successful defense of the homeland; the achievement of preeminence in regional affairs; and possession of sufficient influence at the global level to not only preserve but enhance Chinese national interests. Fulfillment of these basic objectives and aspirations has been constrained, however, by the reality of limited resources, historical and international circumstances, and China's own domestic politics and policies. A critical element of Beijing's security-related policies throughout the 1980's will be the level of military capability that China can achieve and plan on sustaining and improving.

We cannot know precisely China's assessment of its own level of force capability, an assessment crucial to estimating Beijing's likely courses of action in specific situations. We can, however, make general statements which probably are close to those held by China's military leadership. In this regard, then, what can Chinese forces do?

They can successfully defend China against attack from any nation except the United States and the U.S.S.R.

In the event of a Soviet nuclear attack, China would likely suffer devastating, possibly debilitating, destruction. But the Soviet Union could not be sure that it too would not suffer some significant damage, possibly even to Moscow. This is a considerable and important Chinese military achievement.

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[1] For a discussion of current Chinese force structure and equipment holdings, see: "The Military Balance, 1980–1981," Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1980; Asia 1980 Yearbook, For Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, 1980; *Asia Security 1980*, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, Japan; Robert G. Sutter, "Increased U.S. Military Sales to China: Arguments and Alternatives," Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, May 20, 1981.

In the event of a large-scale, conventional Soviet attack on China, there can be no doubt that China would lose large portions of territory. But the capture of areas vital to Chinese security, for example Beijing, probably could not be accomplished by forces presently deployed along China's border (45 plus divisions). Even after substantial reinforcement, which probably would require transfer of forces committed to the NATO front, it is uncertain that Soviet penetration to Beijing could occur in quick order. The Chinese hope they would be able to make the cost of such an attack or the duration of the required effort so great as to work to the strategic disadvantage of Moscow and, hence, deter its occurrence. This too, is an impressive achievement given China's history and situation.

China has demonstrated a capability for limited penetration of Vietnam, but the PLA's modest military objective was accomplished with difficulty. It is questionable whether an effort of larger scope or longer duration would have succeeded. Likewise, given Vietnam's likely upgraded defenses in the border area, a "second lesson" in the near term would have considerable uncertainty associated with its outcome.

The PLA can move into the Korean Peninsula. What is it Chinese forces cannot do?

They cannot invade the Soviet Union successfully.

They probably cannot capture Hanoi without very large losses.

They cannot move against India, Japan, or into noncontiguous Southeast Asian nations.

They cannot project significant power outside their borders with the exception of Indochina and Korea.

Practically speaking, they cannot successfully invade Taiwan.

In short, Chinese forces have barely adequate defenses against a Soviet conventional attack and would suffer great damage were one to occur. A Soviet nuclear attack would be devastating. These realities have driven Beijing's foreign policy direction over the past 15 years. Secondly, the PLA has virtually no capability to project power at long ranges. That fact requires the exercise of skillful diplomacy and political psychology to compensate for military weakness in the pursuit of national objectives.

DEFENSE MODERNIZATION

But continued heavy reliance in the future on these factors would clearly prove insufficient, particularly in the rapidly changing, technologically advancing modern world in which sophisticated weapons have come to play an increasingly important role. The current Chinese leadership is concerned about its ability to enhance its military security beyond present levels, indeed, to maintain it at present levels through its own efforts. It is concerned about its ability to accomplish an adequate defense modernization program.

There is good reason to doubt that the compensatory factors so long relied upon by Chinese leaders to achieve a satisfactory level of deterrence are any longer appropriate and, if they are, for how much longer. Major equipment categories are now 10–20 years out of date or even non-existent. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence of Chinese faltering in the establishment of a modern and efficient defense industry. It is true that a progression of force developments continued throughout the past three decades, despite an array of economic and political reverses which hindered that development. It is also true, however, that an accumulation of societal ills have taken a severe toll on the pace and quality of that development. By the mid-to-late 1970's China's military leadership recognized that the rate and manner of earlier force development provided a near term prospect of their forces falling even further behind the forces of not only the technologically advanced nations, but the forces of lesser states as well.

Consequently, since at least 1975 long-term military modernization plans designed to develop a modern force more appropriate to the environment and threat China will face in the future have been under formulation. Leadership and policy changes since Mao's death and the purge of the Gang of Four have opened the way for more orderly progress toward those goals. Beijing's evaluation of the PLA's performance against Vietnam added impetus to that process, but China today still faces the prospect of seeing the disparity of capabilities between itself and its major military threats growing even wider, unless effective measures are taken quickly.

Beijing's major military requirements can be placed into the following categories:

1. *Improved Weaponry.* There are significant deficiencies in major weapons categories within each service/functional component of the PLA. The ground force lacks sufficient numbers and types of modern antiarmor and antiaircraft systems. It possesses insufficient numbers of trucks and armored personnel carriers (APCs). Its main battle tank, the Type-59, is fast becoming obsolescent. The air force lacks modern interceptor, ground attack, and bomber aircraft. It possesses insufficient

numbers of modern transports and helicopters. Furthermore, avionics and armament on existing combat planes are inferior to those possessed by all of China's most likely adversaries. The Navy lacks sufficient numbers of large surface combatants with adequate armament to perform combat missions beyond coastal defense. Chinese destroyers, lacking ship-to-air missiles, would be vulnerable to enemy air attack once they have exceeded the range of coverage provided by ground-based aircraft. China possesses a very limited number of naval craft capable of conventional amphibious lift operations. Finally, strategic ballistic missile systems suffer from poor accuracy and reliability characteristics.

2. *Improved Training/Unit Readiness/Education.* The same core of political, resource, and systemic problems which have disrupted economic and social advancement for more than two decades in China have also taken their toll on military unit training and the education of military professionals. Training facilities, curricula, and resource material are often out of date or otherwise inadequate; incentive systems have varied in emphasis and effectiveness; and the stimulation of new ideas and communication of new information has too frequently been stifled. In some areas training time has been insufficient, such as that for pilots—a critical deficiency. Large scale, innovative training on a broad joint service, interregional scale has been lacking or only sporadic in the past. The result of these training inadequacies has undoubtedly been reflected in readiness levels of many, but certainly not all, critical combat units.

3. *Improved Doctrine/Tactics.* These same weaknesses are largely responsible for the PLA's close adherance to strategic concepts developed in a different era under different circumstances. Recent commentaries in the need to upgrade the concept of People's War for combat "under modern conditions" urge "emancipation of the mind" and the study of foreign military thinking and its appropriate application to Chinese conditions. Several chinese military delegations have sought to acquire some of this knowledge from abroad, including the United States. Meanwhile, numerous visiting western and Japanese military delegations have brought specialized knowledge and advice to Beijing.

4. *Improved Defense Technology/Production Base.* The Chinese did well, with initial Soviet assistance, in copying or improving upon Soviet weapons acquired during the 1950's. It currently lacks, however, the ability to design and produce modern, state-of-the-art systems. In certain critical functional areas—such as counterair, antiarmor, and antisubmarine warfare—China's only hope for significant improvement is through acquisition of foreign systems through purchase or coproduction. Fulfillment of the Four Modernization goals would allow for a significantly improved indigenous defense production capability, but that is a development unlikely to occur before the turn of the century.

5. *Improved Logistics System.* Although China's transportation system has dramatically improved since 1949, it would probably prove to be inadequate in event of a large-scale, high-intensity war. There is still a shortage of vehicles and mechanized handling equipment, and the overburdened rail system often cannot adequately handle both civilian and military needs during periods of crisis. These limitations raise questions regarding China's sustainability capabilities in the event of a major Soviet attack.

6. *Improved Organization/Command and Control.* The doctrine of "People's War Under Modern Conditions" places special emphasis on the need for improvement in this area. This will be particularly so as new weapons and warfighting concepts are introduced into the force and as combined arms and joint service operations become increasingly routine. Changes may ultimately result in further refinement of or modification to the long-standing military region command structure and in the emergence of larger area commands.

There are efforts underway which address the needs enumerated above and which offer a sense of optimism regarding progress in the future. These include the basic attitudinal change of the post-Gang of Four era in which Chinese leaders are willing to discuss and criticize current military shortcomings in a more frank and realistic manner and to willingly seek foreign knowledge and assistance. In this regard, Sino-United States military interaction has been particularly warm and beneficial to date. Furthermore, the principle of "self-reliance" has been relaxed somewhat to accommodate foreign purchase and adoption of foreign practices. Finally, the new emphasis on improved military unit and individual training appears to be a permanent element of Beijing's military modernization program intended primarily to boost combat proficiency and only secondarily to improve PLA morale. These trends, coupled with programs to increase the PLA's sense of professionalization and focus on purely military missions, advance the prospects for the PLA's modernization.

Nevertheless, persistent problems are impeding forward momentum. A series of economic retrenchments have reduced defense spending levels, delaying once again a number of important military programs. Acquisition of critical foreign weapon systems and defense related technologies has stalled for a variety of economic and/or political reasons. In any event, those acquired considerable lead time for their effective application. PLA morale has suffered in recent years as the military's influence in society diminishes and as political changes grate against the values the PLA as an institution has upheld for so long. Finally, current and anticipated military leadership changes, brought about by politics or age, place additional strain on an organization in the midst of far reaching change. These problems are likely to persist well into the remainder of the decade and probably beyond.

FUTURE MILITARY CAPABILITIES

The underscoring of impediments to rapid progress in force development does not imply, however, that no progress will occur. It is possible to speculate on the general nature of that progress throughout the remainder of the decade.

In terms of force structure, the PLA will probably retain the main force-regional force-militia concept but increased emphasis will be placed on upgrading the combat fire power and maneuverability of main force elements, particularly in northern and southern threat regions. Mechanization of selected units in these regions will probably occur and the creation of additional combat units—especially armored and antiarmor—may occur. Tactical missile units may also be introduced.

Simultaneously, a process of streamlining, as cost reduction and enhanced efficiency measures, may result in decreases in existing unit tables of organization. In certain areas, unit disestablishment or resubordination may occur. A likely candidate would appear to be those regional forces performing public security missions exclusively. A system of ranks and new uniforms may be introduced as professionalization and more enhancements.

In terms of weapons programs, the PLA will likely acquire antitank guided missile (ATGM) and surface-to-air (SAM) systems superior to those already possessed. They will likely produce greater numbers of APCs and trucks of improved design. They will seek to improve the current tank force but introduction of more modern, follow-on, models probably is not possible in the near term.

Aircraft improvements will occur slowly. China has been developing an improved interceptor throughout the 1970's, but there are no indications that its satisfactory completion is imminent. Indeed, recent Chinese interest in such systems as the MIRAGE, HARRIER, and F-16 indicate dissatisfaction with their own development program. Recently, there has been a decline in this interest, probably due to budgetary considerations. This suggests China's indigenous program continues but that a new Chinese interceptor, whenever it is ready for deployment, will be less than satisfactory. China's aircraft armaments will continue to improve but remain far below modern technological standards.

Likewise, there are no signs that China's naval construction program is undergoing rapid expansion. Emphasis will probably be on qualitative, technically oriented, improvements which enhance shipboard armament, communications, and target detection systems. New construction will focus on combatants suited primarily for employment in regional waters and as replacements for aging WWII vintage craft.

China will likely emphasize qualitative improvement of its current ICBM and SLBM systems rather than deploy significant numbers of existing systems. Recognizing it cannot match qualitatively or quantitatively Soviet strategic strength targeted against China, Beijing probably will opt to continue stressing force survivability programs in order to maintain a credible and significant retaliatory strike capability. The continued high level of effort toward development of strategic systems would represent a decision to pursue procurement of requisite sophisticated technologies with a long-term view toward their application. The SLBM program, an ambitious program of the 1970's, will continue to progress at a slow rate through the 1980's with only limited deployment.

In terms of overall military modernization during the 1980's, we are likely to see emphasis on specific programs which improve force capabilities and morale in the near term, but at relatively low cost. These include better and more frequent exercises emphasizing combined arms and joint service operations, command and control, and movement under realistic wartime scenarios. The recent Zhangjiakou exercise signals an intent to make better use of what the PLA already possesses and that "modernization" had better not await the arrival of modern equipment. Other measures previously noted, such as rank and uniform changes and improved military education, will improve individual skill and attitude levels. Study of doctrine and tactics will proceed and changes gradually introduced.

The force enhancements outlined above assume an ability to acquire a limited amount of foreign technical assistance, advanced weapons, and critical weapon subsystems. They should yield modest improvements in overall force capabilities by the end of the decade. These improvements can be discussed in a Sino-Soviet, Sino-Vietnam, and PRC-Taiwan context.

Improvements in Chinese ground force fire power and maneuverability will be achieved through the introduction of, improvement of, or increased numbers of ATGM's, self-propelled artillery, tactical SAM's, tactical nuclear missiles, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and trucks in key combat and combat support units. These additions coupled with introduction of an improved air defense aircraft and better ground attack capabilities will enable PLA units to defend against a major Soviet offensive at points increasingly forward of present main deployment areas, perhaps with greater effectiveness. But the Chinese will be unable to acquire sufficiently large numbers of improved weapons and to assimilate them rapidly into the force with significantly improved training programs, doctrine and tactics, and tactical command and control capabilities. This means that by the end of the decade overall Chinese capabilities against Soviet forces are unlikely to be greater than they are today, unless the Soviets continue improvement of their own forces along the Chinese border at less than current rates.

The same types of improvements should result, however, in a comparative advantage for Chinese forces over those of Vietnam. The forces committed to the Vietnam front in 1989 will be significantly improved over those available for use in 1979 in terms of equipment, levels of training, and tactics employed. The PLA's performance during the 1979 offensive must have been a shock and embarrassment to China's leaders, propaganda claims not withstanding. It is clear that a high priority subsequently has been placed on correcting deficiencies experienced, assessing future requirements, and on planning for their satisfaction. These plans include upgraded equipment, training, and tactics for air, ground, and naval forces, emphasizing offensive as well as defensive operations.

Finally, projected PRC force enhancements will mean continuation of the already existent force imbalance in the Taiwan Strait area. This will not necessarily mean, however, a significant improvement over the current Chinese difficulty, if not inability, to successfully seize and hold Taiwan. China would have to begin years in advance to develop such a capability, and there is no credible evidence that this is occurring. Furthermore, such a decision would probably undermine current PRC domestic development goals, given the expense and scope of effort required. Assuming Taiwan's continued access to required foreign military equipment (not necessarily the FX aircraft) and international constraints to a military assault on Taiwan, the island will probably be able to maintain its already credible level of deterrence.

IMPLICATIONS

Several implications for the United States can be derived from an assessment of Chinese military capabilities and modernization efforts. They relate to the theme put forth at the beginning of this paper regarding complementary Sino-United States deterrence postures and warfighting strategies. What is intended here is merely to identify several for further discussion during the remainder of the workshop.

First, China's modest force development is dependent on continued access to foreign capital, technology, and weaponry. Failure to acquire them will probably result in a further widening of the gap in relative capabilities between China and the Soviet Union. The role played by the United States in this regard will be a critical factor in determining the pace and scope of Chinese force improvements. What would be the consequences of a Chinese failure to achieve the limited improvements projected here? Will a deterioration of Chinese force capabilities invite Soviet aggression or contribute to other instability in the Far East? How would U.S. strategic interests suffer?

Second, if it is true that Chinese military modernization will proceed slowly with only very limited improvement possible by the end of the decade, the question of the amount of China's contribution to U.S. security interests arises. In essence, the question is can China achieve more than a modest defensive capability against the Soviet Union? Probably not, and certainly not during this decade. Is this all the United States expects of China over the next 10 years? If so, is this adequately understood and acceptable in all U.S. policymaking circles? If it is insufficient, are there specific measures which the United States can take to improve China's ability to counter Soviet military power? If there are, what are they and what are their costs? How would such initiatives coincide with Chinese strategic interests and intentions? More pointedly, does China's current level of military capability really pin down the large numbers of Soviet forces in the Far East? Can China in the

future do more than provide for its own defense and assume broader military responsibilities, thereby sharing more of the anti-Soviet military burden? If so, would it?

Third, Chinese force development depends perhaps most fundamentally on domestic stability, economic progress, and avoidance of major conflict. To what extent does U.S. policy contribute to or detract from their achievement and how much consideration is given to such factors in our policy formulation process?

Finally, how would enhancement of capabilities significantly beyond those projected here—particularly if brought about through expanded Sino-United States military cooperation—be perceived by regional powers and the Soviet Union. What would be likely reactions, and would they result in a positive or negative impact on overall U.S. security interests?

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Sloan.

Our next speaker will be Roy Werner, of Aerojet General Corp. of California.

STATEMENT OF ROY WERNER, AEROJET GENERAL CORP., DOWNEY, CALIF.

Mr. WERNER. Thank you.

I suspect that Jay's comment about consensus would be readily apparent, since ours is the easiest panel to reach common agreement. Therefore, rather than try and go through the typical quantifiable military balance, I propose to more or less sketch out a couple of areas of thoughts and questions that seem to me to revolve around the question of where China goes militarily in the next decade and some issues beyond that.

The basic issue in Chinese military discussions, it seems to me, is how to achieve political and military advantage from a position of military inferiority. I think I would probably disagree somewhat with Jay in the sense that as one tries to interpret the Chinese pattern of military policies certainly since the revolution, it seems to me the one thing you can say is that Chinese policymakers have consistently exercised a very realistic judgment of their relative military strength vis-a-vis other nations. As Jay did point out, this is unlike westerners who certainly in the past had some rather common overestimates of it.

In terms of the regional settings, it seems to me the preeminent trend in Asia is the extension of Sino-Soviet conflict. This in turn propels the Asian region back into the theater of global strategy which many Asians in other countries had hoped they could avoid in the future.

Obviously, ASEAN, for example, is going to increasingly have to consider the triangular balance among the Big Three. The other panelists all have discussed the individual military balances. It seems to me the pertinent point there is simply that these individual country-versus-country balances have a tendency—more so than in other systems—to be of a floating nature given shifting alignments, and this certainly complicates the life of the military planner.

Moreover, I would suggest that a long-term strategist is going to have to consider potentially the question of China versus Japan and China versus a unified Korea. I won't go into any of the details regarding some of the Soviet patterns.

Going back to the ASEAN for a moment, Deputy Prime Minister Goh of Singapore, I thought in one sentence, summarized the attitude of many Asian leaders to whom I have talked in the last 2 to

3 years. His statement was that none of the ASEAN states believes it can depend upon military intervention by the United States should a Communist power mount aggression either directly or by proxy. Thus, in the last 2 years, if you look at individual military establishments, it is noticeable that the Indonesians, the Malays, and the Thais are all busy expanding their military force capability, "professionalizing the army," and are obviously worried about having a greater force generation capability.

Japan, it seems to me, obviously apprehensive to some extent of the Soviet Union and uncertain of American resolve, I think, will continue a very gradual projection of Japanese military strength in this century. This basic decision, I would think, was made in 1978, when they in effect renewed their historical ties with China at Soviet expense, and was cemented by the Afghan invasion.

One of the unresolved issues, of course, is whether a different set of Western policies, primarily the United States, but obviously we have influenced the Japanese, could induce a schism between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. If you have the potential to accomplish that, you obviously change the cockpit of Southeast Asia and some of the security questions there.

As a lot of people have discussed, obviously, the emphasis on Chinese security policy is regional and defensive. For example, their military regions have centralized logistic setups, and one of the problems with any power force projection capability is, they simply need immense amounts of time and prior preparation, which gives the other side warning to begin to prepare.

It seems to me, then, that the role of U.S. policy in a regional setting ought to be to influence the policy choices made in Beijing. In terms of Chinese internal debate, obviously, the allocation of resources remains the most critical task facing the present Chinese leadership. Allocation decisions, as we are again discovering in this country, are the core of politics, and despite being the last of four modernizations, the Chinese military-industrial complex will benefit from the modernization of science and technology.

Chinese security policy to some extent, as others have suggested, can be traced through fractional debates regarding modernization which I deem to be essentially allocation issues and strategy. The Chinese have limited experience in alliance politics and a long history of self-reliance. It seems to me since the revolution alliance relationships have waxed or waned depending upon the Chinese perceptions and the external strategic environment.

The military modernization of the PLA at a technical level anywhere comparable to the superpowers obviously is beyond the capability of either the Chinese or the American economies. The International Institute for Strategic Studies recently estimated the cost of modernizing an austere Chinese armored division at U.S. dollars of $664 million. This will give you some idea of the scope of the task that they face. So, the issue for the Chinese is in what areas do you suboptimize. Clearly, the Chinese have been visiting foreign defense technology centers, discussing placing limited orders which have not really arrived in any great measure.

Their deficiencies, as other people have commented on, include: missiles, computers, telecommunications, satellite technology, electronic gear, test and equipment measurement for quality control.

However, the introduction of such equipment demands human resources capable of utilizing them, and the Chinese still are living off the intellectual capital of the many who were educated abroad before the cultural revolution and returned.

This will be the initial development hurdle. It will be a long and arduous task. They are going to have to get back the students they recently have sent abroad. Those people will have to create a multiplier effect within China, and I suspect it may be even longer than some of the other speakers have anticipated.

Previous Chinese military modernizations include the period of 1949–54, when a revolutionary army was transformed into a conventional force and learned some rather bitter lessons about fire power and mobility in Korea, 1955–72, where you went through self-sufficiency, scientific development, nuclear capability, and from 1972 onward, when they started to have a gradual westward orientation in search of modern military technology. Successful defense modernization obviously is dependent upon foreign military technology to avoid a continuing decline vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. I would argue that it is not achievable until well past 1990, at even the most modest levels.

The debate, as others have mentioned, is essentially over the speed of modernization within the PLA, and obviously the leadership of the moment has held the ground there. However, the budget decreases again are not that unknown in the history of the PRC. You had them in 1956 and 1957. You certainly had them in 1972, 1973. It seems to me one of the interesting questions which we obviously cannot answer is whether the Nixon opening to China resulted in the 1972–73 cutbacks and reliance on an increment of American deterrence.

I will skip over the part of the ranks discussion. I did a quick rough draft of some of the issues, and it seems to me that if you look for principles to govern American potential export of military technology, we are obviously in the typical cost-benefit game, and the only principles it seems to me that you can apply are one, a case-by-case judgment, and second, an attempt to decide whether an individual item of equipment will significantly assist Chinese power projection capabilities as contrasted to defensive capabilities vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

You can go through optics, aircraft simulators, diesel engines, early warning communications, test equipment, and the like, and reach individual decisions on those two principles. Another interesting question which is that, unlike the United States, the Chinese problem in staffing the PLA is to select the best recruits from among the millions willing to join. Certainly, if the allegations regarding a substantial reduction in military manpower are correct, that is going to have another impact internally within China.

I would argue that in the earlier period since the Korean war, the development of Chinese military forces has emphasized air, naval, and nuclear programs, and that the ground forces, despite some armor growth, are basically labor-intensive, with many problems, as others have discussed, in mobility, logistics, command, and control, the 10-month training cycle. The only really semi-modernized elements are, of course, the 60-odd divisions that form the backbone of the defensive line, well back of the border. It is

only in this decade that the ground forces have started to see a renewed emphasis on their capabilities vis-a-vis the Soviets.

In terms of the air forces, the only comment I would make down there is, you will remember that in the cultural revolution they apparently sided more with the Red Guard and were stood down for 38 days. They have limited experience, as Mr. Jammes pointed out. It is still the weakest, but the old TU16 can still deliver a 3 megaton nuclear weapon for a range of 1,600 nautical miles.

The naval force is, of course, terribly vulnerable to air attack, and has to stay within range of their land-based aircraft. I would expect in this decade and beyond a renewed emphasis on "presence missions" on the part of the PLA Navy. Certainly that is where China got started in the 1400's, with requests for that sort of thing.

Nuclear weapons are the supreme symbol of self-reliance. In January 1979, the first picture of a missile appeared in "People's Daily." Other people have already discussed their capabilities.

It is a fairly well accepted point, as we understand the Chinese strategy, that ours is a temporary friendship. Obviously the fundamental question you are looking at to some extent is defense military modernization. An obscure but vital question that often gets ignored, it seems to me, is what sort of Chinese State do we want in the 21st century?

I think much of the debate thus far has focused on very short-term objectives, and those problems have been enumerated elsewhere. The future of Chinese security policy will be fairly clear from their deployments, budgets, R. & D. programs, and the impact of internal politics. I would define them as a very benign threat now, a virtue made of necessity. But guns, after all, do not know allegiance, and that can change. It seems to me that the American position ought to be one of maneuver vis-a-vis the Chinese and the Soviets, retaining what I prefer to call a latent threat against the Soviets.

A relatively unexplored topic is the psychological dimension of military power, and some of the Chinese practices there have intrigued me. I think a major motivation, from the very limited discussions that I had in 1979 in Peking, is what I would call the perceptual advantages in terms of the Chinese excursion into Vietnam. It is important to recognize the signal that was sent there, despite the obvious logistical and command and control problems that they have.

We actually know relatively little of Chinese security concepts. Their strategic writings are unavailable. Most of us do not fully understand their historical analogies, and prolonged discussion is infrequent. However, I would like to speculate that they might well hold a very different view of deterrence from Western opinions. To me, this is unsurprising, since China is one of the only regions in the world never controlled by westerners, and possesses its own ancient traditions.

The Chinese may well settle for a minimal strategic force possessing a high deterrent value all out of proportion to its actual numbers in confronting the superpowers. In the Chinese view, of course, no level of assured destruction can win a war or deter an adversary. Yet this is the very bedrock of Western strategic thinking. The Chinese would hold that the population must be defeated

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on the ground, physical occupation taking place. Again, this is virtue out of necessity, but I think they honestly believe this point.

Psychological factors reflecting their traditions seem to me to be more important. Western thought has assumed rationality in warfare. The Chinese historically recognize the emotion of warfare. The "inevitable war" comments and the possibility of "postponement" of that war, for example, is one device, it seems to me, which they employ quite well in this manner. The Chinese believe the critical stage of warfare will be after the nuclear exchange, and therefore stress civil defense, protracted ground combat, and, of course, their hopes of eventual victory despite nuclear devastation.

Chinese security will continue to exploit its geography and its demographics, which are their strong points, to encourage Western assistance against a common adversary, and to seek self-sufficiency by modernization. In this sense, the complexities of nuclear deterrents will probably help to force the Chinese out of what might be termed the strategic isolation and into interaction with the United States about the nature of deterrence, Soviet intentions and capabilities, and global strategies.

Nevertheless, domestic political factors will continue to dictate bureaucratic pragmatism by the military unless the oscillating struggles turn violent again and you have a changed leadership as during the cultural revolution. Economic allocation will remain a critical issue. It would seem to me logical that both the Soviets and the Chinese may attempt to reduce some of their current animosities which would obviously be helpful to their own security planning. This is yet another reason for the United States to seek to remain in the middle of the triangular balance.

In the absence of such modernization, the Chinese will expect the Americans to resist Soviet expansion, to transfer armament technology, and to side with the People's Republic of China on international issues. If economic modernization is partially successful in this century, and if a population-food balance is achieved, the economic constraints upon the Chinese military lessens significantly after the year 2000, and at that point the Middle Kingdom might well become a great power.

[Mr. Werner's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROY WERNER

The challenge in such gatherings is always to provide some insight without simply repeating other speakers. Historically, Americans were puzzled in the 1950's and 1960's by the dichotomy existing between the Chinese declaratory policy regarding the use of military force (revolution) and the caution that characterized actual assistance to insurgents. Although current Chinese doctrine is more advanced, the central issue remains the same: How to achieve political and military advantage from a position of military inferiority?

Our presence here today reveals the absence of a commonly agreed upon conceptual framework regarding U.S. security policy towards China. Recognizing that others will review in detail the actual military balance numbers, I propose to focus on the international setting, modernization, operational capabilities, and our common question—the Chinese future.

THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING

Implicit in this assessment is the thesis that China is a most probable benign military threat to its neighbors in this decade. This assumes, of course, no drastic changes in Chinese leadership. However, nearer the end, I want to challenge the traditionally American short-term focus and discuss indicators of future Chinese security policy.

Traditional threat analysis involves a search for quantifiable military balances, a consideration of possible constraints (geographic, technological), and is eventually defined as a specific level of military power relating to a set of scenarios. This is a monumental task, especially given debates about capabilities versus intentions, qualitative superiority versus quantitative advantages, surprise versus warning. Yet, even these force comparisons must ignore dynamic elements that analysts can measure only in history. Thus, I am inclined towards a narrative overview discounting strict sets of numbers.

East Asia, the scene of the last three American wars, underwent drastic changes in political alignments. The Shanghai Communique, the American defeat in Vietnam, the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1978, and the Sino-American normalization shattered the communist versus non-communist lines of division in Asia, releasing more traditional national geopolitical forces. Now, however, the pre-eminent trend in Asia is the expansion of the Sino-Soviet conflict which, in turn, propels the Asian region back into the theater of global strategy. The Sino-Soviet-American triangular balance means lesser Asian nations must base their foreign policies on developments among the "big three." The American task in this shifting equation is how to manage our relations with China and the Soviet Union while retaining traditional alliance relationships.

Asia, of course, contains several fluid military balances besides the embyronic Sino-American-Japanese coalition against the Soviet Union. These include:

North Korea versus South Korea (which will alter drastically by 1990).

China versus Taiwan (a renewed source of tension in the Reagan administration).

Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. versus ASEAN and China (the "cockpit" of Southeast Asia).

India versus China.

More distant in time, but plausible are: China versus Japan and China versus a unified Korea.

Still, the significant military event is the relentless growth of Soviet military power—almost their only international tool of consequence. Soviet naval expansion continues—but without land based aircraft support—is still unequal to American naval forces. Deployment of Backfire bombers, the SS-20 mobile missile, increased fortification of Soviet held Kurile islands, construction of the Baikal-Amor rail line, and use of Vietnamese facilities all point to increased Soviet projection capabilities. This shifting central balance clearly worries East Asian leaders who perceive that, aside from Japan and Korea, American inland reinforcement will be limited to arms resupply. One of the most perceptive, Deputy Prime Minister Goh of Singapore has said "None of the ASEAN states believes it can depend on military intervention by the United States should a communist power mount aggression either directly or by proxy. . . ." Thus, in the last two years the Indonesians, Malays, and Thais have all begun to expand and re-supply their military forces. The Chinese, recognizing that they need ASEAN cooperation, have begun to play down logistical, fiscal, and propaganda support to insurgent groups. But, ethnic mistrust and cool logic about elusive subversion as a Chinese strategy leave many—especially in Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia—unconvinced. Japan, apprehensive of the U.S.S.R. and uncertain of American resolve, will continue the gradual projection of Japanese military strength during the remainder of this century. The basic Japanese choice made in 1978 to renew Chinese ties at Soviet expense has been cemented by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The Chinese perception at least since the 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion is, of course, one of encirclement in two fronts by the Soviets and their Asian proxies, the Vietnamese. One of the unresolved issues is whether a different set of Western policies could induce a schism between Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. Militarily, China lacks power projection capabilities except for bordering states. Indeed, aside from Korea and Vietnam, the Chinese have not militarily intervened. Current Chinese foreign policy statements are skewed towards global issues. The operational aspects of Chinese security policy suggest both a regional and a defensive emphasis. Thus, the role of U.S. policy should be to influence the policy choices made in Beijing. Ideally, there will not be a return to MAO's emphasis on China as "the arsenal of world revolution." Yet, it is important to note that our degree of influence upon Chinese decisions is uncertain and will always be hostage to Chinese internal politics. In this respect, the allocation of resources is the most critical task facing the present Chinese leadership.

Allocation decisions are the core of politics. Despite being the last of the four modernizations, the Chinese military industrial complex is a major claimant in resource allocation decisions. Moreover, the modernization of science and technology will obviously benefit the military sector. Chinese security policy can be partially

traced through the fractional debates regarding modernization—essentially allocation issues—and strategy.

Security policy is the outcome of ongoing interaction between alliance policies and self-reliance. Both support the independence and equality of China, but wax or wane depending upon Chinese perceptions of the strategic environment. Today, China and the United States are aligned maneuvering against the Soviet Union. But the tactic of maneuver implies temporary friendship. Hence, despite the technology lag evident in Chinese weapon systems, there is a huge defense industry base engaged in production and R&D functions. These industries are directed by state ministries headed by active or former PLA officers.

Military modernization of four million people in a defense force at a technical level comparable to the superpowers is simply beyond the capability of the Chinese or American economies. For example, the IISS estimates the cost of modernizing an austere Chinese armor division at $644 million. Rather, the issue is in what areas of the Chinese sub-optimize. Clearly Chinese teams have been visiting foreign defense technology centers and discussing placing quite limited orders or obtaining manufacturing licenses. Presumingly, such acquisitions would form the foundation for local production and a modern military capability. Hence, missiles, computers, engines, telecommunications, satellite technology electronic gear, test and measurement equipment for quality control purposes, are of keen interest. Introduction of such equipment, however, demands human resources capable of utilizing such resources. Herein lies the initial Chinese development hurdle and it will be a long arduous task. The extension of years of conscript service in 1978, speeches by then Chariman Hua and Marshal Yeh, and publications in the same year all echoed this theme. Recent war college exchange visits to the reorganized military academies reveal a Chinese desire to further develop their "professional" skills.

Previous Chinese military modernizations include the period of 1949–54 when a revolutionary army was transformed into conventional forces and learned bitter lessons about firepower and mobility in Korea; the 1955–72 period of increasing self sufficiency, scientific development, and nuclear weapons development; the post 1972 period when a gradual westward orientation in search of military technology became clear. The current focus includes the development of new weapons, improved scientific and technical capabilities, more professional training, and, perhaps, a simmering debate over whether to emphasize nuclear or conventional forces.

Successful defense modernization is dependent upon foreign military technology to avoid a continuing decline vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. and not achievable until 1990 at the most modest levels. The principal hurdles to be overcome include reduced budgets, inadequate personnel, and internal debates. Yet, the Vietnam lessons proved the need for such revision. Inadequate communications, clogged logistics, loose command structures, were all too evident in that display of punative military coercion.

To an outsider, the core of the modernization debate seems to be on the pace of change. Apparently the Defense Scientific and Technological Commission and many mid-level PLA personnel believe speed is essential. Arrayed against this view are Tung and his emplaced PLA leadership which accept the emphasis on economic development. As the Peking Domestic Service pronounced of February 5, 1977:

"If we are not to be bullied by foreign enemies we should also have atom and hydrogen bombs, modern communications equipment, transport means, and so forth. All these cannot be obtained without the development of the metallurgical, machine building, fuel, chemical, power, meters and instruments, electronic and other basic industries. Only by developing such industries rapidly can we lay a solid material foundation for strengthening national defense."

In Hua's report to the Fifth National People's Congress in 1978 the theme of economic development before (full-scale) military modernization was anointed. After all, the crash military modernization begun after the Korean War so drained the civilian sector that by 1956 the targets of the first five year plan (1953-57) were in doubt. According to the economic report at the People's Congress in July 1957, PLA funding decreased 383 million yuan in 1956 and another 594 million yuan in 1957. Likewise in 1972-73 substantial reductions were made in Chinese defense spending. Perhaps with the Nixon opening to China, the PRC began to tacitly rely on an increment of American deterrence.

Recently a Japanese newspaper reported that in July the Party Central Committee and the powerful Military Affairs Commission began a new campaign of self-criticism in the junior and mid-level PLA ranks. Earlier, in 1980, party enrollments in the military were restricted to military academy graduates. Further, there is a proposal to demobilize 1½ million personnel. Taken together, these suggest continuing concern over the loyalties of many PLA personnel and the realization that current policies are counter to the probable bureaucratic goals of the military. This

latter point, however, is subject to questioning since some PLA leaders may prefer professionalism and slower modernization to revolutionary zeal and more old equipment.

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES: FIGHTING ON THE MANCHURIAN PLAINS

During this decade China will remain a traditional continental power lacking any real capability to project force beyond her contiguous borders. Modernization, at whatever pace, and the U.S. relationship are counters to Soviet expansion. Meanwhile, a Chinese nuclear force is being developed for strategic deterrence.

The PLA is a mass volunteer organization, the cheapest per capita soldiers in the world, and a key to upward mobility in Chinese society. Unlike the United States, their problem is selecting the best recruits from among millions willing to join. Mostly unskilled, its members are generally assigned to a military region and perform some civilian exchange labor. Since the Korean War, development has emphasized air, naval, and nuclear program. The ground forces, despite some armor, are labor intensive, with problems in mobility, logistics, command and control. The ten month training cycle allows for civic assistance, especially during harvests. But, the emphasis on a Soviet threat means that ground force modernization must be confronted—particularly for the 60 odd divisions stationed behind the Sino-Soviet frontier, to include the key armor divisions.

The PLA Air Force is the world's third largest with ample room for qualitative improvement. During the domestic turmoil of the 1960's, it was "stood down" for 38 days because of its association with "Red Guard" personnel. It's only recent use, as an air cap for the seizure of the Paracel Islands in January 1974, provided no real test. Ground attack missions appear to be pre-planned given limited liaison and ground control. The primary bomber, the old reliable TU-16, has a radius of 1,650 nautical miles and could deliver a 3 megaton nuclear weapon on India, numerous but obsolescent, underpowered and poorly armed. Further, deployments are concentrated rearward of the Sino-Soviet frontier and the Foochow Military Region opposite Taiwan, so multi-front operational capability is dubious.

The Chinese navy is designed to defend a 6,000 mile coastline, preventing any enemy's seaward thrusts. This means control of the Yellow, East and South China seas. The only SLOC mission, in my judgment, is in the Taiwan Straits. Its aging vessels include 97 diesel submarines and 38 major surface craft. Motor gunboats, armed with Styx surface to surface missiles (easily jammed), patrol fishing areas, investigate waterborne craft and "rescue" citizens. Amphibious Assault capabilities—a key in power projection force structure—are ancient and few. The entire naval force is vulnerable to air attack and therefore must remain within range of land based aircraft. In 1967, naval forces went up the Yangtze to Wuhan to put down an armed rebellion, but generally seem to be less involved politically than other branches. In the future, naval expansion may include "presence missions" to the south, near the old tributary states of Asia (The Kingdom of Malacca in the early 1900's first sought Chinese support and protection). Given the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and off-Vietnam, the Chinese are likely to expand into this area. Chinese naval capabilities against Vladinostok are quite few and U.S. military units would be necessary to threaten that northeastern port complex.

Nuclear weapons are the supreme symbol of self reliance. Hence, as a non-NPT signatory, China resents superpower nuclear hegemony and is anxious to acquire its own retaliatory capability. On Jan. 2, 1979, the first picture of a medium range missile appeared in the People's Daily and the next few weeks saw frequent discussions of the scientific aspects of modern warfare. Presently the Chinese possess a modest but credible nuclear retaliatory capability of 90 Tu-16 bombers, 50 MRBM's 60-85 IRBM's and four CSS XC-3 ICBM's. They are a distant threat to the United States, but capable of striking any U.S. ally in Asia. The development of nuclear weapons by India, Japan, either Korea, Pakistan, and Taiwan would be a matter of grave concern. Although one supposes the Chinese are examining tactical nuclear weapons, there is no public literature on this subject. Although obvious factors led the Chinese to emphasize "People's War" as a deterrent to a conventional invasion, this unlikely future threat will mean the future focus will be on strategic systems with retaliatory forces as the key deterrent. Meanwhile, the immutable Chinese masses and territorial vastness present an aggressor with unique challenges in the Chinese view.

THE FUTURE

Earlier I noted our "temporary friendship" with the Chinese and the slower pace of defense modernization. An obscured, but vital question is what sort of a Chinese state do we want in the 21st century? Admittedly short-term objectives will take

priority in foreign policy decisions, but structural aspects cannot be swept aside—except at our own risk.

The indicators of future Chinese security policy are fairly clear: Deployments, budget, R&D programs, the impact of internal politics, and the scope of overseas weapons acquisitions. Benign threat—now a virtue made of necessity—can change. Guns, after all, owe no allegiance. The preferred position, in my judgment is to assist the Chinese with selected weapons development, but avoiding a formal military alliance. Moreover, such a policy may lessen the odds of a reversal of Sino-American relations when leadership changes occur. This stance preserves American Manuever which can be used to signal the Soviets, retains a latent threat, but can improve Chinese defensive capabilities against the Soviet Union. While generally a critic of simplistic offensive—defensive divisions of weapons technology, anti-tank missiles, helicopters, night vision devices, and related equipment can improve Chinese defense capabilities (and offensive potential against neighbors).

Another relatively unexplored topic is the psychological dimension of military power. An obvious example is the Soviet retention of almost all serviceable weapons in the active inventory, thereby enhancing perceptions of Soviet strength. Few will, of course, ask about maintenance, spare parts, crew training or the other specifics needed to honestly evaluate these "bean counts." Today the Soviet Union gathers political benefits from the perceived superiority of its ground forces along the Sino-Soviet border and NATO. This perceptual advantage was indirectly challenged by the Chinese incursion into Vietnam, proving that the Soviet bear was not so fierce. The intent, in my opinion, was to shore up the Chinese position among Asians and limit the perceptual advantages of the U.S.S.R. Likewise, I maintain the U.S. Navy still possess a diminishing qualitative superiority over the Soviet Pacific Fleet because non-reloadable SSM launchers are only a threat once. If the Seventh Fleet survives the first salvo and has an air cap, there is no contest. But, Asian leaders and defense experts stress greater Soviet gross tonnage and naval visits. Yet, foreign ministers must make policy amid third party perceptions. I believe the Chinese understand this psyco-political phenomenon, the key to deterrence, much better than Americans. The objective reality of military power can be less when the subjective judgement is that a state will use armed coercion (including latent forms like gunboat diplomacy).

We know little of actual Chinese security concepts. Their strategic writings are unavailable, we do not fully understand their historical allegories, and prolonged discussion is infrequent. Still, to judge from official statements, programs and behavior, one can speculate on a Chinese view of deterrence quite different from Western opinions. This is unsurprising since China is the only large region never controlled by Westerners and possesses an ancient tradition of its own. No level of assured destruction can "win" a war or deter an adversary. Yet this is the very bedrock of Western thinking. The population must be defeated on the ground and physical occupation must take place. Otherwise, as the Chinese taunt the Soviets, they will win. Psychological factors, reflecting those old traditions, seem to be more important. We assume rationality in warfare; the Chinese recognize emotion as Sun Tzu proclaimed centuries ago. The "inevitable war" indeed may be postponed (or even avoided) by an emotionally developed strategy of heightened vigilance, upsetting global superpower dispositions", and exposure of appeasement (People's Daily, Sept. 19, 1978). Further, the Chinese believe the critical stage of warfare is after the nuclear exchange and therefore stress civil defense, protracted ground combat and eventual victory despite nuclear devastation. Of course, four decades of revolutionary leadership in which political organization, masses, morale and symbolism played key roles have undoubtedly influenced Chinese military leaders. China's security will continue to exploit its geography and demographics, encourage Western assistance against a common adversary, and seek selfsufficiency via modernization. Domestic political factors will dictate bureaucratic pragmatism by the military unless the oscillating struggle turns violent as during the Cultural Revolution. Economic allocation will remain the crucial issue. Further, logic would suggest an attempt to reduce Sino-Soviet hostility if terms can be reached. In the absence of moderation, the Chinese will expect America to resist Soviet expansion, transfer armament technology, and to side with the PRC on international issues. If economic modernization is partially successful, if a population-food balance is achieved, economic constraints upon Chinese military modernization in the post year 2000 environment could disappear. And, at that point, the Middle Kingdom would indeed be a superpower.

SAMPLE MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER MATRIX

Item	Benefit	Risk	Timeframe	Comments
Optics	Enhanced PRC defense against U.S.S.R.	Minimal if passive FLIR and new technology excluded.	1986–91	U.S. technology will continue to advance. Only use aside from Sino-Soviet border is against Asian states, a low risk.
Aircraft simulators	do	None, commercially available	1981–86	General purpose models, not aerial combat simulators.
Diesel engines	do	Economic risk to other Asian states if Chinese export production.	1981–86	Improves fuel conservation and reliability of equipment.
Inertial navigation system.	do	Some, given potential use against U.S. allies and as a base for technical refinement.	1981–86	Clearly, a case-by-case decision on each sale.
Early warning radar	do	None	1981–86	An obvious defensive asset.
Test equipment	Improve industrial base.	Slight, Chinese will press onward regardless of United States.	1981–86	Sell less sophisticated Network analyzers.
Communications systems.	Improved C^3 system	Small, even if Chinese reverse engineer.	1981–91	Another case-by-case decision.
Computers ADP software.	Improved defense	Small, primarily because of competitive world developments.	1981–91	All but most recent that could be used in nuclear development. Mini models, disc drives 16–64K memory chips, all are possible sales.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA REGIME TYPE/POLICY MATRIX

Issue	Regime type		
	Leftist/radicalist	Technocratic-military coalition[1]	Weak, fragmented
Regime and succession	Unstable, unable to insure succession.	Stable, orderly succession	Unstable, so weak succession is not an issue.
Sino-Soviet relations	Extreme hostility ideological attacks	Hostile	Appeasement.
Sino-American relations	Hostile	Rapprochement, détente	Deferred hostility.
Sino-India relations	do	Indifferent except for Indian-Soviet axis.	Defensive, especially over Tibet.
Sino-Southeast Asian relations.	Seek influence, active support of insurgencies.	Seek influence, try to dampen Asian fears of PRC, exploit Asian fears of SRV.	Lowered interest.
Sino-Japanese relations	Political hostility, seeks trade	Rapprochement, attempt to obtain technological and economic cooperation.	Uneasy rapprochement, PRC fearful of Japanese attempt to exploit Chinese weakness.
Sino-Korean relations	Compete actively with U.S.S.R. for influence, strong support for North Korean positions against South Korea.	Attempt to secure North Korean tilt toward PRC at Soviet expense with only verbal support of North Korea versus South Korea because of United States and Japanese connections.	Lowered interest.
Military forces levels and focus.	Very high, focus on political indoctrination proper "revolutionary" domestic tasks, tactics, advocate "peoples war" abroad.	High, focus on greater professionalism, modernization.	High, but focus almost solely on provincial matters.
Foreign policy	Ideologically active assist wars of national liberation.	Nationalist oriented emphasis on strengthening leadership in Third World while balancing U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.	Hermit.
Economic policy	Self-sufficiency, social priorities	Expanded trade, emphasis on economic growth.	Expanded distribution obtain external trade.

[1] Current model.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Mr. Werner.

I am afraid that I must leave to go to the Agriculture Committee. So I will ask Mr. Bob Sutter to chair the meeting in my absence. Meanwhile, I will observe that in my lifetime of attendance at seminars, conferences, and lectures, it has been my observation that the mind can absorb only so much as the rear end can withstand, so might I suggest that we have a brief recess, and consume some of the beverages and doughnuts that are at the table at the far end of the room?

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

Mr. SUTTER [presiding]. May I ask you all to take your seats, ladies and gentlemen, so that we may resume our discussion?

[Pause.]

Mr. SUTTER. Ladies and gentlemen, let us begin, please.

The purpose now is to address some of the issues that have been raised during the discussion of the papers, to give the other people around the table an opportunity to make comments, ask questions, and so forth.

First of all, I would like to welcome everyone once again. I am very pleased with the turnout, and am very much indebted and thankful to our participants in particular.

Several questions were raised by our discussants this morning in their presentations. From a personal perspective, I got the view

that we see China as a fairly weak country. It has great strengths in some areas, but it has innate weaknesses, and things aren't going to be fixed very easily. I think this has important implications for our later sessions when we look at the prospects for United States-China military relations.

I would like to start the discussion, perhaps, with the observation, Does everyone else around the table agree with that sort of assessment? Should we see China this way? And perhaps more important, would you agree that the Chinese leaders see themselves in this way? Do they see the problems in the same way that we have set forth this morning, or are they more optimistic about themselves over the next 10 years? Roger?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I will take a crack at that. I think we all agree that China is a weak nation militarily and will remain weak for the foreseeable future. I think the Chinese leadership is realistic, as Roy Werner pointed out, about its own strengths and weaknesses. I think they would not agree with some of our comments in every detail. I noted in Sydney Jammes' paper he makes two statements about this, one that China evidently views the Soviet Union as a long-term threat rather than an immediate danger, and the evidence for that is apparently that their defense modernization continues to hold the lowest priority.

I think the Chinese do not agree that the Soviet Union is not an immediate danger. I think they are quite concerned about the danger of a punitive strike, but they also are aware that at this stage of the game all the defense modernization in the world wouldn't change that.

In Sidney's paper, he mentions something which is more to the point, which is, the Chinese weigh the fact that no single, new, conventional weapons system, whether foreign or domestically produced, will markedly change the Sino-Soviet military balance or significantly increase China's ability to defeat a Soviet attack. I think that is more accurate than the statement he makes on the first page.

I think the Chinese have, therefore, over the years, and I think we can make a much better case for this than the case that was made for saying that the Chinese normalized relations with the United States for some tactical advantage in the Vietnam war, for saying that the Chinese, going back to 1969—and just an historical footnote here, the Chinese responded to President Nixon's offer to begin talking, an offer that was deliberately made by President Nixon right after the Soviets marched in Prague—that the Chinese were thinking very much in terms of not building up their defense capability against the Soviet Union through a relationship with the United States, but certainly building up its deterrent against the Soviet Union, even if it was at that stage only a political deterrent.

I think the Chinese saw in improved relations with the United States the opportunity to get improved relations with Europe and Japan, because they quite rightly saw at that point that the United States was the major obstacle to their ability to improve relations with Japan and with Europe, and particularly to get access to technology from Japan and Europe.

By the time we get to 1978, when they began the negotiations with the United States, serious negotiations, leading to full normal-

ization, the Chinese—and they made this quite clear during Frank Press' meetings with Vice Premier Fang Yi in July 1978—that their assumptions about the amount of technology they are going to get through improved relations with the United States, and Japan and Europe had not proven to be the case, because the United States, in their mind because of the lack of full normalization, had continued to obstruct not only their access to technology in the United States but their access to technology in Japan and Europe through our supposed dominance of COCOM.

That leads me to just one more comment, and then I will give up the floor. In John Sloan's paper, he mentions the acquisition of defense-related technology, that it has stalled for a variety of economic and political reasons. I think perhaps the consensus ought to show that the main reason for the stalling, the main political reasons for the stalling have been on the United States side and not the Chinese side.

Mr. SUTTER. Do you mean in our unwillingness to sell military technology?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Our unwillingness to sell them anything in the high-technology area, despite policy pronouncements to the contrary. If anybody would like me to document that, I can.

Ms. DREYER. Yes; would you please?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Very well. I will cite a couple of specific cases. One involves a pharmaceutical house in the United States, a pharmaceutical company that wanted to sell a pharmaceutical plant to China that involved the microencapsulation technique. The microencapsulation technique was disapproved and continues to be disapproved, despite the pronouncements about relaxing controls on the grounds that the Chinese conceivably could use that technique to make tear gas.

The Chinese have requested and have been turned down on any number of items in the computer area, in the metallurgy area, in the range-finding area, in the electronics area, all of the areas of weakness that we have talked about this morning. The Chinese have sought technology and have been turned down.

A couple of days ago I was told that they will continue to be turned down, because the promised technical parameters for American technology that would be freed up for sale to China, promised, I must say, back in July when the administration announced this liberalization, still has not been agreed upon, and still has not appeared in the Federal Register.

As long as they are not agreed upon, nothing is going to go, including a couple of items which I could document in writing if somebody would be interested, items that used to go to China before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but now are not permitted to go to China because of the tightening up on technology transfers to the Soviet Union.

Mr. SUTTER. Roger, perhaps you could provide us something for the record? That would be very useful it seems to me.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Certainly.

[The information referred to follows:]

Export Control Issue

Despite the policy statements that have emerged from both the Carter and Reagan Administration over the past 3 years, there has been in practice little relaxation of controls on exports to China.

In March 1980, the Carter Administration issued Munitions Control Newsletter No. 81 specifying categories of non-lethal defense support equipment which could be considered for sale to China on a case-by-case basis. It is widely believed that under this authority China is already purchasing radars and similar equipment. In fact the only licenses that have been issued have been for one Cessna aircraft and for one camera for a Cessna aircraft. One American company has twice been refused permission to discuss the sale of range instrumentation radar despite the fact that such equipment has been approved for sale to India, a country with Soviet military advisers.

In June 1981, Secretary Haig announced in Beijing that the United States was removing China from the list of prohibited destinations for munitions control purposes. This meant that any items on the Munitions List, including weapons, could be considered for sale to China on a case-by-case basis. In fact, none has been sold and Defense Department officials are telling American companies that as far as the Defense Department is concerned there has been no change in policy since the issuance of Munitions Control Newsletter No. 81, in March of 1980.

Early in July 1981, the Commerce Department announced what appeared to be a significant liberalization of controls on dual-use technology. This policy, however, does not seem to have been implemented. The decision, described as a "Presidential decision," was summarized by the Commerce Department in three main points.

First, all export licenses not requiring COCOM review would be processed by the Department of Commerce without interagency review, thereby realizing a threefold reduction in processing time. This "decision" has apparently been overruled by the Department of Defense which insists on reviewing all cases.

The second point was that there would be a presumption of approval for products with technical levels twice those previously approved. This has been put into effect for computers, but the Commerce Department promised new technical parameters "in a few weeks" for 30–40 other products. It is now almost 6 months later and these have still not been published, reportedly because of interagency disagreements.

Point three was that cases above the "double" threshold would be considered on a case-by-case basis. This has not been implemented either, instead, what was intended as a threshold has tended to become a ceiling. Cases below the double threshold are considered on a case-by-case basis rather than on a basis of presumption of approval and nothing over that threshold is likely to be approved.

American companies are reluctant to apply for licenses on anything that appears at all questionable because a difficult licensing case can cost them both money and goodwill with their customers. Despite this self-imposed restraint, the Commerce Department acknowledges that close to 50 export licenses have been denied under the new policy. In addition to formal disapprovals, companies report being informally discouraged from pursuing license applications by Commerce Department officials who advise them by telephone that their licensing request "will prove difficult and time-consuming." Even when approval is given it is often too late. One company received approval last month on a license application pending since August 1979. Unfortunately, the Chinese had canceled the order in June and presumably turned to a non-U.S. supplier.

The Department of Commerce is now in the final stages of disapproving equipment necessary for manufacturing integrated circuits used in TV sets, watches, and calculators. According to the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense believes that the proposed export would be "detrimental to U.S. national security interest" because it would provide the PRC with technology and hardware "far advanced beyond current PRC industry needs." Significantly, the Department of Defense apparently made this decision on the basis of guidelines drawn up in 1975–76. If this decision holds, the alternative for the Chinese will be to turn to the Japanese who are already installing the assembly plant and TV production plant for the Chinese and, according to press reports, are pressing the Chinese to replace the U.S.-ordered equipment with Japanese products.

Perhaps the most egregious example of failure to implement the various export control liberalization policy statements involves a pharmaceutical firm which several years ago obtained a license to export a microencapsulation facility to the Soviet Union. After the Afghanistan invasion, the license was canceled. This year the company applied for a license to sell the same equipment to China on the basis of advice that the post-Afghanistan tightening up of control on the U.S.S.R. would not apply to China. Commerce advised the company not to pursue the licensing request,

commenting among other things that whoever advised that the post-Afghanistan tightening up would not effect China did not understand the policy.

Finally, companies expressed concern over the absence of any guidelines on the transfer of technology (through licensing) as opposed to the sale of end items. The Commerce Department will not comment except to say this "gives up problems." A related concern is that the Government is holding up licenses for computer sales involving software. Software exports are not controlled by COCOM but unilaterally by the United States. Since the U.S. Government has established no known criteria for software evaluation (and some companies maintain it lacks the technical expertise to do so), the Government is in effect closing the door to the growing market for software in China.

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Whiting?

Mr. WHITING. I am afraid I have to differ with Roger's last point and support the earlier point about the Chinese not perceiving the Soviet Union as posing an immediate threat. Perhaps Roger's use of the term "punitive strike" finesses the question, because punitive strike implies punishment for some kind of action, as with perhaps another lesson being taught to Vietnam. I wouldn't forecast what the Soviet Union might or might not do as a punitive measure against Chinese behavior.

But an immediate threat of attack implies a bolt out of the blue, or a desire to take off some piece of Chinese territory, or to intervene in Chinese domestic politics. I really don't sense in any of my discussions in Peking, most recently in September where I was lecturing at the Institute of International Studies, attached to the foreign ministry, the slightest intimation of an immediate threat.

On the contrary, it seems that all of the efforts on both sides of the border aim at containing local incidents, publicizing them only by choice for tactical political purposes, and working toward possible relaxation at the political level. That possible relaxation at the political level does not carry forward to any serious negotiations, any settlement of the border, or any drawdown of forces of what might be called a prudent posture of defense.

I think it does not reflect that immediate threat, but rather the potential of something that might eventually come up in the longer range future.

Mr. SUTTER. May we have Mr. Werner, and then Professor Robinson, please?

Mr. WERNER. I just wanted to make a quick comment on the military-technology issue. People will have to bear with me, since I am obviously 10 months out of date. Certainly the process on interagency coordination had identified at length numerous specific models and all the areas of technology at the time I left the Pentagon. From the Chinese perspective, if I were on the receiving end, one of the things that would bother me is the leaning that I might be receiving second tier, so to speak, of equipment.

But obviously, it was clear some time back in the interagency process that we are not going to be offering the most modern equipment. No one really at that point had grappled with the question of the Chinese reaction to being given grade B technical equipment, and that is another issue that, when it gets to that stage—if it does—that needs to be wrestled with.

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Robinson, please.

Mr. ROBINSON. I detect somewhat more than marginal differences in the approaches of the several papers. I may be incorrect in this, but I sense that Sid Jammes is saying that China is in fact a

somewhat stronger and militarily more secure power, despite all of the catalog of differences that everyone knows, than, say, John Sloan's paper would indicate. I wonder if we could develop that a little bit.

There is a tendency in general to denigrate Chinese military power, as Sid was saying, but the premise of his paper is that China is a very strong military power. It is only weak in certain circumstances, and with regard to certain states. I want to pick up what Allen said in this regard also, because it seems to me that we are erroneous if we stick to a capabilities only assessment and don't consider the intentions on both sides.

I believe that Soviet intentions, vis-a-vis China, by and large, have been, still are, and probably will remain defensive, and what Allen said is therefore well taken. Now, if this is so, it seems to me that China can be a bit more relaxed about her military problems, that she can afford to take her time in military modernization, that she can put the military component fourth in the four modernizations, and that she can afford to rely more than otherwise on the support, such as it might be, of foreign powers such as the United States.

Mr. SUTTER. We have a curious mix, then, on a variety of different questions: The notion of Soviet intentions has been raised; the mix of deterrents and military modernization; and China's calculations of their foreign situation; and the mix of Sino-Soviet tensions.

I sense a lack of agreement on these issues. Some people would emphasize the Soviet threat. Others seem to be suggesting that Soviet intentions are defensive. Others stress that China really needs the help of the united front with the United States; in particular, that it needs this alinement with the United States.

This has very important implications for U.S. policy toward China, particularly if you want to look at what leverage do we have regarding China; if you have a China that is fearful and under the Soviet threat, and needs the United States in this regard to help it against the Soviet Union, then the United States would have a good deal of leverage in this situation, it seems to me.

On the other hand, if the Chinese weren't under a major Soviet threat and therefore were slowly and methodically improving their military capabilities under a fairly benign situation, the leverage that the United States would have in this situation might be considerably reduced.

Would anyone care to discuss that type of issue and what this means for the United States? Mr. Gleysteen?

Ambassodor GLEYSTEEN. In a way this gets into this afternoon's subject, and I will be very brief about it. I agree with what you have just said. The issue is very important, because the relationship which we might develop militarily with China depends upon our appraisal of that issue.

I don't think we can answer your questions, and I think an attempt to do it with any precision would be futile and misleading. China is a powerful country, largely in a passive, defensive sense. I think the Soviet Union also sees it that way, but China nevertheless complicates Soviet life. The Soviet Union has forces which can defend or attack, and the Soviets have behaved over the last 15 years in ways which have given the Chinese very different signals.

For example, when the Soviets deployed 45 divisions along the border, the Chinese presumably thought that was a fairly offensive type of defense, but on the other hand, a significant Soviet attack against China has never occurred, with the possible exception of 1969.

The key is that the Chinese think they face a threat. If they didn't, they never would have done what they did in 1969–71 period toward us. So, in reference to your questions, there is a range of possibilities which will be affected by many variations. Soviet strength is going to change; Chinese strength is going to change; and intentions are going to change; depending upon political relations—not only in the case of the Soviet Union and China, but also the United States, Japan, and many other players. Although there is no neat answer to your questions, they are very germane to what we will be talking about this afternoon, because we have to calculate, in terms of decades, to embrace a broad parameter, and work within certain general conclusions. We should not get hung up on details.

Mr. SUTTER. Does anyone want to comment on the issue of Soviet intentions toward China in particular?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would just make one point: The question of Soviet punishment and punitive attacks. I would say that it ought to be part of the consensus that the Soviet Union punishes people for doing things that we would not consider to be wrong. [General laughter.]

Mr. WHITING. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Whiting.

Mr. WHITING. Much as I admire the State Department's desire for consensus, I don't think we really want to strive for that at this early stage in this meeting. It might be a very boring day otherwise.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I feel constrained once again to set the record straight. I have nothing to do with the State Department. [General laughter.]

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Robinson?

Mr. ROBINSON. May I ask a question of John which perhaps is out of order? Just what is the direction of Soviet buildup on the border? I have heard several different levels and statements of what the Russians are really up to. I wonder if perhaps someone could enlighten us about that.

For instance, one often hears that the number of Soviet divisions, which often is taken to be a talisman of Soviet intentions and capabilities, as being around 45. I heard recently it is now 56 divisions, which, of course, would be a very great increase. I wonder if anybody can make some useful statements about that which might be helpful to us.

Mr. SUTTER. That is open, presumably, to our paper givers of this morning.

Mr. SLOAN. I am not a Soviet expert, but let me make a few general comments on that particular point.

I think it is fair to say that Soviet forces have consistently improved since 1965 and continue to show improvement. We now say that there are more than 45 divisions along the Sino-Soviet border. This is an increase from the number of divisions that were

there several years ago. You may obtain specific numbers about how many more elsewhere. [General laughter.]

The point is, there are more units, and while these increases and improvements are taking place, one has to bear in mind that these 45 divisions are not all category 1 divisions poised for attack in the near term. So, it is somewhat of a long-term threat, but certainly to Beijing it cannot by any means be comforting or something to not respond to in some way.

I would like to make a few additional remarks, since some of the discussants made reference to some points in my paper.

Mr. Sullivan made reference to a sentence in which I said that acquisition of foreign weapons systems has stalled for a variety of economic and or political reasons. I was deliberately vague on the point, because I did want to imply that this was due not just to the Chinese, that it was indeed due to the actions or inactions of a number of parties.

Also, I think Sid Jammes and I don't have a fundamental difference in view on this particular subject, although we may have put our emphasis on different aspects of the problem. I was emphasizing the fact that while the Chinese can, of course, go it alone as they have in the past, they obviously would prefer not to, and if they are to maintain the current level of capability which they have, vis-a-vis the Soviets, I think they are going to require considerable foreign assistance, and a good quality of assistance.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Werner wanted to make a comment, and then Captain Patton, please.

Mr. WERNER. I will be short and succinct, and will take some nongovernmental sources. If you read the Hong Kong and the Japanese press, the Japanese fairly recently cited 51 divisions. That is fairly well accepted. You have had a good bit of C^3 improvements over the last 10 or 12 years in Soviet force structure there, and you can debate whether they are evolving toward a NATO-type comand structure there or not. That gets to the question of whether you believe they will ever shift reinforcements. I am a little dubious there.

The more intriguing thing to me, which I never have been able to decide, is the scale and scope of fortification by the Soviet side. This is tentative in my mind, but it suggests more of a defensive orientation on the part of the U.S.S.R. than people sometimes credit them with, but again that is a tentative judgment.

Mr. SUTTER. Captain Patton, and then Professor Dreyer.

Captain PATTON. There are some tables in the paper that you will see before you this afternoon that suggest that perhaps from Beijing's point of view it is the trend in the improvement of Soviet force structure throughout the Far East that they find disturbing. The tables suggest that since 1970, the Soviets have increased the size of their military force, land forces, by about 51 or 52 percent. They had 30 divisions in 1970. The number now officially is given as something like 45 or more than 46.

Of course, frankly, it is closer to what Mr. Werner suggested, but because of the way sources are sensitized in terms of getting that kind of information, the communities are a little reluctant to put those numbers out.

Soviet force growth in Asia includes the introduction of the Backfire supersonic bomber, both in the land-attack version and in the naval-attack version just within the last 2 years; the operational readiness of those squadrons, which startled the Pacific region when they went into operations much more rapidly than any of the Backfire regiments introduced anywhere else; the implementation of SS-20's in that theater; and the rather startling growth in the Soviet Pacific fleet, now the largest of the four Soviet fleets.

I think sometimes people get mesmerized by the land border of China, which is very long. The side that faces the ocean, on the other hand, is the only side through which commerce can move and through which the Chinese conduct their intercourse with the outer world; that side is 14,500 kilometers long. That is about 1,000 kilometers longer than Japan's entire coastline, and 2,000 kilometers longer than the U.S. west coast, Alaska and Hawaii.

The Chinese are mindful of the fact that about 60 percent of their population lives within Soviet naval cruise-missile range of that coastline, and three out of every four cities that have over 1 million population are within Soviet naval cruise-missile range of that coastline. They have a considerable reason to take note of the rate of Soviet military growth and the characteristics of that growth, particularly when one looks at the relatively short timespan over which that growth has taken place.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you.

Professor Dreyer, please.

Ms. DREYER. I would like to respond to Roy Werner's point about Soviet intentions toward China being basically defensive. I agree, but I think you also have to take into consideration that it is part of Soviet strategic doctrine that the best defense is often offensive. Also, there is, I think, the perception in the Soviet Union, or at least there was a few years ago when I was following this particular question more closely, that time is on the side of the Chinese.

I don't know, and perhaps someone who has followed this more closely in the last year or so can fill me in, if this perception has been changed since China's four modernizations have proved to have such modest accomplishments. In other words, the Soviet Union no longer worries that it will face a modernized China by the year 2000. So perhaps the U.S.S.R. is less convinced now that time is on China's side.

Another of Mr. Werner's points that I would like to speak to is his query on probable Chinese reaction to being offered grade B technology. My reading of the Chinese press indicates that there is considerable sentiment—although its strength is hard to gage since you don't know who said it and how many people agree with it—in the Chinese military that China may not be able to absorb grade A technology. Just by analogy with the rolling steel mill which the People's Republic of China imported from Germany and which turned out to be such an expensive disaster because people were unable to use it and maintain it, the Chinese are going to be aware of the pitfalls of purchasing advanced military technology.

So, you may not have as sharp a reaction to the offer of grade B technology—the "you are humiliating us and therefore we won't accept it" kind of thing—as one might think initially.

Mr. SUTTER. Ambassador Gleysteen, please.

Ambassador GLEYSTEEN. This is really a question to our expert panelists. Agreeing with what Roger Sullivan says about the American Government bureaucracy, which seems to lag behind the process, political decisionmaking, but assuming that the resistance can be overcome—how much assistance, in a technical sense, can the Chinese absorb and, politically, how much are they willing to expose themselves to dependency on the United States. When I was writing my own paper, I put this aside, but I think it is a very important question. We have been surprised in the past to discover that while we have been trying to climb a certain hill for the Chinese, the Chinese just don't want to go up that hill. I would be interested if any of you have thoughts on the subject.

Mr. SUTTER. You really get to the heart of the question here, and that is, what role does China want the United States to play in this equation? We are talking about deterrence. We are talking about how the Chinese strategy is going to be built against the U.S.S.R. Is there a consensus in China as to what they would like the United States to do in this regard, particularly when you get into the political issue that you raised?

I have read three of the four papers that were delivered this morning, and you all discussed this in one way or another.

Mr. Sloan?

Mr. SLOAN. Here is a beginning answer. It seems that in our papers we were saying that China could not absorb sophisticated weaponry from outside sources rapidly, that it would take a long time, and that the Chinese recognize this, too, and therefore they are very selective as to the types of systems that they will choose to acquire, and of course part of this consideration has to do with resource availability.

So, the answer to the first question is, the Chinese are not prepared to absorb modern weaponry fast at all. But on the political aspect of your question, it seems that while they are, I think, anxious for both technical and symbolic reasons to acquire these key items of weaponry and technology, they probably would not do it at the expense of such issues as Taiwan, and, as was mentioned by one of our speakers this morning, at the expense of being exposed to ignoring problems of real poverty in China and being perceived by the general populace as a pawn of the United States. I think that was a good point that someone made earlier.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Werner, please.

Mr. WERNER. I probably betray my bias and training more in European political economy, but I have great admiration for the Chinese decisionmaking. From what I can judge it to be, it is very skilled at picking out the crucial points and focusing their resources on that.

I think June's question is in many ways the key question. I would add one other qualifier to it, I perhaps give more weight to the political capital and the prestige value. I do think the Chinese have in their own mind fairly well-defined notions of what it is they are after and where they would like to progress in some of these subfields.

You can take some of the commercial vendors who visited China as early as 1976 and 1977, like General Electric, who were most amazed at the detailed specificity with which they were greeted by

the Chinese scientific personnel, especially in terms of knowledge of foreign equipment. They recognize their own weaknesses, and they recognized in those discussions, for example, some of the specific manufacturing problems they might encounter.

Maybe I am oversensitive, because of my previous time on Senate staffs, to the often-cited Iranian example of absorptive capacity. I just don't think the Chinese are going to make that mistake. I think Jay's comments are probably pretty much on track in terms of having a fairly well-defined position, recognizing their human capital requirements and the like.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Sullivan, please.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would agree with that. I would just add a couple of comments.

I think the Chinese have behaved somewhat differently in their conversations with suppliers in the early years and in their conversations with government in their later years. I think one reason for this is, in the earlier period, the Chinese were, I suspect, trying to test the limits of what it was the Americans might be willing to consider selling to them and in later conversations, when I was still in the Government, I think the Chinese were quite clear about what they wanted, and I think they were quite clear as to what our role would be.

I think that had to represent, given the kinds of people who said these things, and they included PLA leaders as well as political leaders, some kind of national consensus.

I think without violating any confidences that I can say in general terms it is something like this. They are concerned and well aware of the limits on their ability to absorb technology, and they are particularly conscious of their limited ability to absorb weaponry, given the foreign exchange constraints they face.

Therefore, what they come out with is a rather modest program involving upgrading their defense industries with technology transfer and some training, and in the weapons area a few quick fix items that are obvious to everybody in the antitank and antiair area.

Also, and I was particularly interested in this, they were very sensitive to our own concerns. They have never in my hearing asked for anything, and I think it was deliberate, that we would consider to be threatening to Taiwan.

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Whiting?

Mr. WHITING. Speaking to Bill Gleysteen's point on what do the Chinese want us to do and what do they expect of us, I think the skepticism which the Chinese leadership has, probably without much serious internal division, concerning U.S. policy stems not only out of a general experience with foreign governments, including the United States, but an assumption that you just cannot rely on a foreign power when you are as weak as China, that the foreign power will seek at some point to take advantage of you, to withhold, to make its own decisions.

More specifically, they have a very vivid recall of what technology transfers from the Soviet Union meant in the late fifties. Whether perceived or real, they sensed that the technology transfer was going to be accompanied by political constraints on Chinese choices. They saw the Camp David meeting of Khrushchev and

Eisenhower as a presumed point of collusion, affecting their choices in the Taiwan Strait.

Some of them may have chosen to extend that technology dependency longer. Mao's decision, however, to push the Sino-Soviet dispute to the point of breaking the military relationship does not seem to have brought any overt challenge in whatever materials have surfaced since his death. That is not one of the points that we have been enlightened about.

I therefore think that in addition to the very sensible and practical constraints on absorbing technology that have been cited by others, with which I agree, there is a larger political inhibition here. That political inhibition does not, however, extend to China'a desire to encourage the United States to confront the Soviet Union on its own, and that has been a point of encouragement in Chinese exhortations for a number of years.

I could not understand Secretary of State Haig's comment in Hong Kong on his route to Peking, that he hoped to encourage the Chinese to stand up to the Soviet Union and halt Soviet expansionism, because it seemed to me that the lectures had been the other way around for a long time.

To the extent, then, that they are forging a united front I suspect this to be the main strategy but one that they are not pursuing with high confidence, one that they are monitoring in terms of each point of potential confrontation, and one where they are not risking their own security.

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Robinson, and then Mr. Sloan.

Mr. ROBINSON. If we can draw conclusions with regard to Chinese security policy vis-a-vis the United States on the basis of China's capabilities alone, I would come to three.

First is that China would like to see the United States act as an insurance agent against the Soviet Union *in extremis*, that is, in such situations as nuclear attack, of the sort that they could not handle on their own, with their own forces.

Second is that the United States is regarded as a supplier of technology at a margin, for all of the reasons cited, political and economic.

Third is that Beijing perceives Washington as a useful temporary partner in situations where China cannot carry out her security policy successfully on her own. Here I would refer to the well-known parallel policies or alleged parallel policies in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

So, I would emphasize three words: In extremis, at margin, and temporary.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you.

Mr. Sloan?

Mr. SLOAN. I would like to supplement my earlier comment with regard to answering Ambassador Gleysteen's questions, and to supplement also, perhaps, a point that Roy was making.

It is true that the Chinese have had a good idea as to exactly what they needed and what they wanted and how much they can absorb and pay for. We give them a lot of credit for having a realistic appraisal, but we also should note that they have learned quite a bit over the past 6 years and are still learning, and just perhaps the height of the learning occurred after 1977.

I would just make reference to what appeared to be a real Chinese perception that such equipment as the Harrier aircraft could solve many of their problems in the short term. This seemed to be, I think, more than just political testing.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Jammes?

Mr. JAMMES. I agree with the statements that the Chinese in general have a clear and definitive view of where they wish to go and what they wish to purchase or not purchase, but let's not make them superman. They are not unlike our own bureaucracy. There is a whole litany of tales of where they do not know where they want to go. But in general, I agree with the comment, but let us keep in mind that they are like the rest of us. They take two steps forward and then one step backward.

Mr. SUTTER. With those words of wisdom, I think we are ready to open the discussion up for questions from the floor. I would like people who would care to ask questions to please raise their hand and then identify themselves, and then make comments or suggestions of one sort or another, and we will proceed now, please. Are there any questions?

Mr. HEATON. I am Bill Heaton. The question I have has to do with two capabilities that were kind of touched on, and I thought maybe people on the panel would elaborate on them a little.

The first would be China's role as a supporter of insurgency in Afghanistan and Pol Pot. That is a military capability, and it probably will have some influence on their relationship with them.

The other one is as an arms supplier to Pakistan, North Korea, possibly the PLO, and perhaps other countries. Even though we mentioned that their capabilities are quite limited, they nevertheless do conduct arms sales to other countries, and this certainly would be important to the interests of the United States in the future.

I wonder if some of you would care to address these points.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I may be getting out of my field of expertise, but I cannot resist making one comment. The ability of the Chinese to support insurgencies looked at lot more formidable when they were an enemy than they do when they are a friend. [General laughter.]

I think they may have value to us more as a supplier of arms, and they have been valuable in the case of the supply of arms to the Cambodians. I don't know, frankly, whether they have been supporting the Afghans, but I certainly hope so. [General laughter.]

They are uniquely equipped, and perhaps this is something we can discuss later on, in terms of the kinds of technology that we are prepared to sell the Chinese.

Since the United States is not capable of making the kinds of weapons in large quantity that some of our other friends in the world might need, we might indeed decide that it is in our interest to have the Chinese make handheld infantry weapons and other types of simpler weapons for sale or for aid on some cooperative basis to people who are in need of such supplies rather than the goldplated ones we prefer to make.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Sloan, please.

Mr. SLOAN. I would say that Mr. Heaton's questions really don't need too much elaboration. They add a balance and contribute to

the discussion this morning on China's military capabilities. He points out two areas in which the Chinese have considerable capability and can make contributions, and we did not cover them in our presentations.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Werner?

Mr. WERNER. I basically would like to pose a question to the Government members of the panel. The last time I did any extensive work on Korean order of battle or military balance was 3 years ago but my impression was that the North Korean armaments industry has succeeded well in the seventies. So I wonder, is there really any sizable Chinese export at this point in time to North Korea on armaments. I am dubious of it myself.

Mr. SUTTER. Does anyone care to comment on that?

Mr. SLOAN. I don't know. My impression is that the Chinese probably could learn things from the Koreans in that regard.

Mr. JAMMES. I guess the only area where the Chinese would have an advantage over the Koreans would be in aircraft. The Koreans are torn between less sophisticated Chinese aircraft and more sophisticated Soviet aircraft.

Ms. DREYER. Which the Soviet Union is very reluctant to supply the Koreans with. I am thinking of Mig-23's, for example.

Mr. JAMMES. Yes.

Mr. SUTTER. Do we have other questions from the floor? The gentleman in the back.

Mr. ORLEANS. My name is Leo Orleans.

Mr. Werner mentions the fact that the Chinese military have millions of youth from which to select the best people into the PLA. Of course, this was the case in the past, but now if the military were modernized they need graduates of the urban schools, and here they would be in competition, of course, with the other sectors of the economy, and science and technology. They would have a hard time getting adequate numbers of competent graduates, especially because now there are incentives for the youth. They can progress faster in the economy than in the military, as it was in the past. That would be one comment.

My other comment is simply to say something that is rather obvious, and I will discuss it this afternoon. The importance of China in terms of our military or our strategic thinking is not so much in China's strengths or weaknesses of the military, but in terms of the Soviet perception of China's military strength and China's intentions.

I think that the Soviet perceptions are undoubtedly quite different from ours.

Mr. SUTTER. I saw a lot of nodding heads over here when the matter of Soviet perceptions was raised. I would like to get the head nodders to make some comment.

Captain Patton?

Captain PATTON. I restrained myself from commenting earlier when it seemed we were bordering on that issue. The reason we are here and the reason that China and the United States are driven to something that 10 or 15 years ago seemed unpalatable is because of the Soviet threat to both countries.

Therefore, it is very important for us to understand when we calculate Chinese military capabilities today, tomorrow, or 10 years

from now, that our calculations are almost irrelevant. It is the Soviet calculations that count.

I think when we discuss, for example, this afternoon, alternative strategies, we have to evaluate Chinese capabilities from Moscow's point of view rather than simply from the point of view of someone sitting in Carlisle Barracks or Leavenworth or Newport or somewhere like that.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Werner?

Mr. WERNER. I wouldn't disagree with anything on the last point. Let me just clarify my own thinking on the first question that was raised.

I agree totally on the point that it is a question of adequacy of scientific talent and numbers. It seems to me, however, that we are forgetting that this is a state controlled economy. They extended the draft a few years ago, which I look upon as another measure to help them in terms of length of service.

The fundamental point which I would make is very simply, in a state controlled economy, their efficiency is judged by where they want to put people, not by normal economic criteria. It is the Chinese leadership's decision, and it is for them to determine what percentage of engineers go where, and whether the most talented go into the nuclear program or go elsewhere to try and help operate steel mills or what have you.

It is simply an indicator of where the leadership wants to take them, and my only quarrel with the gentleman's comment would be that I don't think you can fail to recognize that point. It is not like our economy.

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Dreyer?

Ms. DREYER. I see efficiency in some sense being inhibited by the problems the Chinese are having with the draft at the moment. If you want to be able to absorb advanced technology, you will want to be able to draft the urban high school graduates that Dr. Orleans made reference to. As he says, these are not the people who want to join the army at the moment. In fact, many seem to be actively resisting the draft this year.

There have been comments in Jiefang Junbao (the official army newspaper) recently trying to refute the arguments of that tiny handful who say things like "to join the military is to be put at a disadvantage," and criticizing youth who grumble about military duty, and so on. Even if you extend the draft, and even if you are very efficient in your methods of pulling people in, reluctant soldiers don't make the best military personnel.

Mr. WERNER. I really have no quarrel with what you are saying if we talk about the technician level. But, of course, it is essential to talk about premium scientific talent.

You have a basic choice as a youth in China whether to go with the party and reap the rewards of that, to include possibly foreign education. I guess my argument would boil down to this, in the end, it is the few cream-of-the-crop people who are going to make the advances, supported by able technicians.

So, I wouldn't quarrel with what you say, but I think I would still hew to my distinction.

Mr. SUTTER. There is a question in the back over there.

Mr. GRAHAM. I am James Graham.

I want to go back to the business of Soviet perceptions. I think this obviously is of extreme importance in our relationships with both countries. I didn't want the impression to be left here from what the people have said that the Soviets are incapable of making an objective assessment of the physical capabilities of China's military forces.

If they can verify SALT arrangements with their national collections systems, I think they can verify the physical capabilities that the PLA disposes. If that is true, it leaves us with a long and enduring question of why the Soviets feel threatened, and why the almost hysterical view of China that was particularly surfaced in 1969 and 1970, either deliberately or spontaneously when the Soviets were spreading word that China was a real threat and it was essential to chastise them or do something, and concern in this country over a Soviet invasion, of course, was at a high level, but there is something here besides the current threat or even an objective military threat from China, so they are perfectly capable amongst their professional people of assessing China perhaps more objectively than we have over the past two decades.

They know what the industrial base is. They know what the economic, scientific, and technical problems are. They know what Chinese capabilities are, I think. They have the resources to determine that.

So, there are a couple of cautionary things here. One is that we should be careful in assessing our ability to use China, to use the China card in United States-Soviet relations. I think the capability to play that card is somewhat exaggerated. In previous administrations, after the euphoria of the visit to Peking, what people saw as happening I don't think actually happened, but for the future, we still have to deal with a question that never really has been answered in academic or government research, and that is, what is it that really makes the Soviets so concerned about China, about Chinese hordes coming across the border 20 or 30 years from now?

That doesn't explain 45-plus divisions on the border today.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Barnett?

Mr. BARNETT. I am Doak Barnett, and I want to follow up Jim's comment, because I think it is a critical one. My judgment is that the Soviets' main concern is not Chinese hordes coming across the border, nor is it even some of the worst case contingencies that you can get the Soviets to talk about sometimes, a local flash in which the Chinese will go across the border and cut the Trans-Siberian railroad.

I think their concerns is the development of a kind of relationship between China and the United States which raises substantially the possibility that in local conflicts in Asia, the United States will have involvements and feels like it has to participate, which leads me to a very broad sort of comment about discussion in general, which I think has been implicit in everything that has been said, but I would like to separate this out clearly.

If one tries to assess China's security strategy, in a broad sense, as a priority, as opposed to looking at it from a narrow military sense, I would say quite clearly that there are several levels, and the primary and most important priority of the Chinese at present

from a security point of view is domestic political stability and economic growth.

A secondary and very long-term objective which we have discussed is gradually to improve their hardware, their command and control, and so on, for defensive purposes, but the third element which we talked about, but I think is worth separating out and looking at separately, and a crucial element there, in the short run security policy, is how Chinese policy can take advantage of and influence relations between other powers in ways that can enhance Chinese security.

It seems to me that essentially what the Chinese want most from us is a posture toward the Soviet Union that they believe will constrain the Soviet Union worldwide, including areas nearby and adjacent to China that might affect China's security. This is a very variable although crucial element in China's security policy.

I think in the fifties they counted on the Soviet Union maintaining a posture against the United States which would constrain, limit, and deter the United States. When they began to lose faith in the Soviets' willingness and capability to do this, they began to reassess their relations with the Soviet Union.

At the present time, since the late sixties, their fundamental objective has been, or at least a hope of theirs has been that U.S. worldwide policy would constrain the Soviet Union, but there are lots of variables in how they view the United States in these terms. One is what happens between the United States and the Soviet Union in the next 5 or 10 years. The other is their faith in the United States in general. This certainly will be affected by U.S. bilateral relations over issues such as Taiwan.

So, I think these are three interlocking but in a way quite different elements of Chinese security policy, and in some respect the sort of hardware military one is the least important in the short term, although it obviously is very important in the long term.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you very much.

Would anyone else care to comment on that?

Mr. ROBINSON. What Doak says summarizes very well what I think we all have said for the whole morning. But I would like to go back to the question of Soviet intentions which Bill Graham raised. How do we evaluate those intentions? We should look to two things: first what Moscow says, and then what it does.

What it says, it seems to me, is that there are two lines emerging from Moscow. Many people who have spoken with Soviet officials come away with the clearly documented impression that there are at least two groups in Moscow, those who want to be hard versus those who are more soft to China—those who are more emotional and look to the "Yellow Peril" problem versus those who are much more realistic.

These lines do compete, and the Russians do more between the two. They are not extremes, but they are alternatives. So you can find what you want in Soviet statements about China, and they both have some relevance, because not only are they written on the Russian psyche but because they have actual bureaucratic and institutional support in various places in the Soviet capital.

So far as what Moscow does, it seems to me that there the question is, on the one hand, they have built up militarily while on the other hand, they don't attack. Have they overbuilt, and if they have overbuilt or overdefended themselves, then why? I think they have. I think they are foolish to do that. But the question still is why.

It seems to me there are several answers. One is that they always have had a propensity to overgarrison their borders wherever they find the security threat. They have done this with China, too, despite the fact that from the very beginning people have warned them that that would lead to the kind of Chinese response that we now see, and a vicious circle developing.

Another is that they have overbuilt because they want to protect themselves against repetition of the 1969-type of events, where they seem to be confronted with an emotional and irrational act upon the Chinese part. I suppose the relevance today would be the Trans-Siberian scenario that has been talked about several times here. It seems to me that goes a long way to explain why the Russians have done what they have been doing so far as building up. But why haven't they moved against the Chinese? They have had many opportunities. There have been junctures where the Chinese were weaker or where the Russians could have rationalized to themselves and others that they could have moved against China. And they still might. But it seems to me that they haven't moved because of the uncertainty of the level and longevity of the Chinese response.

Moreover, I don't think the Russians want to sew dragons' teeth with the Chinese over the long run. They know that if they attack China—snipped off a province or whatever, something that they have a capability for doing—that would assure Chinese enmity for a long time. Perhaps—seeing that the Chinese have a long memory—for centuries, or a century, or politically speaking, for the indefinite future.

Finally, I don't think in recent years Moscow has been willing to engender a combined Sino-American response, along the line that Doak was outlining a few moments ago.

Mr. SUTTER. Do we have further questions from the floor or other comments along these lines? This has been a most stimulating discussion.

[Pause.]

Mr. SUTTER. We had one question from over there, please.

Mr. WORDEN. This may be a minor technical question with respect to China watchers trying to read between the lines, but we have heard from various papers that there is an agreement that military modernization is fourth and last of the four modernizations. Assuming that our friends at FBIS heard this correctly, and the Chinese stayed this way, when Hu Yaobang made his Double Ten speech the other day, has listed military modernization, national defense, in third place and not fourth. Perhaps this is an aberration. I can't believe Xinhua would misquote the chairman of the party.

Assuming this was not an aberration or a one-time statement, we can only speculate about what might have prompted Hu Yaobang to change the priority in this one speech.

Mr. PAAL. My name is Douglas Paal. I do watch China. There was no change in China. The public pronouncements, I want to be quick to reassure everyone that military modernization comes last in real priorities.

Mr. SUTTER. Is there disagreement on that?

[No response.]

Chairman PERCY. Good morning. On behalf of the Foreign Relations Committee I want to welcome all of you. We very much value the time that you are giving to be here with us and to address some of the very difficult and perplexing, complex problems that we face in our relationship with the People's Republic of China.

It is regretful that it came on the day that we have long anticipated. Today the Senate must make a decision on selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia. This is, for the former head of a photographic company, a real photo finish. In the prayer breakfast, which I particularly wanted to attend today——

[General laughter.]

Chairman PERCY. We meet every Wednesday morning. Senator Jennings Randolph gave the lesson this morning. He pointed out the fact that five States of the Union came into the Union with a margin of one vote each, including, as I pointed out on the floor to Senator Cranston, who was speaking on the opposite side of this issue, California, which came in by one vote, yet that one vote was all that was needed.

Senator Goldwater, who spoke, is here, by one-half of 1 percent plurality. That is the way the system works. So, the whole exercise on the floor now is to find that one vote on either side. We are looking on our side very hard for it indeed.

So, therefore, I will not be able to stay with you. Senator Strom Thurmond is now speaking. He has promised to speak for another 17 minutes, and then he will have to leave, and I will have to take over floor management again.

To be absolutely certain that I cover what I have to cover in a relatively few minutes, I will simply read from my notes. I will try to put into perspective, as I see it, the importance of what you are trying to accomplish in these three sessions.

I am pleased that the workshop, "The Implications of United States-China Military Cooperation," is really well under way. Mary Locke is keeping me apprised as you go along, and I do have reading time on the floor. She is writing a summary of everything that is said. We are keeping a close tab on this because we do value it so very much.

In the seventies, we saw the United States and China emerge from a long period of mutual hostility and suspicion. Communication, understanding, and our respect for one another have increased multifold since the dark days of the 1950's and 1960's. Personal friendships have flourished as the number of visitors between China and the United States has grown every year. Trade has increased greatly. It just doubled last year, and the potential is absolutely huge. The needs are very great indeed on both sides.

I had the great honor and privilege of going to the Soviet Union on a mission with Hubert Humphrey for 2 weeks. We came back to Washington for 3 days and then headed a mission to the People's

Republic of China. In that 1-month period I had an opportunity to contrast the two societies, and some day I will write a book on that.

While in China, our delegation was received by Vice Premier Deng for 4 hours, and while he was here subsequently, I met with him on several different occasions. I became tremendously fond of him. I just simply said if he ran for public office any place in the the United States, he would do awfully well. All I would ask would be that he stay out of Illinois, because I would not want him as a competitor.

I took him to the Lincoln Memorial, and was profoundly moved that he knew the history of it, why it means so much to Americans, and why it means so much to my own State of Illinois.

On the rather well-known flight that went to Egypt for President Sadat's funeral, I had the opportunity to sit and talk with three former Presidents of the United States about the People's Republic of China and where our relationship was going to go and to talk about the shock that came to Japan when the Kissinger secret mission went through Pakistan. It was a remarkable experience to see the three living past Presidents of the United States and the intensity they have in this unfolding relationship with the People's Republic of China.

The question we face now in the 1980's is, where do we go from here? This administration has taken a decision to consider supplying arms to the People's Republic of China. There is a possibility that we will see very little movement in this direction for a number of reasons, some having to do with China's own security priorities and some having to do with the overall United States-China relationship.

As we know, they have put military modernization into a fourth priority category, other things in their judgment being more important. That is an encouraging sign. But if we do develop an arms supply relationship as one of the first steps toward an evolving security relationship, it is momentous indeed.

Military cooperation between the United States and China could have far-reaching implications for future U.S. policy in Asia, just as a decision to be made today at 5 p.m. on AWACS will have a profound influence upon the unfolding of events in the Mideast for years to come.

China has the potential for becoming a preeminent regional power as well as a key component in the gobal balance of power. Those who support a U.S. military supply relationship with China argue that military cooperation will strengthen an already good relationship. A strong China, secure within its own borders, should contribute to peace and security in the region. Not all interested parties, however, have endorsed the administration's proposal wholeheartedly, and some have absolutely condemned it in an unconditional way.

Certainly in developing its relationship with China, the United States must listen to and take into account the views of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and United States friends in Southeast Asia. I have had some informal conversations already with some of those powers. We should also weigh the concerns of some U.S. analysts who have questioned whether an evolving military relationship between the United States and China could provoke the Soviet

Union and thus raise tensions in Asia. I have had long conversations with our former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Tom Watson, and other experts on the Soviet Union on that particular aspect of this perplexing question.

Others have argued that we should take into account our friends on Taiwan and ask how arms sales to China will advance our desire to see that situation resolved peacefully.

All of these views must be examined and weighed in our decisionmaking. They have been built into the workshop agenda, and have been discussed somewhat this morning and will be discussed extensively in the third session tomorrow.

This workshop is particularly timely. The administration has pledged to consult with Congress before decisions on specific weapons sales are made. If arms sales are approved by the executive branch, congressional decisions may be required if the sales are large enough to qualify under restrictions in the Arms Export Control Act. This series of three workshops is designed to provide Congress with some of the background and analysis necessary to make sound decisions on the issue.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is quite indebted to Senator Hayakawa, the chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, for organizing and hosting this important event.

I don't know what degree of agreement there has been or will be between Senator Hayakawa, who is the chairman, and the ranking member, Senator John Glenn. They are on opposite sides of the issue that is on the floor of the Senate today. Maybe in this area of United States-China relations, by working together in comity with so many of you, we will all arrive at a commonality of interest and viewpoint—more so than we have had thus far on the AWACS issue on the floor, where we seem to be divided right straight down the middle today just as the Foreign Relations Committee was divided in its 8 to 9 vote on the issue.

Certainly, looking at the issue and studying it from all aspects, I would hope we would work toward a consensus as to what the right national policy should be.

We deeply appreciate the cosponsorship of the Congressional Research Service and the participation and work of the CRS staff in preparing this workshop. The issue may be one of the most important to face our committee in the coming year. This workshop, gathering the opinions of some of our Nation's best thinkers on this issue will be making a very highly valuable contribution to the foreign policy of the United States and perhaps even to the stability of the world, when we are talking about a relationship between the most powerful nation on Earth and a nation that embraces one-fourth of mankind, or perhaps I should say personkind. [General laughter.]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you very much, Senator Percy.

Unless there are further questions, I think we have discussed in considerable length the issues on China's military capabilities this morning. If we keep to our schedule, we will reconvene here at 2:30 p.m. to look at alternate strategies in United States-China relations. Thank you all very much for your attention.

[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the workshop recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. the same day.]

Afternoon Session

The workshop convened in room 457, Russell Senate Office Building, at 2:30 p.m., Mr. Robert Sutter (member, Congressional Research Service) presiding.

Mr. Sutter. Let us reconvene, please.

This afternoon the title of our session is alternate strategies in United States-China military relations. We will follow a similar type of format, that is, similar to the format we followed this morning. Four participants will make brief opening statements of around 10 minutes or so, and then the floor will be open for discussion among the various participants. We then will have questions and answers and discussion from the audience.

I am very happy to have a distinguished group of four individuals who will offer presentations this afternoon.

Our first discussant will be William Gleysteen. Ambassador Gleysteen was born in China. He has a very distinguished Foreign Service record. He was Deputy Chief of Mission in Taipei, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, a member of the National Security Council Staff, again Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and most recently was Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. He is now a vice president with the Asia Society here in Washington.

Ambassador Gleysteen.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WILLIAM GLEYSTEEN, ASIA SOCIETY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Ambassador Gleysteen. Thank you.

I give you a choice. You can either read my paper later or you can listen as I read and throw it away. [General laughter.]

One thing I would like to emphasize is that I have dealt with the issue at hand both here in Washington and most recently in Korea where I had a regional perspective of it. If that doesn't come through clearly in my paper, I nevertheless feel very strongly about it. Maybe it will come through in the discussion later.

A program of active military cooperation between the United States and China could profoundly affect U.S. relations with other countries in Asia, far more than the establishment of United States-PRC diplomatic relations or even the strategic shift reflected in the Kissinger journey to Peking. Sensible consideration of how we should proceed in such circumstances requires not only clarity about the objectives to be served and the costs involved, but also realism about the degree to which any particular American strategy might actually influence events in the desired direction.

Military considerations, while generally passive and implicit, have been a key factor in United States-PRC dealings since the inception of the normalization process. Prior to that time, American advocates of change could never break through the accumulated barriers against a rapprochement, even though PRC-Soviet relations had been deteriorating very visibly for over a decade.

After the late 1960's, when leaders of both countries came to recognize the strategic benefits to be gained, the two Governments

cut through their hostile confrontation remarkably quickly, the United States recognizing the global advantage of having the Chinese counter the main threat of Soviet forces in Asia, and the benefit in East Asia of not having to deploy U.S. forces against China, and the Chinese appreciating the diversionary advantage to them resulting from powerful U.S.-NATO forces deployed against the Soviets, as well as potential U.S. assistance in the case of an actual Soviet attack on China.

When this recognition first muddled its way into the American consciousness, the situation, or at least the perception of it, differed significantly from today's. Power equations, ideological factors, and the current political atmosphere led rather naturally to the fluid and sometimes manipulative concept of triangularity in United States-Soviet-China dealings. Relative United States-Soviet military power appeared more favorable to the United States than it does today. The policy of détente was still being actively pursued. And Americans still tended to view the Chinese as ideologically hostile and capable of further policy shifts, including resumed hostility toward the United States.

Apart from obvious concern over the Taiwan question, Americans remained generally ambivalent about the new China connection. On the one hand, they appreciated the security benefits to the United States, and displayed considerable anxiety that these might be erased by a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, an anxiety that reinforced efforts to maintain momentum in the United States-PRC normalization process. On the other hand, they seemed to favor some constraint in the conduct of the China relationship so as not to cause unnecessary damage to the United States-Soviet relationship. Some, and I don't name them, even hoped the emerging United States-China relationship would enhance positive development of the United States-Soviet relationship.

Now, however, we have passed the stages of triangularity and tilt back toward the comfortably simple concept of bipolarity, primarily because relative Soviet military strength has grown appreciably, generating concern among most Americans and paranoia among some. Fear of the Soviets has prompted us to seek greater defense efforts by NATO and Japan, and provoked thoughts of a coalition with China.

The duality in our approach to the U.S.S.R. has disappeared, at least temporarily, removing a restraining factor in dealings with China. Within China, the evolution of a trend toward moderation and pragmatism has eased our ideological discomfort, while discovery that the PRC's armed forces are weaker and more in need of assistance than earlier presumed has made a resurgent China seem even more remote as a potential threat to U.S. security. Sentimentality and competitiveness also have played their part as Americans search for new fields to plow after the harvest of United States-PRC diplomatic relations.

In this apparently simpler world of white hats and black hats, plus their proxies, the Carter and Reagan administrations have accelerated a pattern of decisions which now would permit a more adventuresome phase in our dealings with China. The American public, which might have dragged its feet 5 years ago, has not resisted. Rhetorically, at least, the American view of Soviet power

has adjusted to the more apocalyptic Chinese view that seemed so excessive only a few years ago. Fortunately, however, not all caution has been abandoned. There is still uncertainty about the steadiness of China's present course. There is growing awareness of the cost of building China's forces. The "China card" playing with the Soviets has lost its vogue, and there is more attention to the views of third countries. At least very few advocates of adventure with China are thinking in the grandiose terms of our last major collaboration during World War II, when we attempted to modernize and strengthen the forces of China for the defeat of Japan, only to discover that Chinese leaders had higher Chinese priorities in mind.

To note that enthusiasm for the United States-PRC military relationship has emerged from an oversimplified view of the complex world in which we live is not to suggest that there are no valid arguments in favor of military ties. It does suggest, however, that we remain sober while examining the objectives and other factors.

The most obvious and least controversial objective of military collaboration with China would be to try to sustain an across-the-board relationship in which the PRC remains sufficiently wary to deploy substantial forces against the U.S.S.R. and generally behaves in a friendly way toward the United States. This was a strong argument for originally establishing full diplomatic relations with China.

Although it continues to have great merit as an objective, we should not assume automatically that the only way to achieve it in the next phase of our relations is through bustling military activity. Conceivably, a more active military relationship might at some point be necessary to ward against the possibility of China's return to a more neutral, manipulative role between the U.S.S.R. and ourselves. In present circumstances, however, a modest or even passive military relationship might suffice, because it is apparent that the Chinese need the cover of our military strength as much, if not more, than we need theirs.

A more controversial objective of military cooperation would be to try to create, and I quote, a "strong modern China" to sustain and, if possible, enhance China's ability to affect Soviet military power. While a weak and unstable China would pose serious dangers for East Asia's stability as well as the world balance of power, we should not jump to the reverse conclusion that it is necessarily in our interest to help build China toward the superpower status that was the goal of its previous leaders.

Fortunately, China's current leaders have sensibly opted to put their domestic house in order, and develop a long-range scheme of military modernization—hoping to deter Soviet adventure in the meantime through a combination of borrowed strength, that is, ours, their own rudimentary nuclear deterrent, and their potential for mass defense.

Short of massive military help, which the Chinese themselves do not want at this stage, we need to recognize that even lesser amounts of military assistance to China pose significant problems for us. Some of the difficulties are well-known and perhaps overrated. Others are less known but serious.

While the Soviets were annoyed by the manner and timing of our move to normalize with the PRC, they nevertheless recognized the inevitability of it and they treated it as one in a complex of factors affecting their behavior. A major United States-PRC military program, however, would have a much more fundamental effect on the Soviets—surely negative with the severity of the reaction depending upon the nature and amount of our assistance of China. In the lower range of largely symbolic moves, the Soviet reaction might be manageable. In the higher range, it could only exascerbate United States-Soviet tensions to a point of very real danger, a risk we could justify only if there were overriding, and demonstrably overriding, strategic advantages to be gained from such behavior.

In contrast to Soviet reactions, which are fairly well understood, Americans have tended to underestimate the sensitivity of other Asian countries to Sino-American military cooperation. Within limits, I think, there is some tolerance, though no enthusiasm in Asia for United States-PRC military dealings, but only so long as such collaboration is: One, focused on the Soviet threat, and conducted under the umbrella of a large continuing U.S. military presence in Asia; two, strictly defensive—and that is very hard to define in nature—and limited in amount; and three, not at the expense of U.S. military assistance to other Asian countries.

But the tolerance level of other countries is actually lower than might be inferred from the muffled reactions so far. If a major collaboration were to develop, there would be deep concern in the area, I think almost uniformly, all the way from Korea through India, that China might use any increments to its military strength in ways adverse to the interests of other Asian countries. The reaction could easily be so strong that it would threaten the complex political and military balances underlying current East Asian security.

A third and even more dubious objective of a United States-PRC arms relationship would be hope that it might purchase Chinese cooperation in other areas. The odds are that China's behavior in such matters will continue to be governed by a careful calculation of Chinese interests. Where vital Chinese concerns are involved, as with Korea and Vietnam, it is doubtful that even a massive amount of U.S. assistance would deflect the Chinese from pursuing rather classic interests.

Moreover, the Chinese would not want such a massive dependence on us, and we could not afford either the material or political costs.

Assuming selection of realistic objectives among the ones I have described above, there are at least five further factors to be considered.

One, how much external military assistance could China absorb without endangering its own economic and political stability?

Two, on what terms would the United States offer such assistance, and how would it be allocated in the rapidly shrinking assistance resources for the East Asia region?

Three, what specific equipment, weapons, technology, and training would be appropriate?

Four, what would be the impact, and while this is very hard to estimate, what would be the impact of such assistance on Chinese leadership attitudes toward the U.S.S.R.—would it embolden them or otherwise—or on the Chinese leadership's attitudes toward China's other neighbors, and perhaps even more importantly, their attitudes toward the United States?

Finally, to what extent would the Chinese use such assistance in furtherance of common United States-PRC as opposed to just PRC objectives?

None of these questions has an easy answer, but each would require careful examination, consultation with allies, and some public discussion before any ambitious programs were undertaken. Given the uncertainty inherent in any effort to answer the last two questions, the only prudent course would appear to be to approach all military relationships with China tentatively and incrementally.

Depending on the objectives selected and the answers to the questions posed above, there obviously is a wide range of possible U.S. actions to help the Chinese militarily. At one end of the range would be maintenance of an essentially passive and implicit military relationship; at the other would be a highly visible, large program of military assistance.

I then arbitrarily scheme out in my paper four scenarios. The first one is essentially the status quo as it is now projected under the existing policy. The next one would be to add to that some symbolic actions, such as an exchange of naval visits. The third would be to actually get into an FMS program and much more extensive technology and weapons supply. The fourth I hope is a straw man, where we would have a major military assistance program with China.

I have done these not because they reflect my views, but just as an attempt to establish the range for purposes of discussion. In fact, I think that the third and fourth scenarios that I set out would overstress our relationships and do great damage.

Thank you.

[Ambassador Gleysteen's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEEN

FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED AND POSSIBLE APPROACHES

If pursued vigorously beyond the symbolic level, a program of active military cooperation between the United States and PRC could profoundly affect U.S. relations with other countries in Asia—far more than the establishment of United States-PRC diplomatic relations or even the strategic shift reflected in Kissinger's journey to Peking in 1971. Sensible consideration of how the United States should proceed in such circumstances requires not only clarity about the objectives to be served and the costs involved but also realism about the degree to which any particular American strategy might influence events in the desired direction.

While passive and implicit, military considerations have been a key factor in United States-PRC dealings since the inception of the normalization process. Prior to that time, American (and perhaps Chinese) advocates of change could never break through the accumulated barriers to achieve a United States-PRC rapprochement, even though PRC-Soviet relations had been visibly deteriorating for a decade. After events in the late 1960's finally convinced leaders of both countries of the important strategic benefits to be gained, the two governments cut through their hostile confrontation remarkably quickly—the United States recognizing the global advantage of having the Chinese counter the main threat of Soviet forces in Asia and the benefit in East Asia of not having to deploy U.S. forces against China; and the Chinese appreciating the diversionary advantage to them resulting from power-

ful U.S./NATO forces deployed against the Soviets as well as potential U.S. assistance in case of an actual Soviet attack.

When this recognition first muddled its way into the American consciousness, the situation—or at least the perception of it—differed from today's. Power equations, ideological factors, and the current political atmosphere led rather naturally to the fluid (and sometimes manipulative) concept of "triangularity" in United States/Soviet/China dealings. Relative United States-Soviet military power appeared more favorable to the United States than it does today; the policy of détente was still being actively pursued; and Americans still tended to view the Chinese as ideologically hostile and capable of further policy shifts, including resumed hostility toward the United States. Apart from obvious concern over the Taiwan question, Americans remained generally ambivalent about the new China connection. On the one hand, they appreciated the security benefits to the United States and displayed considerably anxiety that these might be erased by a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, an anxiety that reinforced efforts to maintain momentum in the United States-PRC normalizaton process. On the other hand, they seemed to favor some constraint in the conduct of the China relationship so as not to cause unnecessary damage to the United States-Soviet relationship. Some even hoped the emerging United States-China relationship would enhance positive development of the United States-Soviet relationship.

Now, however, we have passed through the stages of "triangularity" and "tilt" back toward the comfortably simple concept of bi-polarity, primarily because relative Soviet military strength has grown appreciably, generating concern among most Americans and paranoia among some. Fear of the Soviets has prompted us to seek greater defense efforts by NATO and Japan, and provoked thoughts of a coalition with China. The duality in our approach to the U.S.S.R. has disappeared, at least temporarily, removing a restraining factor in dealings with China. Within China, the evolution of a trend toward moderation and pragmatism has eased our ideological discomfort, while discovery that the PRC's armed forces are weaker and more in need of assistance than earlier presumed has made a resurgent China seem even more remote as a potential threat to U.S. security. Sentimentality and competitiveness have also played their part as Americans search for new fields to plow after the harvest of United States-PRC diplomatic relations. In short, American ambivalence about the China connection has all but disappeared.

In this apparently simpler world of white hats and black hats (plus their proxies) the Carter and Reagan Administrations accelerated a pattern of decisions which permit a more adventuresome phase in our military dealings with China. The American public, which might have dragged its feet five years ago has not resisted. Rhetorically at least, the American view of Soviet power has adjusted to the more apocalyptic Chinese view that seemed so excessive only a few years ago. Fortunately, caution has not been abandoned. There is still uncertainty about the steadiness of China's present course; there is growing awareness of the cost of building up China's forces; the "China card" playing with the Soviets has lost its vogue; and there is more attention to the views of third countries. At least very few advocates of adventure with China are thinking in the grandiose terms of our last major collaboration during World War II when we attempted to modernize and strengthen the forces of China for the defeat of Japan only to discover that Chinese leaders had higher Chinese priorities in mind.

To note that enthusiasm for a United States-PRC military relationship has emerged from an over-simplified view of the complex world in which we live is not to suggest that there are no valid arguments in favor of military ties. It does suggest, however, that we remain sober while examining the objectives and other factors to be considered.

POSSIBLE OBJECTIVES

The most obvious and controversial objective of military collaboration with China would be to sustain an across-the-board relationship in which the PRC remains sufficiently wary to deploy substantial forces against the U.S.S.R. and generally behaves in a friendly way toward the United States. This was a strong argument for establishing full diplomatic relations with China. Although it continues to have great merit as an objective, we should not assume automatically that the only way to achieve it in the next phase of our relations is through bustling military activity. Conceivably, a more active military relationship might, at some point, be necessary to ward against the possibility of China's return to a more neutral, manipulative role between the U.S.S.R. and ourselves. In present circumstances, however, a modest or even passive military relationship might suffice, because it is apparent that the Chinese need the cover of our military strength as much if not more than we need theirs.

A more controversial objective of military collaboration would be to create a "strong modern China" to sustain and, if possible, enhance China's ability to affect Soviet military power. While a weak and unstable China would pose serious dangers for East Asia's stability as well as the world balance of power, we should not jump to the reverse conclusion that is is necessarily in our interest to help build China toward the super power status that was the goal of its previous leaders. Fortunately, China's current leaders have sensibly opted to put their domestic house in order and develop a long range scheme of military modernization—hoping to deter Soviet adventure in the meantime through a combination of borrowed strength (i.e. United States), their own rudimentary nuclear deterrent, and their potential for mass defense.

Short of massive military help, which the Chinese themselves do not want at this stage, we need to recognize that even lesser amounts of military assistance to China pose significant problems for the United States. Some of the difficulties are well known and perhaps over-rated; others are less known but serious. While the Soviets were annoyed by the manner and timing of our move to normalize relations with the PRC, they nevertheless recognized the inevitability of it, and they treated it as one in a complex of factors affecting their behavior toward us. A major United States-PRC military program, however, would have a much more fundamental effect on the Soviets—surely negative with the severity of the reaction depending on the nature and amount of our assistance to the Chinese. In the lower range of largely symbolic moves, the Soviet reaction might be manageable; in the higher range it could only exacerbate United States-Soviet tensions to a point of danger—a risk we could justify only if there were overriding strategic advantages to be gained from helping the Chinese in an active military collaboration.

In contrast to Soviet reactions, which are fairly well understood, Americans have tended to underestimate the sensitivity of Asian countries to Sino-American military cooperation. Within limits there is some tolerance if not enthusiasm in Asia for United States-PRC military dealings so long as such collaboration is: focused on the Soviet threat under the umbrella of a large continuing U.S. military presence in East Asia; strictly defensive in nature and limited in amount; and not at the expense of U.S. military assistance to other Asian countries. But the tolerance level is lower than might be inferred from muffled reactions so far. If a major program were to develop, there would be deep concern in the area, all the way from Korea through India, that China might use any increments to its military strength in ways adverse to the interests of Asian countries. The reaction could be so strong that it would threaten the complex political/military equilibrium underlying East Asia's security.

A third, and even more dubious objective of United States-PRC arms relationship would be hope that it might purchase Chinese cooperation in other areas. The odds are that China's behavior in such matters will continue to be governed by a careful calculation of Chinese interests. Where vital Chinese concerns are involved, as in the case of relations with bordering countries such as Korea and Vietnam, it is doubtful that even massive U.S. assistance would deflect the Chinese from pursuing rather classic interests. Moreover, the Chinese would not want such a massive dependence on us, and we could not afford either the material or political costs.

OTHER FACTORS

Assuming selection of realistic objectives for United States-PRC relationship, there are at least five further factors to be considered:

(1) How much external military assistance (i.e. weapons, equipment, and training acquired through cash, credit, or grant) could China absorb without endangering its own economic development and political stability?

(2) On what terms would the United States offer such assistance and how would it be allocated in the rapidly shrinking assistance resources for the East Asian region?

(3) What specific equipment, weapons, and training would be appropriate? Defensive radar might be relatively uncontroversial. However, certain kinds of computer technology might start jitters around China's periphery, while supply of an advanced fighter aircraft would not only seriously complicate our existing problems in Taiwan but also severely strain relations with key Asia allies?

(4) What would be the impact of such assistance on Chinese leadership attitudes toward the U.S.S.R., China's neighbors, and the United States?

(5) To what extent would the Chinese use such assistance in furtherance of common United States-PRC as opposed to PRC objectives?

None of these questions has an easy answer but each would require careful examination, consultation with allies, and some public discussion before any ambitious programs were undertaken. Moreover, given the uncertainty inherent in any

effort to answer the fourth and fifth questions, the only prudent course would be to approach all military relationships with China tentatively, and incrementally.

SCENARIOS

Depending on the objectives selected and answers to the questions raised above, there is a wide range of possible U.S. actions to help the Chinese militarily. At one end of the range would be maintenance of the essentially passive and implicit military relationship; at the other end would be a highly visible, large program of military assistance.

A. *Maintain implicit military relationship without overt military cooperation.*—Each country would continue to benefit from the strategic role of the other; intelligence cooperation would continue; military officials would periodically meet; some advanced equipment and technology sales would be approved; and there would be periodic reminders that the Soviets could not count on U.S. non-involvement in case the U.S.S.R. attacked the PRC.

B. *Increase the level of military cooperation largely by symbolic actions and limited weapons sales.*—In addition to A above, undertake exchange of Naval visits, conduct visible discussions about military contingencies, approve certain limited weapons sales (e.g. anti-air or anti-tank missiles).

C. *Active military cooperation.*—In addition to B above, begin a small Foreign Military Sales credit program; offer sale of more defensive weapons and technology; and agree to entertain certain co-production programs (not aircraft).

D. *Major military assistance program.*—In addition to C expand FMS program to include concessional financing, larger levels, and ad hoc training assistance; permit small combat air and naval units to make familiarization visits to China (but not to engage in joint maneuvers); and broaden further the range of weapons and technology available to China.

NOTE.—If the premises of this paper are correct, Scenario D would probably pass the point of tolerance in our relations with the U.S.S.R. or Asian allies. The same would be the case if we were to carry out joint military maneuvers with the Chinese or supply the PRC with advanced fighter aircraft, massive troop transport capability or highly advanced technology clearly applicable to nuclear weapons or missile developments.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you very much.

Our next discussant will be William Hyland. He is a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has served in the Central Intelligence Agency, as a senior staff member of the National Security Council, as a Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State, as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and as a senior fellow at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. Mr. Hyland?

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM HYLAND, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. HYLAND. Thank you.

I do not have a paper, which I think was probably a wise idea. [Laughter.]

My views on this are not fixed, because I think it is a rather fluid situation. I don't have the impression that the United States is rushing to sell arms to China, I don't have the impression that China is rushing to buy any. Nevertheless, for the Soviet Union, this is not an academic issue. It would be easy to conclude simply that the Soviet Union is opposed to any military relationship between China and the United States. There are really no arguments that are likely to talk them out of this. This is something that is very deeply felt in the Soviet Union. It has racial overtones; it relates to their own history and to their feeling that they may be encircled, and so forth.

It is, therefore, an issue of great sensitivity, and has been at the center of Soviet foreign policy since the Kissinger visit to China in 1971. I think the Soviets see in American policy the specter of an encirclement linking China, Japan, and the United States in the Far East and even linking that combination to Europe.

They talk about a three-power or four-power alliance directed against the Soviet Union. For their own internal reasons, they tend to play it down and say that it won't really last, but that may be simply wishful thinking.

In the early 1970's this concern led the Soviets to use the period of détente to probe the American attitude toward China, to determine whether it was possible to turn détente into an anti-Chinese combination, or at least to break the relationship that was beginning to develop between the United States and China.

This took the form of overtures in the SALT negotiations for special relationships about how to act in the case of a so-called provocative attack. It took the form of discussions during President Nixon's period and even President Ford's. I think the failure—and this is a personal view—the failure in that period to make headway against the Sino-American alinement tended to reinforce the disillusionment of the Soviet leaders with the period of détente. It was not producing what they had hoped with regard to China.

To some extent, therefore, I think a reappraisal in the mid-1970's of the triangular relationship occurred. It was prompted in part by the deterioration in relations with the United States as a result of Angola. Then, the death of Mao in the Soviet view offered a new opportunity, and they made no effort to conceal the overtures to Peking at this time.

It is characteristic of the Soviets to believe that their dispute might be affected by a change in personalities because on their side much of the dispute in the early days was attributed to Stalin and Khrushchev. Thus, there was considerable maneuvering in the period after Mao's death.

The Russians were somewhat hopeful that Chinese politics might produce a more favorable faction, and there was a certain tendency to wait and see in Soviet policy. During 1978, the Chinese began to get their policy together and in August concluded a treaty with Japan which the Russians considered to be a watershed. It marked a failure on the part of Soviet diplomacy to prevent a reconciliation between Japan and China. It led directly to the Soviet underwriting of the treaty with Vietnam, that led to the invasion of Cambodia, and was followed by the Chinese counterattack. Out of that conflict came the first Soviet and Chinese efforts to discuss issues since the early 1960's. Those talks that did take place in connection with the exploration of the formal treaty of 1950, which the Chinese denounced, were probably more serious on both sides than we in the West tended to believe, because they were concealed, or at least their content was kept fairly private, and they went on for some weeks.

They actually were adjourned shortly before the Afghan invasion, but the Afghan invasion was the formal occasion for the Chinese to denounce the talks, and to turn again to real hostility. That was followed by the real Soviet nightmare; in 1980, Harold

Brown and Bill Perry went to China and raised the possibility of a military aspect to the United States-Chinese relationship.

The Soviets began to react more strongly when they saw that not only had they not accomplished anything with the Chinese in their own diplomacy, but that the Chinese were turning even more toward the United States, and the United States was holding out the possibility of a military relationship.

In mid-June, at the Central Committee meeting, there was a very strong emphasis on what they call the new phenomenon of a link between China and the imperialists and the threat that it posed for the Soviet Union.

So, especially during the trip of Secretary Haig, Reagan's policy was not all that large a break from the Soviet perspective. They see a continuity going back at least to the Brown visit, if not before; but they do characterize the Reagan-Haig policy as a qualitative change, and they have been saying since late summer that a decision to sell substantial amounts of military equipment has been taken, and is, therefore, not subject to reversal.

What the Soviets now say, at least on the public propaganda level, is, "Will the United States carry this relationship to its conclusion?" That is, will there be a true military alliance, with or without a treaty, between the United States, China, and, perhaps Japan? This is much discussed in the Soviet press. They generally say that this presents a clear danger, but that there may be several obstacles: One, the Chinese cannot be trusted, and two, the United States may wake up in time and realize that the weapons they sell to China will be turned against American friends in Asia. They don't discuss those weapons being turned against the Soviet Union.

Now, the Soviet Union realizes, and the Soviets cite various figures to this effect, that there are very clear limits about what the United States could do in rearming China. The figures that they use indicate that between $300 billion and $400 billion is the total requirement to arm 300 Chinese divisions. I believe this figure is from the ISS military balance, which gives some figures on how much it would cost to rearm one Chinese division. It appears that the Russians have simply multiplied, but that they have not done any real calculations on their own. They do cite the fact, however, that China would need foreign military sales credits if it were to get substantial amounts of aid. They are fairly realistic, I think, in recognizing the limits of the Chinese.

The second thing the Soviets say is that it is unlikely—in fact, they rule it out almost entirely—that there will be any American aid to Chinese nuclear weapon development or any nuclear warheads themselves. They also tend to rule out aid to Chinese missile production, but I am a little suspicious of the way they treat these, because, to some extent, this is being written for Soviet audiences as a reassurance.

What they think to be most likely is that China wants "the hen and not the eggs." This is a quote from a Soviet official. In other words, China wants the technology. They don't want to buy large quantities of weapons. It is this technology transfer that the Soviets expect to widen and expand.

Basically, the Soviets have discounted, to a large extent, the question of arms sales. What they are uncertain about and obvious-

ly uneasy about is the actual character of that relationship, whether it will consist of the sales of end items only, mostly technology, or some other mix, and its extent over a period of time.

The Soviet reaction to this has been rather interesting. It has taken several different forms. First of all, what really worries the Soviets is that Europe and the United States will combine to help the Chinese. There has been a lot of private pressure from the Soviet Union on Europe to prevent this, especially on Germany, because they feel Germany is a key country in this respect.

An aspect of this which is going to become more important is an effort to split off European security interests from Chinese interests through the negotiations that will begin at the end of November on theater nuclear weapons, particularly on the SS–20 missile, which is a mobile missile and can be moved from European Russia to the Far East. The Russians are now saying very clearly that they are willing to talk about limitations and reductions of those missiles in European Russia, or the western part of the U.S.S.R., implying that what they do against China should not be of concern to the Europeans.

This is going to pose a rather interesting test for the United States, because the United States is under pressure to make some kind of accommodation on this issue due to popular demonstrations in Europe; but should the United States make a deal at the expense of China, then the Chinese will have learned an important lesson about how much they can trust and rely on the United States. Therefore, there is a calculated Soviet effort to undermine the whole relationship between the United States, Europe, and China.

The second development has been the substantial improvement in Soviet-Indian relations since the return of Mrs. Gandhi and the sales of substantial amounts of new military equipment to India. Interestingly enough, the Chinese have tried to counter this by some improvement in their relations with India through a visit of their Foreign Minister and an agreement to resume border negotiations.

Third, the Russians have warned the United States both directly and indirectly of the dangers of playing the China card, or of carrying it any further. This reaction is typical of Soviets when they are worried and afraid. It is not a lot of tough talk, but rather a straightforward effort to dampen the situation.

It is interesting that the Chinese and the Russians are again back to the questions of whether they can resume negotiations, whether the negotiations should concern the border or the broader relationship. According to the press reports, the Russians have made an offer and the Chinese are studying it.

I suspect that this is still the basic Soviet strategy. They have never totally abandoned the idea that there might be some residual faction in the turmoil of Chinese politics that would still be willing to make a deal with the Soviet Union. This may be the wishful thinking of a group of old men who cannot quite accept the fact that the monolithic alliance of the fifties is no longer valid, but I think that, until the Soviets have at least one more round, they will not draw any decisive conclusions.

Beyond that, there is the question of the particular Soviet leadership. The leadership under Brezhnev, especially with Gromyko, Suslov, and Andropov, have become accustomed to the China problem, to the constant maneuverings and tensions, and while they may harbor some wishful thinking about reconciliation, they know it to be a tremendous problem.

That, however does not necessarily apply to Brezhnev's successors, who may feel that their predecessors were responsible for the destruction of the Sino-Soviet alliance and for bringing about considerable difficulties for the Soviet Union; so there is the problem of the Soviet succession and how the next leadership would see the relationship.

Nevertheless, I think we can end where we began. No Soviet leader, neither Brezhnev, Khrushchev, Stalin, or their successors can accept the idea of a strong military power in China. They must either limit Chinese military power or reduce it. It seems that is the thrust of Soviet policy now and the thrust of any policy for the next leadership. This must clearly be kept in mind by the United States. As Ambassador Gleysteen said, we might be able to move tentatively and incrementally in some military relationship, but if we move very far or very fast, we will confront the real danger of a reaction from the Soviet Union.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you very much. We will wait for just a moment to see if we can get our sound system working a little better.

[Pause.]

Mr. SUTTER. Our next discussant will be Col. James R. Martin. He is a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. He holds advanced degrees, such as a master's in public administration and a Ph. D. in political science from Harvard University. Since May of 1980, he has been assigned as Assistant for Regional Studies, Directorate for East Asia and the Pacific Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and I managed to say that all without taking a breath.

Colonel Martin, please. Perhaps you can speak up. I am not sure how much of this is getting into the system and actually being amplified, so please speak in a loud voice.

STATEMENT OF LT. COL. JAMES ROBERT MARTIN, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Colonel MARTIN. The lower one's rank in the Pentagon, the longer the title. [General laughter.]

So if you find someone whose title stretches over three of four lines, you know that he is down among the hewers of wood and the drawers of water. That is where I fit. [General laughter.]

I want to reiterate what I said on the cover sheet of my paper, which is that the views which I express now and in the paper are my own, and do not purport to reflect in any way the position of any Government agency.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak. I was very pleased to hear Ambassador Gleysteen and Professor Hyland give most of my paper. That means that I should be able to be even more brief.

To reiterate what Ambassador Gleysteen said, we do receive a number of strategic benefits from the improvement in United

States-People's Republic of China relations following the Shanghai communique. We ended the era of confrontation with China, freeing U.S. resources and permitting greater flexibility in our deployment of U.S. forces. We also increased Soviet concerns about what they see as a two-front security problem. Both of these represent strategic benefits to us. Some have said that in 1972 with the Shanghai communique the U.S. security problem went from a 2½ war problem to a 1½ war problem and the Soviets did the opposite.

Since the normalization of United States-People's Republic of China relations, our strategic relationship has moved somewhat beyond this relationship of implicit counterweight to the Soviets that existed in the seventies. Beijing now actively supports a stronger NATO, increased Japanese defense efforts within the United States-Japan defense relationship, and U.S. efforts to improve its own military strength. Beijing provides political support for U.S. security positions and takes a moderate stand in the international fora and among Third World nations.

We have seen increasingly where our interests converge and the capability for taking actions in parallel.

Now, these strategic benefits are important to the United States, and I think everyone recognizes that. What is not clear is what type of strategic relationship between the United States and the PRC is necessary in order to maintain those benefits. There are those who argue that an implicit counterweight relationship, one which is almost the byproduct of the Sino-Soviet split, is sufficient for the United States to gain these benefits without any further action on our part.

There are others who feel that a relationship does not exist and one has no assurance of these benefits unless you can write it down in a treaty. They seem to feel that somehow having a treaty would provide greater assurance that China will actually behave in a particular way in the event that they are called upon to do so.

I list five double conceptual alternatives as ways the United States-People's Republic of China can be structured. There are, I suppose, additional ones if you start with Sino-Soviet rapprochement at one end. But I have eliminated those types of relationships and have begun instead with the implicit counterweight relationship. I think this describes basically the relationship following the Shanghai communique and prior to the normalization of diplomatic relations, certainly the relations prior to the beginnings of a relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China military departments.

This type relationship is almost exclusively anti-Soviet in its strategic inception, and the most important factor in it is that each partner looks at the other one as a steadfast, reliable, and capable opponent of the Soviet Union in its own way. This, of itself, is a sufficient reason for maintaining the relationship. The dangers to the relationship are rapprochement or disillusionment of one or the other side with the benefits.

We have moved beyond that, I think, in the current relationship with the PRC, but perhaps not as far as the next option. I list that option as a Sino-American entente. This would be a relationship which is still a relationship of independent partners, but with more emphasis on the bilateral relationship rather than an almost exclu-

sive interest on the Soviet factor. It would recognize that parallel policies can be pursued where parallel interests exist.

The goal of our China policy in this type relationship would be to strengthen the durability of the relationship, to reduce the probability that it could be rapidly reversed either by Soviet diplomatic blandishments or by shocks to the relationship in the normal course of events, and to give it the legs for the longer haul. It would not focus exclusively on the anti-Soviet factor, and it would require a certain amount of momentum in our bilateral relations with the Chinese.

My third and fourth alternatives get into the higher range of military cooperation which Ambassador Gleysteen mentioned, and are closer to the idea of a military aid relationship. I have divided that level of cooperation into two components, one of which would focus on a relationship that would try to enhance China's ability to deter a Soviet attack on China and would imply a great deal of assistance from the United States for China's defensive capabilities.

The other is one which says, if a few Soviet divisions tied down on the Chinese border is good, more would be better, so let's make the Chinese more of an offensive threat to the Soviet Union and tie down more.

Both of these in fact would imply large quantities of military aid to China. As I discuss in my paper, they would not be feasible even then, because the Soviets would notice before they could take effect. Given the magnitude of the Chinese modernization problem, and the length of time that military modernization would take even with massive assistance from the United States or anyone else, either of these approaches could be destabilizing in the near term. They could in fact bring about that which they seek to prevent, and provoke a Soviet attack rather than deter it.

Rather than enhancing the strategic benefits, they could end in costing the United States one of the major benefits of the relationship as it exists now. Since they could be destabilizing in the near term, such relationships would at least imply some type of U.S. defensive guarantee of Chinese security. Such a guarantee would take us from a situation where the United States can be less concerned about a significant amount of Soviet military strength, that which is targeted against China, to a position where the Soviet forces become our concern. This would be a net strategic loss to the United States in worldwide planning and the global balance.

Finally, a more formal relationship would be the fifth option that I posit in my paper. I don't think I need to go into that. The advantage of the more formal relationship, however, vis-a-vis the Soviets, is that in a formal relationship you could specify the limits rather than rely on people to imply them from what you are doing in your other policies.

In that sense, it could be a less destabilizing type of relationship than either of the massive assistance types of relationship, defensive or offensive.

To sum up, in my view, China is a stategic counterweight to the Soviet Union by virtue of her size, her geographic location, and the Sino-Soviet split. The United States-People's Republic of China bilateral relationship did not make China a counterweight, but rather recognized the fact that China already was one. The nature

of the relationship can affect only marginally how heavy China can be in the strategic balance with the Soviet Union, because of the magnitude of the Chinese modernization problem. However, the nature and state of that relationship is important in determining where China weighs in the balance and the stability, real and perceived, of that orientation.

The existence of what both sides proclaim to be a long-term strategic relationship in and of itself increases deterrence by making the Soviet Union less confident that it could neutralize China and thus free its Asian forces for use elsewhere. The more we improve the real and perceived durability of the United States-People's Republic of China relationship, the more the Soviets will be concerned about what they view as a two-front security problem. Those actions which improve durability could also put into place the mechanisms for expansion of the relationship should Soviet behavior in the future require it and the evolution of United States and Chinese interests support it.

Thank you.

[Colonel Martin's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LT. COL. JAMES R. MARTIN*

The United States-PRC strategic relationship predates the normalization of diplomatic relations. Its basis comes from the late 1960's when the Sino-Soviet split flared into open fighting and the United States was seeking a way to extricate itself from Vietnam. The results were the beginnings of a strategic dialogue with the Kissinger visits and the 1972 Shanghai Communique. During the same 1965-72 timeframe, Soviet forces opposite China rose from about 150,000 to over 400,000 troops, from 20 to well over 40 divisions. After 1972 quantitative increases slowed but qualitative improvements continued through equipment modernization.

The Shanghai Communique, and the gradual improvement in United States-PRC relations which followed, ended the era of confrontation with China, freeing U.S. resources and providing us greater flexibility in our global security planning. Improved United States-PRC relations also increased Soviet concerns about what they view as a two-front security problem and permitted the United States and China each to consider the other a strategic counterweight to the Soviets.

Since the normalization of United States-PRC relations, the strategic relationship has moved somewhat beyond the implicit counterweight relationship of the 1970's. Beijing now actively supports a strong NATO, increased Japanese defense efforts within the United States-Japanese defense relationship, and U.S. efforts to improve its military strength. Beijing increasingly provides political support for U.S. security positions and takes a moderate approach to North-South issues in international fora and among the third world nations. Moreover, where United States and Chinese interests converge, as in Indochina and Southwest Asia, we have been able to pursue parallel policies.

ALTERNATIVE SECURITY/STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS

While it is clear that these strategic benefits are important to the United States, the type of United States-PRC strategic relationship required to maintain or enhance them is less well defined. Conceptually, there are five basic tyes of relationship we might seek. The first two represent modest levels of United States-PRC security cooperation; the others represent progressively higher levels of security ties. The five alternatives are:

Implicit counterweight relationship;
Sino-American entente;
relationship based on perceived need to deter a Soviet attack on China;
relationship designed to force the Soviets to increase their forces along the Sino-Soviet border, during the next 10 years; and
Sino-American alliance.

* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other governmental agency.

A. Implicit Counterweight Relationship

An implicit counterweight relationship is one in which the United States and China each recognize the value of the other as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. The focus is almost exclusively anti-Soviet and the most important factor in motivating and preserving the relationship is each one's perception that the other will remain capable and steadfast in opposition to Soviet expansion. The goal for the United States in this type of relationship is to preserve its strategic benefits against the twin risks of Chinese disillusionment with its value or worse, Sino-Soviet rapproachement. The importance of United States-PRC bilateral relations in this context lies in their contribution through consultations to avoiding misperceptions about policies and intentions and in their effect on Soviet perceptions of the potential for Sino-American cooperation.

The United States-PRC relationship of the late 1970's could probably be best described as an implicit counterweight relationship. Current relations have moved somewhat beyond this level and now contain a heavier bilateral emphasis than would be part of a pure counterweight relationship.

B. Sino-American Entente

Entente is a relationship based on mutual independence but with pursuit of parallel policies where parallel interests exist. Its emphasis is on United States-PRC relations, their durability, and the potential for cooperative action. It is not exclusively anti-Soviet in focus but it recognizes China's value as a counterweight to the Soviets and enhances it to the extent that it reduces the probability that the United States-PRC relationship would be subject to rapid reversal.

In an entente relationship the United States would seek to strengthen and broaden bilateral ties in all areas, including defense, in order to build a broad based perception in the Chinese bureaucracy that the relationship has utility which transcends our anti-Soviet interests. The anti-Soviet nature of the understanding would remain latent, and would emerge only in response to Soviet actions. We would seek to avoid actions which might alter China's current policies toward the United States, the West in general, and the U.S.S.R. At the same time, we would seek to present an image of restraint in the absence of Soviet provocation, limiting policy changes both to avoid gratuitous provocation and to leave open the prospect of escalation.

To increase the utility of the relationship in Chinese eyes would require that it be relevant to the achievement of Chinese purposes other than that of opposition to the Soviet Union. Among the most important of these are Chinese modernization goals. Therefore, although the entente relationship does not necessarily imply a U.S. interest in improvements of Chinese industrial or military capabilities per se, it does imply a willingness to contribute to China's modernization process, including defense modernization. There is subtle but important difference between being responsive to Chinese perceptions of their modernization requirements and promoting certain improvements. In the entente relationship we would seek to be responsive to improve the relevance and utility of our policies in Chinese eyes.

C. Relationship Based on Perceived Need to Deter a Soviet Attack on China

This would be based on the assumption that the Soviets, anticipating the success of China's modernization with support from the West, may conclude that time is not on their side and move to preempt China while it is still relatively weak. A successful Soviet preemptive attack or intimidation by credible threats of such attack could remove China as a factor in the global balance of forces.

If our goal is to strengthen Chinese deterrence of a Soviet attack, we should:

make the linkage between United States and PRC security more explicit;

assist China to strengthen its defensive military capabilities; and

avoid improvement of Chinese nuclear or power projection capabilities which would make China a greater offensive threat to the Soviets and risk provoking that which we want to deter.

Unlike the previous alternatives which focus on the symbolic effect of U.S. policies, this one would require active U.S. support for improvement of Chinese defensive military capabilities.

The impact on the Soviets would likely be mixed. It would reinforce Soviet concerns about the wisdom of attacking China but they would also consider the difficulties we would face in mounting any direct retaliatory actions against an attack on China. Since any significant U.S. contributions to Chinese defense capabilities would require several years to achieve results, they could have the opposite effect of that intended—reinforcement of Soviet perception that time is not on their side, provoking them to act now. At the least, such active and direct U.S. involvement in improving Chinese capabilities would ensure that Sino-American relations would be a contentious issue in our future dealings with Moscow.

Our friends and allies would be concerned that they might get drawn into the Sino-Soviet dispute on our coattails. They might also see this as our assuming additional commitments which could only be honored at their expense. This could undercut our efforts to encourage them to do more in the common defense.

To the extent that it increases the likelihood of U.S. involvement in a Sino-Soviet war, this approach could reduce the strategic value of the United States-PRC relationship to us. It could place back into the balance against our own forces, Soviet divisions now offset by the Chinese counterweight. Furthermore, Chinese technological and fiscal constraints, the sheer magnitude of the problem, and the relatively low priority given defense modernization by the Chinese mean that there can be no quick payoffs.

All of these costs are given heavier weight by the fact that they may be unnecessary. Few consider there to be a significant probability of Soviet preemptive attack. The apparent Soviet strategy is instead to pursue gains in the third world rather than concentrating power against their principal adversaries.

D. Relationship Which Would Force the Soviets to Increase Its Forces Along the Sino-Soviet Border During the Next 10 Years

As the West seeks to reverse the adverse trends in the global balance, the next 5–10 years are the most dangerous. If we could force the Soviets to devote more resources to countering China, we could buy more time to reverse the trends. To do this would require that the Soviets perceive China as a growing threat to their security rather than as an obstacle to their expansion. Since China would be unwilling to assume a more provocative stance against the Soviets without increased guarantees for its own security, the previous alternative is subsumed in this one.

This option would have a lasting adverse effect on United States-Soviet relations. It would almost certainly provoke Soviet retaliatory actions in other areas of the world and would increase greatly the probability of a Soviet preemptive attack on China before the program could reach fruition. It would spell the end to any U.S. commitment to reviving détente and provoke an adverse reaction from European allies for whom that prospect is a basic element of policy. Asian allies on China's periphery would be alarmed at the improvement of Chinese power projection capabilities. Taiwan, of course, would be appalled.

There are other significant dangers:

We could pay the price of fashioning such a policy only to find that the Chinese refuse to play. They have been very cautious about deliberately provoking the Soviets.

We could simply provoke a net increase of Soviet total military capabilities with no degradation of their capabilities in other areas of the world. This was the pattern of the Soviet buildup of its Far East forces in the sixties and many contend that it is the most likely Soviet reaction.

(The counterargument is that the Soviet economy cannot continue to support increased levels of defense spending). If this were the result, we would exacerbate our strategic problems in the event the Soviets were able to reach an accommodation with China permitting a redeployment of forces.

E. Sino-American Alliance

An alliance would be anti-Soviet in orientation and be based on the assumption that United States and PRC security interests converged to the degree necessary to support a mutual security agreement. Its goal would be to develop an agreed division of labor between United States and Chinese forces in the event of a major war with the Soviets and to build the capabilities on both sides to implement it.

The impact of an alliance on the Soviets and our allies could be less severe than the offensive option (D) to the extent that they would see the alliance as a restraint on unilateral Chinese actions. However, formalization of the anti-Soviet coalition would have a lasting adverse effect on United States-Soviet relations and might raise suspicions in Asian capitals that the agreed division of labor might include an agreed delineation of United States and Chinese spheres of influence in Asia.

DISCUSSION

The three higher level options share the characteristics of active U.S. promotion of Chinese military modernization and some degree of U.S. commitment to come to China's aid in the event of a Soviet attack. In the near-term, this latter factor runs counter to our interest in minimizing additional commitments of U.S. forces. Without severe Soviet provocation, an alliance probably is not politically feasible in either capital. Furthermore, the offensive option (D)—and to a lesser extent, the deterrent option (C)—is extremely provocative in the near-term but, because of

severe constraints on China's modernization, pays no dividends in increased Chinese military capabilities for several years. There would be few marginal gains if any, from these options over the next 5–10 years during which the trends in the global balance will be most dangerous. The costs are therefore more significant, particularly in terms of probable Soviet and allied reaction.

Another consideration which argues for maintaining some limits on the relationship is concern about its long-term viability. No one can predict with confidence the indefinite continuation of the status quo. Although no one predicts a drastic near-term change in China's strategic orientation either, we nevertheless need to hedge against the possibility of a different Chinese orientation in the longer term. However, we must also recognize that China's future orientation will itself be influenced by experiences to come as well as by those in the past. Excessive caution out of fear of eventual United States-PRC confrontation could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. On the other hand, a more forthcoming policy could enhance Chinese perceptions of the long-term utility of a pro-Western orientation, reducing the risk of eventual confrontation as well as favorably affecting the near-term global balance of forces.

Ideally from the U.S. perspective, the United States-PRC relationship should contribute to deterrence of Soviet expansionism across the spectrum from subversion in the third world to worldwide war. At the upper end of this spectrum, the relationship contributes to deterrence if it causes the Soviets at least to perceive a sufficiently high probability of China opening a second front that they cannot redeploy forces from the China border. It would be even better if they felt compelled to tie more forces down. At the same time, however, the relationship should not be needlessly provocative to the Soviets, running the risk of triggering that which it is supposed to deter.

At the lower end of the spectrum, the potential for escalation in the relationship contributes most to deterrence. If the China factor is to contribute even marginally to deterring more limited Soviet actions, it will do so because the Soviets wish to avoid escalation of the United States-PRC relationship to a new stage. Thus, the ideal image to be portrayed is that of a relationship with no clear upper limit, with institutional structures in place to permit rapid expansion, but without the inevitability of expansion in the absence of Soviet provocation.

China is a strategic counterweight to the Soviets by virtue of her size, geographic location, and the Sino-Soviet split. The United States-PRC bilateral relationship did not make China a counterweight; it recognized the fact that China already was one. Furthermore, the nature of the relationship can affect only marginally how heavy China can be in the strategic balance with the Soviet Union. However, the nature and state of the United States-PRC relationship is important in determining where China weighs in the balance and the stability, real and perceived, of that orientation. The existence of what both sides proclaim to be a long-term strategic relationship of itself increases deterrence by making the Soviet Union less confident that it could neutralize China and thus free its Asian forces for use elsewhere. The more we improve the real and perceived durability of the relationship, the more the Soviets will be concerned about what they view as a two-front security problem. Those actions which improve durability would also put in place the mechanisms for expansion of the relationship should Soviet behavior require it and the evolution of United States and Chinese interest support it.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you very much.

Our next speaker is Capt. James M. Patton. Captain Patton has had a good deal of experience serving on destroyers and submarines. He has worked on the Navy operations staff in their Strategic Plans and Policy Division. He received his Ph. D. in international law from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He served on the Navy operations staff in their Systems Analysis Division. He was in the State Department Policy Planning staff, and he was head of the War Plans and Policy, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and most recently, in his present position, he is executive director, Chief of Naval Operations, Executive Panel.

Captain Patton?

STATEMENT OF CAPT. JAMES M. PATTON, U.S. NAVY

Captain PATTON. Thank you.

Like Bob, I enjoy being here today, and like Bob's comments, mine are completely unofficial. One of my former bosses, Bill Hyland, at the State Department and others here have warned us. I think I counted three or four times today, about being careful not to provoke some sort of Soviet reaction to whatever growing military relationship we might devise with China.

It always troubles me to pick up the stick from that end because, after all, we are sitting here based on some felt need shared with the Chinese to move closer together to respond to what the Soviets already have done. Somewhere in my paper are some tables which show the growth of Soviet military forces on China's land side, and on China's maritime side. I don't want to recite the litany of the simultaneous growth of Soviet forces for the last 10 years in Europe. It would take more time than we have to articulate it in either strategic or conventional terms.

If, in fact, the felt need is leading us and the Chinese in the direction of establishing some sort of collective security arrangement, it seems to me that it would be useful to explore those key factors which would drive whatever strategy we would select within that arrangement and which would essentially drive the context of the arrangement itself.

The kinds of factors that I have in mind are the following:

One, I have watched very carefully not only the development of major Soviet forces on China's land side, but the remarkable development of Soviet transportation infrastructure, internal lines of communication between Soviet forces located in Asia and in Europe. I have done some calculations to indicate how very quickly NATO could be overwhelmed, despite the best efforts of the United States to reinforce NATO, were those Soviet forces now stationed in Asia to arrive within 25 or 30 days on the Western Front.

So one of the felt needs viewed from the United States-NATO side is to do whatever is necessary, wherever it is necessary, to prevent that from happening. That means that we must consider involving ourselves in something like a collective security arrangement with China.

Two, I mentioned this morning and will mention again some figures on the maritime side. For some reason this has not received attention. China's coastline of some 14,000 kilometers is longer than the entire coastline of Japan, and longer by a considerable amount, a couple of thousand kilometers, than all of U.S. territory facing the Pacific basin.

China has an extremely small navy. Technologically it is a very inferior navy. The fact that the Soviet Pacific fleet has grown to be the largest of its four fleets makes China necessarily uncomfortable. Mention was made this morning that 60 percent of her population lives within Soviet naval cruise missile range of that coastline. Three out of every four cities with over 1 million population are within Soviet naval missile cruise range of that coastline.

There is no expectation on our part, on the Chinese' part, or on anybody's part that the Chinese navy ever is going to be able to defend that coastline adequately. So, from their point of view, their felt need is greater than just some sort of rearming in order to protect the long land border in what is by anybody's judgment a

very barren, almost wasteland area. They have a much more immediate need.

Three, the third kind of factor which might condition our thinking about the kinds of strategies and hence the kinds of security options we might elect with China has to do with their embryonic nuclear capability. Obviously, we would like to see that not grow. Clearly, the Russians would like to see that not grow.

Left outside the context of any form of collective security environment, it is bound to grow. There is no alternative for the Chinese. On the other hand, within the context of some form of collective security environment, there may be an opportunity to limit its growth.

We have had some experience with Britain and France in that regard. Each of them has been competent to produce more nuclear weapons than it has over the last 30 years. By virtue of the protection of the U.S. nuclear mantle, they have not done so. So one of the things we need to be thinking about is restraining China's nuclear weapons potential.

If we can erect a few straw men, it might be helpful to imagine what kinds of collective security environments we might find ourselves entering with China. In my paper, I run through three; these seem like the obvious possibilities.

One would be for China to embrace a membership in NATO. I leave aside all of the obvious reasons why many of the NATO countries would be uncomfortable with that. But that is a conceptual possibility. It is an interesting one because it has the merit of the underlying tenet of "an attack on one is an attack on all." If in fact there should be such a broadened NATO alliance, the Soviet Union would understand that were it to move against NATO on the west, it might have to worry about China and a two-front war.

China would take reassurance from the fact that any movement against China would involve some sort of NATO operation against the Soviet Union, and of course there is a U.S. nuclear guarantee that overrides all NATO partners wherever they might be. So it is not an altogether stupid idea. It is just a difficult one.

Second, there is an interesting alternative to Chinese membership in NATO which is something Bill Hyland mentioned a little while ago, though not in these terms, that is, a "Pacific Charter" as an analog to the North Atlantic Treaty.

In these very rooms and under the auspices of this very committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, some 30 plus years ago, Americans were deliberating out of a felt need—based, by the way, upon the same provocation—the necessity to enlist in a collective security environment for the first time in the history of the Republic in peacetime. Much to their credit, they did it hand in hand, jointly, the executive and the legislature. We may be doing the same kind of thing again, and this meeting may be the precursor.

A "Pacific Charter" might initially involve no more than China, Japan, and the United States—and perhaps Canada, though that is not clear. I think it is important for us to understand that we are talking about a growth in Soviet military capabilities that makes us worry about the future of this Nation, makes the Chinese worry about the future of their nation, and therefore, causes other vexing

problems, like the two Koreas, the Taiwan situation, and the reactions of ASEAN, to be viewed from a new perspective.

Whether or not a "Pacific Charter" might grow to be more than a piece of paper, as the North Atlantic Treaty grew into NATO, is something for scholars to debate.

A third alternative might be simply a bilateral security arrangement between the United States and China. Whether or not that would include implicit or explicit nuclear guarantees on the part of the United States is an interesting question, though one for which I have no answer, although there is merit in moving toward or including with any such collective security environment that kind of nuclear guarantee.

I think there is probably room under all three of those generically, conceptually possible collective security environments, NATO, a regional alliance, or a bilateral alliance, room for us to assure China without arming her. Almost everyone around the table—and I am reminded of Baskin and Robbins, where you come in and take a number—almost everyone has lined up to tell us about the problems associated with arming China. It would be an enormous task. It would be difficult for China to assimilate. It might provoke a strong Soviet reaction, and so on and so on.

It has occurred to me that if in fact China has a felt need for maritime assistance, we have naval forces in the Pacific currently which are superior to the Soviet naval forces there. We have for too long automatically considered that those U.S. naval forces would decamp and move to the Atlantic in order to concentrate all of our forces in that theater to fight the Soviet Union.

Only relatively recently have we realized that to leave China and Japan under those circumstances on their own would cause us much more pain than if we deprived the Atlantic of those Pacific forces.

For example, there is no hope whatsoever of mining the straits of the Sea of Japan without Japanese cooperation, which they wouldn't give us if we left. One-third of the Marine Corps, nearly the largest group of American military living in Asia, live in Japan. We would hate to see them disarmed and interred or forced to retrograde under impossible circumstances but such might be the case in the event that the fleet was not on hand to honor our defense commitment to Japan.

And, of course, we would not like to see the 40 to 50 Soviet divisions that are on the Chinese border moved over what I must tell you is a very efficient internal line of communications—100 trains each way each day—to contend with our forces in Europe.

I would suggest that we add to our list of things that we would consider arranging with China, either incident to one of the kinds of collective security environments that I have described or incident to some more other general arrangement, a maritime commitment of some sort, to prevent the Soviets from interfering with Chinese commerce and Chinese access to the open sea. We have, of course, given in much more explicit terms the same kind of guarantee to Japan as well as, I might add, our nuclear guarantee.

Thank you.

[Captain Patton's prepared statement follows:]

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Prepared Statement of Capt. James M Patton

Note.—The views contained herein are the author's own; they do not represent the official view of any U.S. Government department or agency.

OVERVIEW

No sensible discussion of Sino-United States military relations can begin without reference to the remarkable growth in the military capabilities of the Soviet Union during the last two decades. More than simply impressive due to its size, sophistication and geograhic sprawl, Soviet military growth has been remarkable in that its compound rate of increase has never waivered even in reaction to often dramatic changes in the military postures of the United States, NATO and China. There is a "juggernaut" quality in that apparently relentless growth rate which arrests the attention of responsible national authorities throughout the northern hemisphere. Lacking the ability to escape geographically from the menace implied by the swelling Soviet military potential, some national authorities are searching for accommodation formulas, while others, to whom concessionary accommodations with the Soviet Union would be unthinkable, are repairing their own military capabilities and reappraising the value of anti-Soviet collective security arrangements. This then, is the context of the evolving Sino-United States relationship. The military feature of that relationship is a natural product of both country's reactions to the increasing Soviet military threat.

SINO-UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE SECURITY

It is not yet clear to what degree China and the United States will cooperate in their efforts to offset Soviet military capabilities or what the pace of such cooperation might be. Each country recognizes a set of benefits and penalties associated with closer military ties with the other. (Resolution of the Taiwan issue, for example, holds a prominent place among the considerations of both countries.) We can only predict that if Soviet military capabilities continue to grow at the same or even nearly the same rate, both China and the United States will begin to weigh the benefits of closer military ties more heavily than the penalties. It seems unlikely that either country would consider concessionary accommodations with the Soviet Union preferable to some enhanced Sino-United States collective security arrangement. Given the complexity of each country's set of benefits and penalties, it would be unwise to define collective security options too precisely and, moreover, it would be inappropriate for any active duty military officer to infer special knowledge or advocacy concerning such a sensitive foreign policy issue. Nevertheless, it is possible to describe the range of options and to speculate in general terms about strategies associated with each option.

SINO-UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE SECURITY OPTIONS

Along the spectrum of conceivable Sino-United States collective security arrangements, only three options seem plausible enough to warrant consideration of accompanying strategies:

Option A.—The association of China is some coherent military way with the principal existing anti-Soviet coalition, NATO. The United States, in this case, would act as a "bridge" between the European members of the alliance and China in much the same way that the United States has been the connecting link between the Western Europeans and their remote NATO partners in Greece and Turkey.

Option B.—The association of China in an Asia-Pacific regional coalition with Japan and the United States (and perhaps Canada). In this case, a "Pacific Charter" would copy the paradigm of the North Atlantic Treaty (adding an "anti-hegemonic" characteristic) and some cooperative military arrangement would serve as a Pacific analogue to NATO. Existing de jure defense relationships between the United States and Japan (and the United States and Canada) might be blended into such a regional coalition in ways similar to those which merged the U.S. bilateral defense agreements with Greece and Turkey more or less smoothly into the broader NATO alliance. At some later date (and depending upon finding a suitable formula), a protocol might include the Republic of Korea, although the specifically anti-North Korean function of the United States-ROK military relationship may simply remain a unique anomaly in an otherwise anti-Soviet collective security environment.

Option C.—Finally, the difficulties of designing any form of multinational alliance might preclude more than a bilateral Sino-United States defense arrangement. Even such a limited anti-Soviet coalition could be organized with any of a number of levels of commitment—from binding mutual defense, perhaps with implicit or explicit U.S. nuclear guarantees, at one extreme to non-binding defense consultation

at the other. (Some might argue that the current Sino-United States relationship has already risen above the lowest levels of commitment, and that the recent U.S. decision to permit the transfer of certain classes of lethal weapons and weapons related technology has established a de facto Sino-United States military coalition. Certainly, the Soviets might take that to be the case.)

SINO-UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE SECURITY STRATEGIES

Regardless of the eventual organizational form of any closer Sino-United States military relationship, certain factors are bound to influence the selection of alternative strategies.

Probably the most important factor is the Soviet land force in Asia. Now numbering nearly 50 divisions, more than 10 percent of which are armored, this substantial (see table 1) Soviet land army has been steadily upgraded in men, equipment and communications. Amply supported with tactical aircraft and nuclear weapons and based in close proximity to the Chinese border, this element of Soviet military menace is clearly stimulating Beijing's interest in collective security.

Less obvious, but of critical importance to NATO, are the interior lines of communication (air and rail) which connect Soviet forces in Asia with Central Europe. Improvements to these lines of communications have kept pace with the growth of the land army opposite China. These transportation facilities could, in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, facilitate the rapid accumulation of sufficient Soviet forces in Europe to outnumber all of NATO's available reinforcements. Matched with the force multiplying advantage of express front-to-front redeployment capability, the large and still growing Soviet land force in Asia presents a strategic dilemma to both China and the United States. China must find some coalition strategy which will minimize the risk that the Soviets will some day move their forces across China's borders, while the United States must devise a strategy that will prevent the Soviets from moving their forces away from China and towards NATO—or, perhaps toward the Persian Gulf. The question arises, why should China be anxious to contribute to NATO's defense by tying down Soviet land forces in Asia? The answer, sensibly enough, is that the Chinese can predict what their own lot would be, should the Soviets ever enjoy a clear win over NATO.

One could argue that a strategic formula which would satisfy both China and the United States, vis-a-vis the "management" of Soviet land forces in Asia, could only be found if China becomes associated with NATO. Bound together by the "attack on one equals an attck on all" fundamental tenet of NATO (not to mention the U.S. nuclear guarantee which extends to all NATO partners), China might take comfort from the knowledge that any Soviet temptation to cross their common border would be tempered by the concomitant military reaction of the United States and NATO—in effect, initiating the two-front war which the Soviets most dread. The United States and NATO, on the other hand, could be reassured, given such a broadened alliance, that a Soviet attack on Western Europe would trigger Chinese hostilities in the east, thus tying the enemy's "other army" to an Asian front and precluding its possibly decisive employment against NATO. It is not clear that any other option for the inclusion of China in a collective security arrangement would provide the same propitious double-acting result. Neither an Asia-Pacific regional alliance nor a Sino-United States bilateral alliance would express the same East-West connectivity. In either case, the United States might be perceived by its NATO allies to have a double identity—one facing them and having military obligations which they were prepared to share, and another facing Asia with military obligations which they only vaguely understood. It is one thing to accept that the security of Bonn or Brussels is synonymous with that of Washington, but something else to follow Washington's lead in the defense of Beijing. (There might be an analogy here to NATO's ambiguous response to U.S. unilateral efforts on behalf of Persian Gulf security.)

The second factor which will influence the choice of strategy is the Soviet naval force in the Pacific. Growing at a rate akin to that of the Soviet land force in Asia (see table 2), the Soviet Pacific Fleet is now the largest of the Soviet Union's four fleets. Armed with nuclear as well as conventional cruise missiles, with ranges of 300 miles or more, and supported by its own air arm of long range bomb and missile carrying aircraft (now including a dozen or so supersonic Backfire bombers), the Soviet Pacific Fleet could act as a hammer against the anvil of the Soviet land forces on the Chinese border and could bedevil China severely even if those land forces were redeployed to Europe against NATO.

China is only gradually coming to understand the special quality of menace represented by the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Barred from overland access to the rest of the world (save for North Korea) by the Soviets to the north, the wall of the Himalayas to the west, and the jungles of Indo-China to the south (as well as their

new enemy, the Vietnamese), China must look eastward and to waterborne commerce for nearly all of the trade required for development. China' coastline is 14,500 km long. (This compares to 13,700 km for Japan and 12,200 km for the Pacific shores of the continental United States, Alaska and Hawaii.) Some 60 percent of China's population and three quarters of her cities of over 1 million inhabitants are within 300 miles—Soviet naval cruise missile range—of that long and relatively unprotected coastline. China's navy is both smaller and technologically inferior to the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Given the navy's apparently low priority in the competition for resources, it seems clear that China will not be able to defend its access to the sea, or its people and cities near the sea adequately against the Soviets for the foreseeable future. (See table 3 for comparison of the Chinese, Japanese and U.S. naval forces in the Pacific.)

Unlike the Soviet land force in Asia, the Soviet Pacific Fleet cannot quickly redeploy to the European theater along interior lines of communications; thus, it does not represent the same kind of threat to NATO. The "anti-hegomonic" countries around the Pacific basin must devise a strategy which will contend with Soviet naval strength in the Pacific without reference to NATO, if need be. Such a strategy would find a home within the context of any of the three collective security options which might embrace China, so long as the United States is prepared to counter the Soviet Pacific Fleet. In the absence of any other naval forces with that capability, this contribution to anti-Soviet collective security must fall to the United States.

As the Chinese surely know, the U.S. Navy in the Pacific is already obligated to extend its protection to Japan in the event of a Soviet attack on that country. U.S. agreement to broaden that obligation to include at least some portion of the maritime defense of China would seem a likely ingredient in any form of de jure Sino-United States coalition. But, would it be possible for the U.S. Navy to satisfy such an obligation? That would seem to depend upon whether the U.S. Pacific Fleet is free from any necessity to redeploy from the Pacific in the event of hostilities with the Soviet Union without having first disposed of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Defeating the Soviet Navy in the Pacific would, moreover, require that the U.S. Pacific Fleet be armed and maintained in sufficient strength to take the offensive promptly, eliminating or neutralizing the Soviet Pacific Fleet before it could develop its full potential to menace Japan and China (or the long standing U.S. allies in the Pacific, the Philippines, Australia, or New Zealand). If the Soviet Navy should be permitted the opportunity to choose when, where, and whom it will attack around the whole periphery of the North Pacific basin, a naval force much larger than the U.S. Pacific Fleet would be required to defend adequately against its incursions.

SUMMARY

While it is not yet possible to predict whether there will be a Sino-United States military coalition of any sort, it is possible to discern what the main lines of military cooperation might be within the various coalition options. If the United States and NATO would have the Soviet land force in Asia "tied down" by China, they (or perhaps the United States alone) must be responsive to legitimate Chinese requests for weapons and equipment with which to combat that land force. The United States seems already to be moving in this direction. Moreover, the United States, as the only major naval power in the Pacific (besides the Soviets), must be prepared to consider Chinese requests for naval protection against the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Neither of these lines of Sino-United States military cooperation need risk offending Chinese sensibilities about having foreign military forces based in China, nor would they require redeployments of existing U.S. forces or the expansion of U.S. forces beyond levels currently planned by the Reagan administration. The question of whether or not U.S. land or air forces might be deployed to China in wartime must await the development of much closer Sino-United States military ties than now exist. Likewise, the issue of an eventual Chinese application for space under the U.S. protective nuclear mantle will have to remain unaddressed until China's own preferences for membership in the anti-Soviet collective security environment are finally articulated.

TABLE 1.—SOVIET LAND FORCE IN ASIA

Type division	1970	1980
Armored	10	6
Motorized infantry	20	40
Total	[1] 30	[2] 46

[1] Less than 50 percent fully mobilized ("category 1 and 2").
[2] More than 50 percent fully mobilized ("category 1 and 2").

TABLE 2.—SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET

Type ship	1970	1980
Carrier	0	1
Missile cruisers	6	9
Gun cruisers	3	3
Missile destroyers	3	10
Gun destroyers	10	10
Missile submarines	[1] 12	[1] 40
Torpedo submarines	[2] 93	[2] 60
Frigates	37	48
Patrol craft	100	140
Amphibious	6	11
Mine warfare	90	95
Auxiliaries	200	225
Total	560	652
Naval aircraft:		
Bombers	90	130
Anti-submarine	25	130

[1] Percent nuclear powered: 1970, 40; 1980, 85.
[2] Percent nuclear powered: 1970, 5; 1980, 25.

TABLE 3.—COMPARISON OF NAVAL FORCES, 1981

Ship types	PRC Navy	Japanese MSDF	U.S. Pacific Fleet
Carriers	0	0	6
Misssile cruisers	0	0	14
Gun cruisers	0	0	0
Missile destroyers	0	0	16
Gun destroyers	7	33	19
Missile submarines	[1] 1	[1] 0	[1] 3
Torpedo submarines	[2] 100	[2] 13	[2] 42
Frigates	20	15	37
Amphibious	32	6	31
Mine warfare	17	37	0
Auxiliaries	134	46	60
Naval aircraft:			
Fighters	600	0	156
Bombers	150	0	205
Anti-submarines	6	130	130

[1] Percent nuclear powered: PRC Navy, 0; Japanese MSDF, 0; U.S. Pacific Fleet, 100.
[2] Percent nuclear powered: PRC Navy, 2; Japanese MSDF, 0; U.S. Pacific Fleet, 88.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you very much.

This session this afternoon has provided a wide variety of issues and a great deal of food for thought. Let me make a personal observation here. I have been struck by the incremental nature that the first three speakers spoke of, in other words, that we can move incrementally, and that the Soviet response, at least initially, may not be all that bad. It is when we cross a certain threshold that it seems to be something to worry about. We are not yet there though, it appears, judging from Mr. Hyland's presentation in particular.

One thing that we should consider, perhaps, as we move down an incremental relationship, is what is driving this relationship, and clearly, Captain Patton has put his finger on one major thing that

is driving this thing from his perspective, and that is the Soviet power, and how it drives both China and the United States.

Something to consider, therefore, is, can this incremental relationship, can these factors that the other three speakers think will slow us down in this process and therefore warn us not to go too far in this regard, can they change over time? What factors will cause this equation to change?

Captain Patton suggests, it seems to me, that the Soviet forces will push us and therefore cause us to recalculate and cause China and us to come closer together. Would the other speakers agree with this? Would the other speakers agree that perhaps the situation could change, that we aren't locked in to our current policy; and what factors would have to change for them to support, let's say, a closer relationship? What sort of issues would they point to as instrumental in causing the United States to move more closely to the Chinese in a strategic relationship?

Colonel Martin?

Colonel MARTIN. I couldn't let that go without commenting on the fact that what I was presenting was not increments but options, and there is a difference between the two. It is not an implication that one would evolve inevitably from one step to the next, but rather one can pick and choose among those as to the strategic direction that we should take.

If your choice is what I have characterized as the implicit counterweight relationship that focuses primarily on the Soviet threat and on the common interest in countering the Soviet threat, then you do have the United States-People's Republic of China relationship as a dependent variable to the United States-Soviet relationship, and what happens in the United States-Soviet relationship almost of itself drives what you do with the PRC within certain limits.

So, if that is the path that we decide we should take, then yes, we would be reactive to what the Soviets are doing or perhaps trying to anticipate and get ahead of it, but in a very limited sense.

If, on the other hand, you are approaching the relationship from the standpoint of the entente relation, which says that we have strategic interests with China over and above those dealing directly with the Soviet Union, that there are other interests as well, and that there are other opportunities for parallel policies when your interests coincide, and you are concentrating on the importance of enhancing the durability of the relationship, then the bilateral factors are more important. The perceptions of the two nations about the relationship, its health, and where it should go in other areas are large factors in driving the relationship, perhaps to the extent of doing some things that could cost you something on the United States-Soviet side.

You might be willing, taking that option, to take steps that might not deal directly with countering the Soviets, and could in fact be somewhat provocative to the Soviets. I think these are two distinct types of approaches that you could take at the lower level of the types of relationships that are available.

Moving beyond that, you have the question of whether the United States in its policies with China now should assume a position of being responsible as opposed to being responsive for

certain aspects of Chinese military modernization or Chinese military operations, either by having a formal alliance, a collective security agreement, or by setting out deliberately to develop a Chinese defensive capability of U.S. design or a Chinese offensive capability of U.S. design in order either to increase deterrence or to increase Chinese provocation of the Soviet Union.

I think that is a quantum leap in the type of approach to such subjects as military sales and the military relationship and where the military relationship should head from the lower range of the spectrum of options that are available. Their lower range options look instead at building the relationship itself and at being responsive within that relationship to Chinese perceived needs, Chinese plans, and Chinese capabilities.

These are not increments, but rather are separate options. You have a basic choice as to how much you focus on the Soviet Union in choosing among them.

Mr. SUTTER. Ms. Locke?

Ms. LOCKE. This afternoon we are discussing scenarios. We seem to have gone from scenarios which include minimal security cooperation to scenarios which would include some sort of collective regional security arrangement. I have heard a Senator on our committee pose a scenario which would include virtually no military cooperation, certainly no arms sales, and certainly no security assistance.

Rather, the United States would focus its attention and its energies on economic, cultural, and political cooperation with the PRC, and for the time being, would exclude any sort of military cooperation.

My question to our panelists on behalf of this Senator who will be reading the transcript, is this. Can we have a close, friendly relationship with the PRC essentially without any military component?

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Whiting, and then Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. WHITING. Had you asked that question a year or two ago, I think my answer certainly would have been different. I certainly would agree with those who talk about the fragility of our relationship with Peking and the suspicion with which Peking views U.S. policy. This administration has declared as policy its willingness to consider arms sales. To reverse that policy situation under present circumstances both within China and internationally would be exceedingly unwise, and I for one couldn't subscribe to it at all.

In other words, I don't think this is a realistic proposal, because the political fallout from it would be very damaging to our relationship, and not one that we could recover in the near future. Therefore, I think we have to work within the confines of the present policy and not go back to where we were, let us say, with Harold Brown's visit, and the nonlethal sale of military equipment.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Sullivan, and then Professor Robinson.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I don't really have to add to that. I agree with that. I would just say that my answer to your question would be no, but please tune in tomorrow for greater detail. [Laughter.]

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Robinson?

Mr. ROBINSON. I agree, except that I think what Mr. Hyland is reasonably well convinced of is that the process so far has been

reasonably cost-free in regard to our relations with the Soviet Union. That is, the Russians have blustered but not done much more, and they have discounted what has come so far.

Also, if I might borrow from what I and others might say tomorrow, I don't think we can afford to dispense with this instrumet of policy. It is a very useful one. Unfortunately, we live in an era in which military assistance, sales, and transfers are one of the principal means by which national policy is conducted. I don't think, therefore, that we can afford to put it aside lock, stock, and barrel.

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Dreyer?

Ms. DREYER. I agree with Professors Robinson and Whiting, but I do think the question of how much and when the United States sells in this military relationship deserves careful consideration. There is a danger. Even when everyone agrees that these sales are to remain on a case-by-case basis there is a danger of what one might call the slippery slope. That is, the feeling that because you have approved one thing then you should approve another, and so on.

I think it would be exceedingly dangerous if this relationship which we have agreed on and which I agree with Professor Whiting that it would be bad to go back on, if we interpret this to mean that what the Chinese ask for, the Chinese get; otherwise they will scold us, which they are very good at, as all of us who have dealt with them know, and say, "but you promised and therefore you have to deliver," then we are creating problems for ourselves. We must guard against allowing the Chinese to build up unwarranted expectations.

I think we have to have some guidelines built in, some predetermined position from which we can deal with unreasonable demands. After all, in terms of selling the Chinese arms, we promised them something but we didn't promise them everything.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Werner?

Mr. WERNER. I have just a quick side point, and I am certainly not a Chinese internal expert, and this is open to debate, but we must remember the fact that the PLA plays a rather significant internal political role as well.

Mr. SUTTER. The question of open-endedness is something with which we must wrestle in dealing with some of the ambiguities in our relationship with China. Does anyone have any notion as to how that should be handled? I mean, to answer Professor Dreyer's question, how do you avoid the slippery slope, the continued progress toward one direction or another?

Mr. Hyland?

Mr. HYLAND. Well, if present trends continue, I suspect we can sell them everything up to and including an AWACS. [Laughter.]

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Sullivan, and then Mr. Hyland.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would make just two quick comments on that. One is that I think it has been about 10 years since Henry Kissinger said that a strong and secure China was in our national interest. I think we have done remarkably well in avoiding the slippery slope. We haven't sold them anything.

The other point I would make is, I think this is not a problem that is specific to the United States-China relationship. I mean, how do we avoid the slippery slope with Pakistan, Israel, and Saudi

Arabia? I mean, it is a general problem, and I am not sure we should take a lot of time to address which is a generic problem for all arms sales.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Hyland?

Mr. HYLAND. To be more serious, I think that military hardware is not the issue. I imagine that anyone could come up with a list of 50 weapons including even tanks and some forms of aircraft that are not all that dangerous in limited numbers over a period of time. It would not change the military balance, especially since the Russians seem to be constantly building up everywhere.

The more basic question is whether you become involved with collective security arrangements doing that over a period of time? Are we moving to a position where we have to defend China, where China will have us in a position where we automatically will be drawn into their defense if there is a confrontation with the Soviet Union?

That, it seems to me, is the critical question for the United States and for the Soviet Union, because if the Soviet Union sees that kind of relationship coming, it may preemptively try to break it apart.

Mr. SUTTER. We will have Ambassador Gleysteen, and then Professor Robinson.

Ambassador GLEYSTEEN. I am grateful to Captain Patton for having broken the unanimity of view which I feared we had come to. Carrying on with Bill Hyland's point, I think the concept of collective security a very extreme solution because it is a rigid solution to a fluid problem.

We do not really know, to harken back to this morning, all of the factors that are going to influence Soviet attitudes toward us, ours toward them, China's toward us, China's toward the Soviet Union, and—although we have not given it much attention—the attitude of other regional powers, Japan's toward China, Southeast Asia's, and so on.

A rigid solution through a collective security arrangement, even the most minimal kind, would bind us at certain points in dealing with the other facets of the problem. It certainly would make me very hesitant to get involved, leaving aside the dubious political feasibility here in the United States. You might even argue that we would shortly be in a great deal more trouble with the Chinese under collective security arrangements than under these more informal and selective arrangements. Looking back historically, while we didn't have a collective security arrangment with China in the pre- and post-World War II periods, we had something very close to it which created tremendous strains between our countries. The Soviets had a collective security arrangment with the Chinese which in 1958 contributed massively to the break.

This is not an entirely hypothetical question. I think we very well could be faced within a very short time with a choice that we would not want to make, and so I, at least, would opt for tentative and incremental approaches.

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Robinson, please.

Mr. ROBINSON. I have three quick words on the "slippery slope" question. I am not worried about this issue so much, I guess, as perhaps some others are. First of all, I think the Chinese are as

wary as we are of slipping down that slope, and they will keep us from going down just as much as we will.

Second, I don't think it is a question of whether the Soviets will react this way or that way in determining how far we can go with the Chinese. It is Chinese performance, that is, the policy that they have, that is one of the tests that we have to attach to our military relations with the Chinese. That, I think is as important as the Soviet reaction.

Third, in this whole field of technology transfer, incuding military technology transfer, the timeframe is long. In fact, it is so long that if things begin to go awry, there is plenty of time to draw back. So, I am not so worried about the whole problem.

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Whiting?

Mr. WHITING. Since the issue of collective security has been brought explicitly to the table, I must bring up at this point the fact that we would be guaranteeing the security of a country which has territorial disputes on land and sea with almost all of its neighbors. These disputes are in some cases initiated by Chinese definition. We are rather ignorant in precise terms of where those border disputes would carry China, or under what circumstances they might become actually activated.

That being so, it would seem highly imprudent for the United States to sign in effect a blank check for circumstances that might actually be provocative and trigger the conditions under which we would either come to China's defense or, much worse, betray our own commitments.

Mr. SUTTER. I have Mr. Jammes next.

Mr. JAMMES. I may be a little bit out of sequence here, but I would like to step back from collective security for 1 second and go back to the issue of arms and arms technology being provided to the Chinese.

We had several speakers this morning and this afternoon who indicated that if we provided arms to the Chinese in too large a quantity or too fast, this would provoke the Soviet Union, but I think it would be fair or appropriate to ask a question now, what was meant by provoking the Soviet Union? What would be a likely scenario? Does provoke mean that there would not be SALT talks, or does provoke mean that they would attack China?

I think we would be serving the committee well if somebody could address this question and indicate what they think a likely scenario would be in the sense of the Soviets are provoked and they are provoked to our detriment.

Mr. SUTTER. Captain Patton, I know you have a comment. Do you want to pursue that issue or address another one?

Captain PATTON. Oh, that would be fun to pursue. [Laughter.]

Not quite facetiously, I might characterize a Soviet reaction in Asia to the kind of provocation we have been talking about as perhaps: adding a division a year, upgrading one or two divisions a year to "category one" or "category two," adding a Backfire regiment a year, and bringing more ships into that area.

Mr. JAMMES. What would be different?

Captain PATTON. That is the point! That is exactly what they are already doing. We are reacting to their provocation and the litany of the Soviet buildup is there for everybody to read. What is it that

people are worried about? If they are worried about rattling nuclear sabers, we would address that in a different context—with or without China. But if we are worried about the Soviets increasing military strength in Asia, they are already on a steadily increasing trend and that is troublesome enough.

By the way, at the same time they are increasing their military strength everywhere else.

So, the nature and extent of a realistic Soviet reaction in response to "provocation"—what that awful-awful might be is, I think, already self-evident. It is happening.

Now, let me move away from that, because I think some quite serious questions have been raised. One has to do with the obligation that the United States might undertake in connection with embracing a collective security arrangement of some sort with China. It is possible that China might make mischief with her neighbors and we would not like to be associated with any such mischief by virtue of an agreement.

I guess I have to point out that no collective security agreement is like any other collective security agreement. As a sometime student of international law, I understand that we design those agreements to our own taste. We commit ourselves only to those things to which we are willing to commit ourselves. The arrangement with Japan is a perfect example.

We could obligate ourselves to react to nothing else but a Soviet attack on China proper.

Another point, though, which I think needs a response is the price of binding ourselves into some sort of collective security arrangement with China. This has been mentioned as being rather high. There is no free lunch in this business of national defense. If there were any easy, simple solution to offset the astounding growth in Soviet military capabilities, our State Department and Defense Department would be well on their way toward implementing that. But there are no "no-cost" solutions. We will have to give up something. If it is some of our independence as a world actor, that is too bad.

The alternative, by the way, to having to give up some independence by entering into some sort of binding contractual collective security arrangements, would have been to have kept pace with Soviet military expansion, and we didn't do that. It would have been to have worked harder without our NATO allies to have kept pace within the existing framework of collective security with Soviet military expansion, and we never did that successfully. It would have been to have prevented the loss of U.S. nuclear superiority, and we didn't do that.

Now, we already have danced, if you will, and in one way or another we must pay the piper.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you very much. I know that John Collins would like to say something from the audience. Normally we would start at 4 o'clock with our half-hour audience discussion, but if it is agreeable to you, perhaps we can open it up for general discussion from the audience at this time. Is that agreeable to the participants here?

I see that it is. John?

Mr. COLLINS. I think a basic purpose of closer cooperation with China is to improve our own security posture, and it is possible that providing arms to the Chinese will serve that purpose. It is also possible that it will not serve that purpose at all. I think we need to think through very carefully some fundamental problems before we jump into this.

As an example, we now have what I perceive to be a very stable Sino-Soviet military balance. There has not been any crash Soviet buildup along the Chinese border. They completed their quantitative buildup 15 years ago, and they are modernizing their force at a steady pace, but I don't see any evidence that it is a crash. They are not particularly concerned about Chinese capabilities, conventional capabilities at this time, if I read the tea leaves correctly.

It is my belief that if things really blew on them say in Eastern Europe over this Polish situation, that they wouldn't hesitate to pull some of their forces away from the Chinese frontier, because they just don't perceive a serious threat there right now.

They went through a period where a lot of people in the military establishment in the United States said that the Soviets are going to nuke the Chinese because they are watching the Chinese produce a nuclear capability that is going to threaten Mother Russia.

Well, 1964 came with the first device exploded on a tower in China, and there wasn't any nuclear attack by the Soviet Union and there hasn't been one since. I think a basic reason was that they still don't see the Chinese nuclear threat as a critical peril to the Soviet Union.

Question: If we start building up Chinese conventional forces to the point where the Soviets really are getting queasy about it, then they cannot take any positive action without being able to counter the Chinese nuclear capability, which is getting better every day.

So, almost surely they are going to scrap the ABM Treaty. Do we want that or don't we want that? It certainly is a possibility. It is a possibility that they are then going to pre-empt. Do we want to drop the stability that we have in East Asia now? Is the payoff going to be big enough for what the costs will be?

Here is an example. If war did occur between China and the Soviet Union and it did go nuclear, we have a good friend in Japan. We have another one in Korea who will be covered with nuclear fallout, and they won't even be in the war. There are all kinds of spinoffs here that I think really are worth taking a hard look at.

The last thing is, do we really want to tell ourselves that we can rely heavily on the Chinese to pull U.S. chestnuts out of the fire when we haven't even put our own house in order? I want to look at all of these things very carefully before I decide that I am going to put a lot of money into military assistance for China.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you, John. Many of those points will be addressed tomorrow when we look at the broad implications of United States-China military cooperation, but you have given us a lot of food for thought.

We still have the issue both of the Soviet reaction and the collective security arrangement, which are still sort of hanging over us. Do we have anybody who would like to address either one of those or followup on what John said?

Colonel Martin.

Colonel MARTIN. I don't think I want to address the Soviet reaction question, but maybe I can the other one. I am disturbed that we leap immediately in our discussions to the conclusion that a military relationship invariably, one, involves military assistance and military aid on a massive scale, or two, involves a collective security relationship. I will go back once again to the fact that as I have said in my paper, and as Allen has heard me say before, no one can predict with any degree of confidence what China's orientation will be in the long term. For that matter we can't predict many other countries' orientations for the long term either. In China's case in particular we need more time in which to see trends of the post-Mao leadership come to the fore before we can make such predictions with confidence.

You hear people on both ends of the spectrum predict that on the one hand, the Chinese will sit on the mountaintop and watch the tigers fight or that they are trying to take our assistance now to turn against us later, and on the other hand, there are those who say, no, that isn't true, the present orientation is good forever.

In our heart of hearts, we have to admit that we cannot say for sure which way it is going to be. This argues for some caution in the relationship and some limits on it, but saying that the relationship with the Chinese should have limits does not necessarily mean that it should have no progress. We have to recognize that the events of the next 10 years will have a bearing on China's orientation 10 years from now just as surely as the events up to this moment will have a bearing on that orientation.

If the Chinese, the important decision groups and important power groups within the Chinese bureaucracy, in fact find themselves frustrated at every turn with their tilt toward the West, then the chances are increased that when they are more modern and when they weigh even heavier in the strategic balance, the Chinese orientation will be counter to our interests.

Another argument for focusing on building the durability of the relationship and for focusing on responsiveness as opposed to a massive aid program is that it may enhance the perception of utility on the part of key decisionmakers, including the PLA. With this in focus, military sales would be for the purpose of being relevant and not for the purpose of making China a defensive giant or offensive pygmy or some other higher level of relationship.

Mr. SUTTER. We have a question over here.

Mr. Ross. I am Ed Ross. Does anyone on the panel believe that China now or in the future is receptive to entering into a collective security arrangement with the United States?

[Pause.]

Mr. SUTTER. There is stony silence.

Professor Hinton?

Mr. HINTON. I think the answer is clearly no, but what Deng Xioaping has said—what has to be done is to make sure that the Soviets do not feel that they can fight one of us without fighting the other, which is not the same thing but——

The REPORTER. I am sorry, I cannot hear you.

Mr. SUTTER. That was Prof. Harold Hinton of George Washington University, and he said that Deng Xioping said it is essential that the Soviet Union does not feel it could fight either the United

States or China without having to worry about what the other party would do.

Yes; the gentleman in the back. Would you please identify yourself?

Mr. JOHNSON. I am Chris Johnson. I first came upon this question this morning. We were talking about Chinese military modernization. I think it is germane to this discussion as well, and that is, what are the signals that Beijing prefers to send out. In the level of military modernization the signals are type and speed of modernization, type of weaponry. We know they are going after defensive rather than patently offensive. I would venture to say that if they went into or tried to build or acquire something like an F-111 or Jaguar medium-range, fast, low-altitude penetrating bomber, that would elicit quite a response from Moscow.

So, I think in our calculations of what Peking wants out of this, or what Beijing wants out of this, we have to be aware that they are sending signals, too.

Mr. SUTTER. Yes, Banning?

Mr. GARRETT I think that this issue of whether it would be provocative to the Soviet Union has not been formulated quite properly. In the first place, the Soviets have already reacted. They viewed National Security Adviser Brzezinski's trip to Peking, in May 1978, as the beginning of a military relationship between the United States and China, and began reacting in their own way.

So, from their perspective, they have reacted to what they perceived was an increased danger, or you might say from our perspective that to some degree we have provoked them. Soviet analysts would point to a number of particular Soviet actions taken since 1978, in reaction to our actions with China.

The point is that it is not a matter of provoking a direct Soviet action against China—because then you may have to sell cruise missiles to the Chinese to get a clearly identifiable response from Moscow. And it seems very unlikely that there are many things that we would conceive of doing with China, at least in the near term, that would lead to a Soviet attack on China.

I think the real question is, what do we want the Soviet reaction to be, and are we going to put ourselves into a position with China, where we are foreclosing our options with the Soviets, whatever those options might be, including even arms control talks.

That is really what we have to address. What do we want the Soviets to do, how we would like them to react to the different things that we do with the Chinese. Furthermore, are the Chinese themselves going to be in a position to put constraints on us by showing displeasure, for example, that we are talking to the Russians, or by having the tail wag the dog in Indochina policy, which I think tended to happen in 1978 and 1979? Are we going to have created a situation in United States-Soviet relations which really would worsen the prospects for carrying out other policies that we might have in mind.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you very much.

Mr. ROMANCE. I am Frank Romance.

On the matter of the cost of arming China, I think in the minds of many this conjures up ideas of masses of conventional weaponry. I am not personally convinced that assisting China to better use

the forces that it presently has in the Peoples Liberation Army would be all that expensive, provided that you were willing to do certain things, as an example, early warning radar. The Chinese admit that they face a massive Soviet threat, but there are, it seems to me, certain steps that could be taken with relatively low cost which would permit the Chinese to use their existing forces more effectively. I think it is just one question that hasn't been given an awful lot of thought.

Mr. SUTTER. It raises a broader question as well, which is, what kinds of things in a military way could the United States do vis-a-vis China? In other words, are the transfer of hardware and intelligence sharing, clandestine military operations, defense and intelligence consultations, symbolic interchanges, joint planning, or getting up to joint exercises, this type of thing—which ones of these are provocative, which ones of these aren't? What sort of mix are we talking about here in this regard?

The gentleman in the back, Mr. Nelson.

Mr. NELSON. I am Harvey Nelson. I was going to exactly approach it from that point. It seems to me that the discussion on the table has gone from the general possible policies to try to work your way down. You could also start with your specific scenario, as Frank suggested. You could put the scenario forward on a very specific policy suggestion, and then try to figure out how this might redound in terms of all of the strategies, and whether or not it seems desirable.

What if you were to say, for example, that the two greatest needs, as near as we can perceive them from the outside, in terms of Chinese defense capability and in terms of maintaining what you might call a reasonable balance between the Soviet Union and China, although it is still a major imbalance, would be, first of all, battlefield air defense systems, and second, antiarmor systems for the Chinese, and then the United States set about attempting to rectify these two most basic needs with development assistance?

How would this then redound upon the alternate strategies that we have been looking at? Banning was just bringing up, would this make the Soviet Union behave the way we want them to? Would it impinge upon strategic arms limitation? Would it make more likely a preemptive strike against the Chinese, although that seems unlikely to me? With a specific policy suggestion such as that, how do you then begin assessing the alternate strategies?

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Whiting?

Mr. WHITING. Mr. Chairman, as I listened to your own list, I thought you were giving a status quo description rather than a hypothetical scenario. Since intelligence sharing has been reliably reported to have been in existence in terms of monitoring Soviet missile behavior, since your reference to clandestine military operation was at least alluded to by Assistant Secretary of State John Holdridge in remarks that he made in Peking after the Haig mission, it could be presumed that a number of those steps at that end of the spectrum already exist, and those that we are not cognizant of the Soviets probably believe are occurring anyway. [General laughter.]

Since there has been a multiple use of the word "perception," in this case it does affect policy assumptions and reactions. I think

one really has to push considerably up the list before one gets into a future choice. I am not talking about these.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you.

Mr. Werner?

Mr. WERNER. I would like to briefly second Professor Whiting's remarks. The intelligence exchange is underway. Training programs and professional exchange visits are well underway, to include correction of some very serious deficiencies in the PLA. The engineering where the PLA has a large construction corps operation has not been fully implemented, but there is some potential there.

It seems to me the only question of the sort you raise again gets back to a case-by-case weapons systems and related questions. Ground radar is on every list that I ever saw at DOD, to include specific models, and the degree of risk. It is simply that a political decision has not been made. It seems to me the fundamental question that we really haven't addressed to my knowledge well within the U.S. Government or in academic circles is, to what degree do we want to attempt to create joint international policies that relate to American-Chinese cooperation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

You can talk about all sorts of scenarios, such as Korea, or Vietnam, and almost any problem if you want to factor in a method for involving the Chinese. It simply becomes a very risky business. Nobody, for understandable reasons, is prepared to move in that range, and in the higher range of the more threatening weapons systems.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you. Mr. Barnett.

Mr. BARNETT. I have a couple of comments. Mention was made about the slippery slope by June Dreyer, worry about it versus don't worry about it. I guess I agree with Roger that we are not charging in to sell and they are not charging in to buy. I think the whole gist of this morning's conversation was that in fact in the hardware sense our relationship at best is going to be a slow and incremental one, and I agree with Mr. Romance that what they are really interested in is a slow technological process, but I would say that we already have been on a slippery slope.

I belong with those who 2 years ago, before Secretary Brown's trip, thought that we could build a sound and lasting relationship if we knew how to do it politically and economically, without getting into a step-by-step incremental increase of military relations.

It seems to me that everything that has been said by the last two or three speakers indicates that we are in that kind of an incremental relationship, starting from, I would say, Frank Press' visit, and going to every visit, Mondale's visit, then Brown's visit, then Perry's visit, that there is a kind of built-in momentum that we have to get a new relationship in this field. It seems to me we have not thought through all these basic questions, as to the rationale for it, the costs of it, the benefits of it, and the possible way in which you can define limits to it.

I would not consider it a wise policy to keep on incrementally as we are going without some clear conception of all of these parameters, and the limits, and the cost of the benefits. I will admit that these are based on judgments which are not easy to make, includ-

ing what the PLA is going to think 10 years from now and how that might affect our relationship.

The other comment I was going to make is that nobody mentioned the whole United States-Peking-Taipei triangle as it affects us, and very frankly, our discussion could be academic 1½ months from now. [General laughter.]

The Foreign Ministry is on record very recently saying, if you are going to sell more advanced weapons to Taiwan, we don't want to buy any weapons from you, and this is a very complicated factor.

I would argue, incidentally, that you cannot just ignore what our arms relationship with Taiwan is going to be, and looking at our arms relationship with Peking there is almost a built-in catch-22. If we start delivering some advanced weapons systems to Peking, I would argue in the context of American politics that it is almost certain that there will be irresistible demands that we balance this with advanced weapons sales to Taiwan, which I think could abort the whole thing.

Now, this is just one of many complicated relationships, and there are many others that you could put on the table during the course of the discussion, and there will be some placed on the table tomorrow, too, but I think this is one very sensitive one that has to be taken into account.

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Dreyer?

Ms. DREYER. I certainly agree with Professor Barnett that we have been building an incremental relationship, albeit a very quick building up of this incremental relationship. It sometimes seems to me, though, that we are building on increments without looking where those increments are taking us. That is what I meant by the slippery slope.

All I seem to hear in what Professor Barnett is saying that we are not sliding very fast.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I just want to add a cautionary note. A number of people have said that we already have done a great deal in the military security area with China. My impression is that there are an awful lot of people in the country, including some people in these illustrious halls up here, who think we are doing more than in fact we are doing.

I have run across this before. Both Doak and I were at a conference at the American Assembly where at one point we were drafting the final conclusions, and one of the draft conclusions was that we should continue to do what we are doing but not go beyond it, and then the description of what we were doing was, transferring military production technology, and so forth, and listing all sorts of things that we aren't doing.

I got up and pointed out that we weren't doing these things so we changed the recommendation to, we should do it. [General laughter.]

There are certain things going on. There is a very limited, unless it has changed since I left the NSC, and I doubt that it has, very limited kinds of things that might pass for intelligence exchange, though I am not sure I would call it that. There is extremely limited training, and maybe technically it is training, but we are

not sending people to our military schools. We are not teaching them how to use weapons.

There have been some logistics teams that have come over and had a few meetings, and some people have gone to China and looked around, but there have been no military exercises. There is no joint planning. There is no sale of defense technology. There is no sale of weapons. Even the munitions list 81, which came out under the Carter administration, and then the new decision to remove China altogether from the list of prohibited destinations for the entire munitions list—well, a lot of people believe this means things really are happening when in fact nothing has happened except those statements.

I am not saying that we aren't building incrementally, but I am saying that it hasn't gone as far as an awful lot of people think it has.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Hyland, then Professor Dreyer.

Mr. HYLAND. That is a good point, Roger, but it is not because of American shrewdness; it is because the Chinese have been reluctant to go very far without understanding what the United States was really willing to do. For the past 3 to 4 years, the United States has had someone in China, in Peking, saying, please take our technology, please take our weapons, please take our intelligence.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Oh, no, Bill. Come on.

Mr. HYLAND. The Chinese have said, we will think about it, we will get back to you. That is the current situtation. Now, someone, perhaps the Deputy Prime Minister, said that he would be coming here right away. That was in June and it is now almost November. We still don't know that he is coming, and if he is coming, he certainly is not coming to buy a lot of American equipment.

Frank Press, Harold Brown, and Zbigniew Brzezinski seemed eager to sell arms to the Chinese, so it seemed as if the United States was willing to go quite far in the military area. The Chinese, however, were smart enough to understand that the United States was not a very solid rock on which to build a defense policy.

Mr. SULLIVAN. There is a germ of truth in what you say, Bill, but that is all. [General laughter.]

I went on both Frank Press' trip and the Bill Perry trip. While Frank Press and Bill Perry may have had their personal views on what they wanted to recommend to the President, there never was any decision to pour either technology or military weapons on the Chinese, and it certainly was not the Chinese saying, gee, thanks for these offers but we don't want this stuff.

What has happened is a classic kind of bureaucratic political struggle in the United States, where someone will get the President to approve a policy which has happened in the case of our last two Presidents. President Carter approved a policy of loosening up exports of technology to China, and President Reagan has issued another one in this administration, and there are a lot of people at the technical levels in the Government who oppose that, and who have been very, very successful in blocking the implementation of the policy.

That is pretty much what it boils down to. The cancellation or postponement, and I prefer cancellation, because I think that is

what it is, of the Chinese Vice Chief of Staff Liu Huaqing's visit, relates to two things. One, the very vagueness of the response he got from the United States to his list of requests of things he wanted, and second, his fear, justifiable I would say, that he was going to get mousetrapped into coming to the United States and having people here say a lot of things about what weapons we were prepared to sell to the Chinese and then on the heels of his visit announce some arms transfer to Taiwan, putting him in the position of looking like he struck some kind of deal.

Ms. DREYER. In other words, the mousetrap seems to have two ends—perhaps one to catch white mice and the other, black. [General laughter.]

Mr. SUTTER. I have Professor Dreyer and Mr. Werner.

Ms. DREYER. This is a question for Mr. Sullivan, or Captain Patton, or whoever might have information on it.

Far Eastern Economic Review last week quoted an anonymous conservative Senate staff member—we can all have fun speculating on who that almost certainly is——[Laughter.]

Ms. DREYER [continuing]. As saying that every time a Chinese comes to this country, or Haig, or whomever goes to China, we promise the PRC something else, and asking where is all of this going to end? Now, is the anonymous Senate staffer incorrect in this statement?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I don't mean this as a frivolous response, because it really is the literal truth, but the record is, every time someone senior goes to China, they promise them the same thing they promised them the last time, and that is exactly the history of the last 1½ years or 2 years. I don't know how many times we have promised them—what was that computer system? The Western Geophysical System. Oh, we gave that to them four or five times at least. [General laughter.]

I think where it is going to lead is precisely where—I mean, where it is going to lead unless there is some effort in the Senate or in the White House to make sure that we have a policy and that it is going to get implemented by an awful lot of people in the bureaucracy who don't want to implement it, it will end up just where it has ended up every time, with fine policy statements being made and nothing ever happening, and the Chinese saying, why do you say these things? Do you mean them? Or don't you mean them? Don't you run your own Government? Or what is the problem here?

Ms. DREYER. So the slope turns out to be a plateau?

Mr. SULLIVAN. No; the slope is upward and it is slippery. [General laughter.]

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Werner, do you have an additional comment?

Mr. WERNER. Yes; my impression, from having monitored a lot of Rogers' and others' trips, is that his comments present an accurate assessment. The only thing I can speak decisively to personally results from when I accompaned a group of Senators to Beijing in January 1979. Some people will remember, I spent a fair amount of time on SALT verification questions. The Senators and Deng Xiaoping discussed the question of shared intelligence. Obviously, unbeknownst to us, but evidently down the road a bit, the executive branch decided to go ahead and share that in a manner that must

have been fairly conducive to him, although the Senators on the trip had some reservations.

Mr. SUTTER. Are there any more remarks? Professor Whiting?

Mr. WHITING. Well, Roger is not to be challenged in terms of record of trips on specifics. But on principles, U.S. delegations have clearly successfully gone from one thing to another, the Export-Import Bank credit being the feather in Mondale's cap, the non-lethal military weapons transfer being Brown's feather, the Haig visit being military arms sales.

So, I think it does duck the question to focus on specific technical items, because once a principle is established and a policy is established, it does open the way for expectations on the Chinese side.

I think Roger is quite right. If Chinese expectations are not realized, there is going to be a problem. On the other hand, each successive expansion of permissive policy does make it more possible for this or the next administration to take actions that are no longer de novo, but have been more or less assumed as part and parcel of U.S. policy. So, I think we are quite right here in discussing these questions and asking more searching questions about the assumptions which underlay these policy principles, rather than whether this computer or that computer really went to China.

Mr. SUTTER. There is a question in the back, and then one over here.

Ms. CHRISTOPHER. I would like to return to Dr. Barnett's point that we have largely ignored the whole topic of the Peking-Washington-Taipei triangle. I would like to ask the members of the panel what possibility do you see in the near future, say, 5 to 10 years from now, of a real confrontation between Beijing and Taipei, and to what extent will this jettison U.S. goals for regional security in East Asia, and possibly also does Peking feel emboldened by its new relationship with the United States to go ahead and make these pronouncements, as they seem to be increasingly doing in the press? It seems to me their various statements on Taiwan have been louder in the recent year or so.

Mr. SUTTER. Captain Patton?

Captain PATTON. I think the record shows that during this period of growing Sino-United States mutual interest, the whole tone of Beijing's statements in regard to Taipei has changed for the better. If we look at the offers that they have made, even just in the last few weeks, asking Taipei to consider some sort of reunion based on allowing them to maintain their military forces and to maintain their economy, but requiring changes in a couple of trappings of sovereignty, like in fact, the flag and the national anthem, we will see that there is much improvement.

I would doubt very much, given the awful urgency of doing something to offset the growth of Soviet military capabilities, about which we are both concerned, that either the United States would do something vis-a-vis Taiwan to disrupt a growing Sino-United States relationship, or would China—I repeat, or would China.

There is nothing that regaining Taiwan by force of arms, for example, which I guess is the underlying concern, would gain for China that would compensate for the loss of strength that it will gain by allying in some fashion with the United States, and exer-

cising force of arms against Taiwan would halt progress in that direction. I just don't think that is even a realistic strawman.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you. It is 4:30. There was one other question in the back. Mr. Graham, do you want to ask that question?

Mr. GRAHAM. I will keep it for tomorrow.

Mr. SUTTER. It has been a very lively discussion this afternoon. Tomorrow, we will address an issue that is even more complicated than the one we addressed today. We look forward to convening at 9:30 a.m. tomorrow morning here in this room.

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the workshop recessed, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Thursday, October 29, 1981, in room 457, Russell Senate Office Building.]

THE IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED STATES-CHINA MILITARY COOPERATION

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1981

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
Washington, D.C.

The workshop convened in room 457, Russell Senate Office Building, at 9:30 a.m., Mr. Robert Sutter (member, Congressional Research Service) presiding.

Senators present: Senator Hayakawa.

Mr. SUTTER. May I ask you all to please get some coffee and then take your seats so that we may begin with our third session? [Pause.]

Mr. SUTTER. Welcome back to our third session. Today we will look at the broad question of the advantages and disadvantages of closer United States-China military ties.

The past two sessions have been very rewarding for us all. They have raised a whole host of questions and a variety of issues that need further consideration. This is purely my personal view, but I was very impressed by the, while not uniform, nonetheless, the amount of agreement that we found in assessing China's military capabilities; although there was a cautionary note on how one should assess those capabilities in looking over China's overall strategic importance.

As we looked at the likely scenarios of United States-China military cooperation, we looked at a range of possibilities, and we saw some dangers in moving in a rapid way toward closer military cooperation with China. There seemed to be, to this observer, to one who has watched this debate emerge over the past several years, a surprising amount of agreement among our participants on this issue.

So, today, we will see in more detail whether there is agreement, and in what areas we agree and disagree in looking at the broader question of advantages and disadvantages of closer United States-China military ties.

We will proceed along the same format as we did the last time, and we'll go in the order as appears in the program.

We will begin with Mr. Banning Garrett. Mr. Garrett is a specialist in United States-China strategic relations and a senior analyst with Harold Rosenbaum Associates in Arlington, Va. He also is a research associate with the Institute of International Studies at the University of California. Until 1980, Mr. Garrett was president of Internews and strategic affairs editor of its foreign affairs biweekly.

I would now call upon Mr. Garrett.

STATEMENT OF BANNING GARRETT, HAROLD ROSENBAUM ASSOCIATES, ARLINGTON, VA.

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Bob.

The primary advantage as I see it of U.S. military ties with China is to consolidate and strengthen two front deterrence of the Soviet Union at a time of perceived U.S. weakness vis-a-vis Moscow and increasing concern that a future war might quickly become global in scope.

The Soviet Union has become increasingly worried that the United States might provide direct or indirect aid to the Chinese in a Sino-Soviet war or seek to exploit Soviet weaknesses resulting from such a conflict. The Soviets also worry that China might become involved in a United States-Soviet war or attack a war-weakened Soviet Union.

These possibilities for expansion of conflict to a two-front confrontation with the West and China have existed theoretically for more than a decade. The increasing cooperation between Washington and Beijing makes such wartime cooperation more likely even if still far from certain. The very uncertainty of this situation, however, and the grave consequences of miscalculation provides an important deterrent to Soviet actions which could lead to escalation into a two-front war.

Throughout the seventies, the Soviets worried that a military dimension might be added to the Sino-American relationship, and that United States-Chinese wartime cooperation might become a more credible possibility. The Soviets threatened to take countermeasures against Western arms sales to China, and warned that the Chinese would ultimately use the weapons against American allies in Asia.

Soviet officials and analysts say that they perceive the U.S. decision to forge a strategic relationship with China in the spring of 1978 as the beginning of military ties with Beijing, and that this decision contributed to overall deterioration in United States-Soviet relations, and to a greater Soviet military buildup in the Far East.

While the Soviets apparently at first envisioned a major Chinese military modernization program, and possible large-scale transfers of U.S. arms to China, by 1980 they had become less fearful of a shift in the Sino-Soviet military balance. As noted yesterday by Mr. Hyland, the Soviets were quite aware that China had put military modernization at the bottom of the four modernizations, and even had cut the defense budget as well.

The Soviets realized that China could not afford to buy large quantities of foreign arms, that the United States was not about to give China large quantities of sophisticated weapons, that U.S. industry probably could not even produce surplus arms for China on a scale required to alter the military balance, and that the Chinese probably could not absorb large amounts of advanced military technology even if it were provided.

Soviet analysts saw a potential increased military threat from China in the long run, perhaps in the next century, if China succeeded in building a powerful and advanced industrial economy to support such a buildup. In the short run, Soviet analysts, like

many American experts, acknowledged that the Chinese would be lucky to keep pace with improvements in the Soviet forces in the Far East rather than fall further behind.

Why, then, have the Soviets expressed such alarm at the prospect of Sino-American military ties? In my judgment, the Soviets are concerned primarily about the global, political, and strategic implications of United States-Chinese defense ties. They have viewed with apprehension Chinese success in forming a loose anti-Soviet united front of the United States, NATO, Japan, and other countries, and most of all, the Soviets fear the possibility of a two-front war, as I have said, facing possible coordinated action between NATO on the west and China and the United States in the east.

Some Soviet analysts argue that Moscow's strategy of building up its forces in the Far East to intimidate China has been successful, and that China would remain neutral in NATO-Soviet conflict. Others are not so sure, however, and fear that China might see its national interests at stake in such a conflict, and would act to insure defeat of the Soviet Union so that a victorious Moscow could not turn its full fury on China.

They also fear that China might take advantage of a war-weakened Soviet Union to seize territory in the Far East or central Asia.

Soviet military planning for coping with the Chinese is vastly complicated by the two-front war threat. The Soviets apparently base their strategy and deployments on the model of the Manchurian campaign of August 1945 that destroyed the Japanese Kwantung Army in 10 days at the end of World War II. The Chinese, by the way, also think that the Manchurian model is the basis of Soviet planning.

While Soviet military leaders have extolled the Manchurian campaign in the last 10 or 15 years as a model for modern military operations, Soviet analysis of that blitzkrieg indicates their awareness of the difficulty of duplicating it today.

The primary factor for success in 1945 was that the Soviets had secured their western front before launching the war in the east. Stalin agreed at Yalta that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan 2 months after the war ended in Europe. The Soviets had maintained an uneasy standoff with the Japanese along the Sino-Soviet border throughout the war at the price of deploying 40 divisions in the region, just 5 to 10 fewer than are deployed in the region today.

This force was judged insufficient to route the Kwantung Army, however, and the Soviets had to shift some 750,000 troops, about 50 divisions, to the Far East after the defeat of the Germans in order to launch their offensive against the Japanese. This was done in complete secrecy.

Today the Soviets cannot count on a secure western front that would allow them to shift the scores of divisions to the Far East, nor could they do so in secrecy.

Prior to World War II, the Soviets delivered two sharp defeats to the Japanese at Lake Khasan in 1938 and Kalkhin Gol in 1939, with the result, if not the aim, of discouraging Japan from keeping its commitments to Germany to open a second front against the

Soviet Union. Soviet strategy today is also aimed at neutralizing potential enemies—not necessarily with military action—to ease the two-front war threat. This includes intimidation of China on the one hand and attempts to drive a wedge between China and the United States on the other. Similarly, the Soviets would like to divide the United States and NATO by exacerbating conflicts between the Americans and the West Europeans, especially over approaches to nuclear weapons deployments and arms control.

In short, the lesson of World War II and the Manchurian campaign of the Soviets is that the Soviet Union cannot win a two-front war. Escalating to the use of nuclear weapons does not improve Soviet prospects, as the China factor simply adds even more target demands on Soviet strategic and theater nuclear forces, and opens the possibility that the Soviet Union would face eventual counterattack by the surviving Chinese after being crippled in a nuclear war.

The Soviets are fully aware that China plans for protracted conflict even in the postnuclear phase of war, and that surviving Chinese conventional forces, command, control, and communications capabilities, administrative structures, and economic recovery assets, as well as the Chinese nuclear forces, pose a potential threat to the Soviet Union that must be countered by Soviet forces.

The Soviets in my view are already deterred by this strategic situation. U.S. military ties with China should aim at consolidating and strengthening two-war deterrence of the Soviet Union. Careful measures with China could enhance the credibility of possible wartime cooperation between Washington and Beijing, and thus reinforce Soviet concern that a local conflict could escalate to a global war.

I would add here that both Soviet and American military leaders in the last few months have been talking about the notion that any conflict starting anywhere between the two powers could quickly escalate to a global conflict, as the United States would seek to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities in other theaters of conflict, and the Soviets might do the same to the United States, and that this conflict could be protracted, possibly even remain conventional for some time before going nuclear. So, both powers are thinking in terms that they are going to have to fight a many-front war, and I am simply saying that the China factor is a very complicating one for the Soviets.

I would add here that deterrence rests to a large extent on uncertainty. China may not be able to count on the United States if it got into a war with the Soviet Union, but the Soviets could not count us out in their calculations about a Sino-Soviet conflict. Similarly, we cannot count on the Chinese opening a second front against the Soviets, but Moscow cannot be certain the Chinese would not. Even the Western Europeans worry that the United States would confine a nuclear war to a European battlefield, but the Soviets cannot take the risk that the war would not escalate to a strategic nuclear exchange with the United States.

The two-front deterrence of the Soviet Union in large part depends on continued Chinese strategic alinement with the United States. Many experts are concerned that China is an unreliable ally which could return to a pro-Soviet alinement or a position of

equal hostility toward the superpowers. We should be clearheaded and hedge our bets with the Chinese as best we can, but we should also carefully assess the prospects of a major shift in China's foreign policy.

It is often argued that either through a change of leadership or a change of policy by the current leaders, China could again radically shift its domestic orientation and return to a Soviet model of economic development. This shift in internal policy, it is argued, would lead China back to the Soviet camp.

While it is certainly possible that internal changes in China could lead to a shift in its strategic alinement, it seems to me more likely that the Chinese would continue their current orientation toward maintaining a U.S. counterweight to Soviet power, even if they reoriented their domestic program away from the four modernizations' present use of capitalist methods and reliance on Western technology and investment.

China has pursued a foreign policy based on a traditional approach to national interests and is likely to continue to do so. If China were feudalist, capitalist, pure Communist, or Soviet style socialist, its leaders would likely see their country's national security interests in similar terms and choose among the same options. In a period such as the present, with a powerful and threatening Russia on China's northern border, and a powerful but nonthreatening United States far away, Chinese leaders would likely choose a similar strategy of allying with the United States against the Soviet Union.

It is worth noting that between 1971 and 1981, China has undergone tremendous internal political and economic policy shifts and leadership changes, yet the basic thrust of China's foreign policy has remained unchanged. A shift in China's foreign policy is more likely to result from a major change in China's strategic environment—a change I do not foresee at present—rather than from a change in internal policies.

The formation of alliances, especially between bitter enemies such as China and the Soviet Union are now, or China and the United States were 15 years ago, are usually, if not always, forged on the basis of a perceived common threat. While China and the United States perceive the Soviet Union as a common threat, what country or bloc will provide such a common threat to China and the Soviet Union to drive them together in the foreseeable future? Japan? Western Europe? The United States?

It is quite possible, however, that China will eventually seek to ease tensions with Moscow, but this should not portend a Sino-Soviet rapprochement or an end to the Soviets' two-front war dilemma. Such an easing of tension need not be against U.S. interests.

It is also possible, of course, that Sino-American relations could be seriously damaged by political forces within either country struggling over bilateral issues such as Taiwan, and that the result could be major damage to the larger strategic interests of both countries.

The likely stability of China's strategic posture should provide room for approaching our developing relationship with China cautiously and with a sense of our own priorities and interests. Al-

though we should not let an issue such as the sale of advanced fighters to Taiwan interfere with our relations with Beijing, we also should not feel compelled to support all of China's policies or comply with all of China's wishes on arms sales or on other issues simply to please the Chinese.

America's most fundamental national interest is its own survival, which means, first of all, avoidance of a nuclear war. To this end, our relations with the Soviet Union are far more important than our relations with China, and we should not allow Sino-American relations to foreclose our options with the Soviet Union, including future improvement in relations with Moscow and new arms control agreements, both of which could displease Peking, but both of which may also be in China's interests in the long run.

Thank you.

[Mr. Garrett's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BANNING GARRETT*

TWO-FRONT DETERRENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION

A Framework for Assessment of U.S. Military Ties with China

Few issues have been as sensitive and controversial within the United States Government over the last 7 or 8 years as that of military ties with China. This has been primarily because the issue has been not simply a bilateral matter between China and the United States but rather an inseparable part of the debate over U.S. global strategy and American policy toward the Soviet Union. And U.S. strategy and U.S.-Soviet relations have been and continue to be the focus of deep, unresolved differences among American policymakers. It is this "triangular" context that has made China policy—especially military ties—so difficult to formulate and to agree upon within the U.S. Government.

Six years after the first tentative move toward military ties with China, The United States still had not settled on a comprehensive approach to China that includes integration of China policy with Soviet policy and overall U.S. global strategy. Since approval of the British sale of Spey jet engines to China in December 1975 by President Ford, the United States has made a number of moves toward military ties with China, including normalization of relations on a strategic basis, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's visit to Beijing in January 1980, and the announcement by Secretary of State Alexander Haig in June that the United States would consider selling lethal arms to China on a case-by-case-basis. These and other moves have clearly added up to a policy direction. Yet there has been no formalized agreement in any of the three administrations on an overall China policy.

On the contrary, policymakers have been unable to reach consensus on the broad outlines of policy and instead have agreed to—or acquiesced in—specific decisions, such as "tilting" toward China in transfer of military-related technology, which have had definite policy implications. These decisions—while not representing a comprehensive administration policy—have nevertheless created expectations in Beijing, Moscow and Washington. Some officials in the Carter administration, for example, viewed each decision as another step down a path toward a quasi-alliance with China against the Soviet Union, while others continued to oppose such cooperation, sought to minimize the impact of each decision, and hoped to draw the line with each step forward. Like other policy struggles involving basic assumptions about the Soviet Union and U.S.-Soviet relations, few minds were changed and no new consensus was reached in the process. There simply were winners and losers.

The Reagan administration also seems unable to reach agreement on Soviet policy or U.S. global strategy, thus making formulation of an agreement on a comprehensive China policy extremely difficult. And as the continuing struggle over Taiwan arms sales policy indicates, our bilateral policy remains uncertain and subject to conflicting pressures within the administration and between the executive and legislative branches of government.

There are many reasons for continuing differences over military ties with China that include political and bureaucratic factors. But the fundamental problem, I think, is that the triangular issues involved are very difficult and subject to strong

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argumentation for conflicting views. And the uncertainties about the future and the potential negative impact of policy choices have been far greater on this issue than on most of the other difficult issues faced by the President. Nevertheless, the issue of military ties with China touches on the most critical areas of U.S. security, and as such is an urgent problem that requires exploration of a wide range of views with an eye toward developing a consensus on at least the bases and priorities of our China policy. With this in mind, I offer the following framework and some caveats for assessing the implications of U.S. military ties with China.

The primary advantage of U.S. military ties with China is to consolidate and strengthen two-front deterrence of the Soviet Union at a time of perceived U.S. weakness vis-a-vis Moscow and increasing concern that a future war might quickly become global in scope. The Soviet Union has become increasingly worried that the United States might provide direct or indirect aid to the Chinese in a Sino-Soviet war or seek to exploit Soviet weaknesses resulting from such a conflict. The Soviets also worry that China might become involved in a U.S.-Soviet war or attack a war-weakened Soviet Union. These possibilities for expansion of conflict to a two-front confrontation with the West and China have existed theoretically for more than a decade. The increasing cooperation between Washington and Beijing make such wartime cooperation more likely, even if still far from certain. The very uncertainty of this situation, however—and the grave consequences of miscalculation—provides an important deterrent to Soviet actions which could lead to escalation into a two-front war.

Both Soviet and U.S. military leaders have recently expressed views that a future U.S.-Soviet conflict may spread quickly to other theaters as each side seeks to exploit the vulnerabilities of the other. In addition, both sides see a possible protracted global war that could involve use of nuclear as well as conventional weapons. For the Soviets, the "China factor" in their military planning looms much larger than is generally understood and greatly complicates their strategic position. Despite Soviet doctrine and planning to fight and win a global war, the Soviets are not confident in their ability to fight on two fronts against China and NATO.

Following the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, the Soviet Union began a major buildup of forces in the Far East to cope with a perceived "Chinese threat." By the late 1970's, the Soviet had more than tripled the number of divisions deployed in the region and had deployed first line conventional and nuclear military equipment and created a theater level command structure for the Far East. Washington's refusal in 1969–70 to acquiesce in a Soviet strike against China's nuclear forces and the subsequent Sino-American rapprochement in 1971–72 raised the specter for the Soviets of U.S. assistance to China in the event of Soviet attack. The Nixon administration was signalling both Moscow and Beijing that it considered China's independence and territorial integrity to be an important—perhaps vital—U.S. security interest.

Throughout the 1970's, the Soviets worried that a military dimension might be added to the Sino-American relationship and that U.S.-Chinese wartime cooperation might become a more credible possibility. The Soviets threatened to take countermeasures against Western arms sales to China and warned that the Chinese would ultimately use the weapons against American allies in Asia.

Soviet officials and analysts say that they perceived the U.S. decision to forge a strategic relationship with China in spring 1978 as the beginning of military ties with Beijing and that this decision contributed to overall deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations and to a greater Soviet military buildup in the Far East. While the Soviets apparently at first envisioned a major Chinese military modernization program and possible large-scale transfers of U.S. arms to China, by 1980 they had become less fearful of a shift in the Sino-Soviet military balance. They noted that China had not only put modernization of national defense at the bottom of the Four Modernizations, but had cut defense spending as well. The Soviets realized that China could not afford to buy large quantities of foreign arms, that the United States was not about to give China the weapons, that U.S. industry probably could not even produce surplus arms for China on the scale required to alter the military balance, and that the Chinese probably could not absorb large amounts of advanced military technology even if it were provided. Soviet analysts saw a potential increased military threat from China in the long run—perhaps in the next century—if China succeeded in building a powerful and advanced industrial economy to support such a buildup. But in the short run, Soviet analysts like many American experts, acknowledged that the Chinese would be lucky to keep pace with improvements in Soviet forces in the Far East rather than fall further behind.

Why then have the Soviets expressed such alarm at the prospect of Sino-American military ties? In my judgment, the Soviets are concerned primarily about the global political and strategic implications of U.S.-Chinese defense ties. They have

viewed with apprehension Chinese success in forming a loose anti-Soviet united front of the United States, NATO, Japan and other countries, and, most of all, the Soviets fear the possibility of a two front war, facing coordinated action between NATO on the West and China and the United States in the East.

Some Soviet analysts argue that Moscow's strategy of building up its forces in the Far East to intimidate China has been successful and that China would remain neutral in a NATO-Soviet conflict. Others are not so sure, however, and express concern that China might see its national interests at stake in such a conflict and act to insure defeat of the Soviet Union so that a victorious Moscow could not turn its full fury on China. In addition, they say, China might take advantage of a war-weakened Soviet Union to seize Soviet territory in the Far East or Central Asia. The Soviets also foresee possible direct or indirect U.S. assistance to China in the event of a Sino-Soviet war, or Western attempts to take advantage of an embattled or weakened Soviet Union.

Soviet military planning for coping with the Chinese is vastly complicated by the two-front threat. The Soviets apparently base their strategy and deployments on the model of the Manchurian campaign of August 1945 that destroyed the Japanese Kwantung Army in 10 days at the end of World War II. While Soviet military leaders have extolled the Manchurian campaign as a model for modern military operations, Soviet analyses of that Blitzkrieg indicate their awareness of the difficulty of duplicating it today. The primary factor for success in 1945 was that the Soviets had secured their Western front before launching the war in the East. Stalin agreed at Yalta that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan 2 months after the war ended in Europe. The Soviets had maintained an uneasy stand-off with the Japanese along the Sino-Soviet border throughout the war at the price of deploying 40 divisions in the region—just five to ten fewer than are deployed in the region today. This force was judged insufficient to rout the Kwantung Army, however, and the Soviets had to shift some 750,000 troops—about 50 divisions—to the Far East after defeat of the Germans in order to launch their offensive against the Japanese. Today the Soviets cannot count on a secure Western front that would allow them to shift scores of divisions to the Far East, nor could they do so in secrecy.

Prior to World War II, the Soviets delivered two sharp defeats to the Japanese at Lake Khasan in 1938 and Kalkhin Gol in 1939 with the result—if not the aim—of discouraging Japan from keeping its commitment to Germany to open a second front against the Soviet Union. Soviet strategy today is also aimed at neturalizing potential enemies to ease the two-front war threat. In the Far East, this includes intimidation of China on the one hand, and attempts to drive a wedge between China and the United States on the other. Similarly, in the West the Soviets would like to divide the United States from the rest of NATO by exacerbating conflicts between the Americans and the Western Europeans, especially over approaches to nuclear weapons deployments and arms control, or to be strong enough to intimidate NATO into quiescence during a strike against China.

While the "lesson" of World War II and the Manchurian campaign seems to be that the Soviet Union cannot win a coventional two-front war, escalation to the use of nuclear weapons may not improve Soviet prospects. The "China factor" places very extensive target demands on Soviet strategic and theater nuclear forces and opens the possibility that the Soviet Union would face eventual counterattack by the surviving Chinese after being crippled in a nuclear war with the United States. The Soviets are aware that China plans for protracted conflict even in the post-nuclear phase of war and that surviving Chinese conventional forces, command, control and communications capabilities, administrative structures and economic recovery assets—as well as Chinese nuclear weapons—pose a potential threat to the Soviet Union that must be accounted for in Soviet force planning.

It is far from certain that a conflict would develop into a two front war, but deterrence rests to a large extent on uncertainty. China may not be able to count on the United States if it should get into a war with the Soviet Union, but the Soviets cannot count us out in their calcuation about a possible Sino-Soviet conflict. Similarly, we cannot count on the Chinese opening a second front against the Soviet Union, but Moscow cannot be certain that the Chinese would not.

This uncertainty posed by the Soviet strategic situation is already a significant deterrent to Soviet military action against China or against the United States and its vital interests. U.S. military ties with China should aim at strengthening the credibility of two-front deterrence of the Soviet Union. Careful measures with China could increase the likelihood (and potential effectiveness, if deterrence fails) of possible wartime cooperation between Washington and Beijing.

There may be concern among some analysts that such a two front deterrence strategy rests on a fragile basis because China is an unreliable ally which could

return to a pro-Soviet alignment or to a position of equal hostility toward the superpowers. We should be clear-headed and hedge our bets with China as best we can. But we should also carefully assess the prospects of a major shift in China's foreign policy.

It is often argued that as a result of either a change of leadership or a change of domestic policy by the current leaders, China could again radically shift its strategic orientation and return to close alignment with the Soviet Union. While it is possible that internal changes could lead to a dramatic change in Chinese foreign policy, it seems to me more likely that the Chinese would continue their current orientation toward maintaining a U.S. counterweight to Soviet power even if, for example, they re-oriented their economic program away from the Four Modernizations' current emphasis on using capitalist methods and relying on Western technology and investment and instead pursued an economic strategy based more on the Soviet model, including less dependence on Western technology. China has pursued a foreign policy based in large part on a traditional approach to national interests and is likely to continue to do so. If China were feudalist, capitalist, pure Communist or Soviet-style socialist, its leaders would likely see their country's national security interests in similar terms and choose among the same few options. And in a period such as the present—with a powerful and threatening Russia on China's northern border and a powerful but non-threatening United States far away—Chinese leaders would likely choose a similar strategy of seeking to build a united front with the United States against the Soviet Union.

In the last ten years, China has undergone tremendous internal political and economic policy shifts and leadership changes, yet the basic thrust of China's foreign policy has remained unchanged (although not unchallenged). And it was not changes in China's domestic policies or economics or in its leadership that led to the "tilt" toward the United States in 1969–71 (although domestic political opposition was an obstacle to shifting China's strategic posture). Domestic political factions may tend to support conflicting national strategies, but those strategic alternatives 1) are few in number (two or three) and are determined primarily by external factors, and 2) in a given historical period, the external factors are likely to be decisive in influencing the alternative chosen by the leadership. Consequently, a future shift in China's foreign policy is more likely to result from a major change in China's strategic environment—a change I do not foresee at present—than from a change in internal policies or leadership composition.

Although few analysts foresee a renewal of the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950's, it can be noted that the formation of alliances—especially between such bitter adversaries as China and the Soviet Union are now or the United States and China were fifteen years ago—is usually, if not always, based on the preception of an overriding common threat. While China and the United States now perceive the Soviet Union as such a threat, what country or bloc is likely to provide a perceived common threat to China and the Soviet Union to drive them together in the foreseeable future? Japan? Western Europe? The United States?

It is possible, however, that Beijing will eventually seek to ease tensions with Moscow. But this is unlikely to portend a rapprochement or an end to the Soviets' two front war dilemma. (Western Europe's detente with the Soviet Union did not eliminate the possibility of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, although it probably reduced the likelihood of such a war occurring.) An easing of Sino-Soviet tensions need not be against U.S. interests, especially if China's actions are not based on a serious deterioration in Sino-American bilateral relations or Chinese disillusionment with the value of the United States as a counterweight to Soviet power.

The likely stability of China's strategic posture should provide the United States with time and space to develop our relationship with China cautiously and with a sense of our own priorities and interests. Although we should not let an issue such as the sale of advanced fighters to Taiwan (which I view as militarily unnecessary and politically provocative) interfere with our relations with Beijing, we also should not feel compelled to support all China's policies or to comply with all China's wishes on arms sales or other issues. The United States' most fundamental national interest is its own survival, which means first of all avoidance of nuclear war. To this end, our relations with the Soviet Union are far more important than our relations with China (the Soviet Union is also in a far stronger position to damage our interests short of nuclear war), and we should not allow our relations with Beijing to foreclose our options with Moscow, including future improvement in U.S.-Soviet ties and new arms control agreements—both of which could displease the Chinese, but both of which also may be in their interest in the long run.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Garrett.

Our next discussant will be Prof. Thomas Robinson. Professor Robinson is the Sun Yat Sen professor of China studies at Georgetown University. He has served at the National Defense University, at the Council on Foreign Relations, at the Social Science Department of the Rand Corp., and at the University of Washington. His publications are well known to us all, and we very much look forward to his remarks today.

Professor Robinson, please.

STATEMENT OF PROF. THOMAS ROBINSON, SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Bob.

It may have been Samuel Johnson who said once that the purpose of professors is to provide lists. Dutifully following Bob Sutter's dictum, I have done that. I have attempted to set down a number of advantages and disadvantages to the United States of possible military ties with China, and then to make critical assessments of each of those advantages and disadvantages. It gets a little bit wild and woolly at times, and I would hope that eventually we could all take a look at the paper, which is much more satisfactory, rather than hear me talk about the matter.

Let me introduce a procedural note first. I will be giving counterarguments to each of these arguments that are put forth. But the list of counterarguments doesn't add up necessarily to a set of disadvantages, nor do the counterarguments to the disadvantages necessarily sum to things that can be called advantages. So you can see that Sam Johnson was right. [General laughter.]

With regard to the advantages, the first one I would flag is the argument that says: What we are trying to do is use military ties with China to help deter the Russians. Presumably that deterrence, once we get the Chinese on our side, is made more efficient. The resulting situation would turn the Russians around, be more honest about things, and adopt a policy of détente rather than conflict with the United States.

Deterrence as a policy, and the contribution of China to it, would be much cheaper than having to defend China.

On the other hand, we should be reminded that it takes a long time for such a deterrent relationship to be enhanced by moving the Chinese militarily into our camp. And costs in the meantime may be high and tend to escalate. In the long run, we might find ourselves in a rather untenable situation.

Moreover, we have to worry about the Soviet reaction. The Russians may well merely increase their own strength against China, and we might find them—indeed, ourselves—involved in a Sino-Soviet arms race. Moscow could also use that enhanced military strength against ourselves. So these arguments for and against deterrence ought to be made manifest.

There is a subargument that sometimes is made, that the United States in some Machiavellian fashion ought to foster a Sino-Soviet arms race. By doing that we would make China more dependent upon us, and we would divert the Soviet threat to China. I don't think this is a very good argument. We need not give the Russians another excuse to increase the level of their own arms. We need

not foster a faster than necessary arms buildup by China. And it could lead to Sino-Soviet détente if the Russians and the Chinese caught on to what we were trying to do to them. In any case, Americans are pretty bad Machiavellians, and so I don't think this is something we are going to have to worry too much about. [General laughter.]

A second argument is that a little bit of Soviet military presence in Siberia and in the North Pacific is a good thing, what I would term "glue." It glues together America and its Asian allies. It builds a more solid anti-Soviet united front, and helps develop a peaceful regional trans-Pacific system that could well include China.

The United States could then look forward to leading this new united front at minimal cost to itself. These costs would be less burdensome than if there were no such united front and if the Russians were not present to help provide the means by which we could construct it. China would also become, or continue to be, a peaceful participant in that new system. It would allow the United States, China, and our Asian allies and friends to address other regional issues on their merits. In general, it would help place the Sino-American relationship in the broader regional context, where it belongs.

Against this, it should be noted first that the United States is not very good at overall regional management, at least in the time frame necessary to work out such a thing. Second, probably more than a minimal investment would be needed to construct and run such a large anti-Soviet united front. Third, the Chinese, to say nothing about the Japanese and others, have their own interests that go beyond mere anti-Sovietism and being junior partners in an overall American-led coalition.

So the argument that the Russian military provides a kind of glue for solving Asian problems is not strong enough by itself. It is necessary but certainly not sufficient.

Third, there is the argument about policy coordination as opposed to military transfers. We sometimes think that American-Chinese policy coordination exists with regard to Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and tacit sea and air cooperation. This is obviously a good thing, this argument has it, for it stops the Russians, it forces them back possibly, it balances them at the minimum.

The United States thereby obtains Chinese assistance at a most needed time, in the early eighties when we are weakest. Thereby we prove our fidelity to the anti-Soviet cause about which the Chinese are so concerned these days. And if worse were to come to worst, we and the Chinese would get the necessary military work experience with each other to coordinate and cooperate against the Soviets.

Against this, it should be noted that policy coordination does represent loss of freedom, for the Chinese as well as ourselves, and the argument is as good as that loss of freedom is acceptable. Coordination also is only as good as our joint interests are close. These are not coterminal, as both countries have often noted, although are obviously parallel.

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Moreover, it is probable that the mere suggestion of rushing into coordination of policy with the Chinese would probably frighten them off. And coordination could cause the Russians to overreact.

The sum total of this argument is that we should not go too far too fast in this sense with the Chinese. If we are going to move along these lines, we ought to drift along on a case-by-case basis.

Policy coordination ought to come in on cat's feet.

Fourth is the argument that military ties will encourage the Chinese to stay strongly anti-Soviet. We will reward the Chinese by means of military transers and so forth, and thereby they will stay "good." We will kind of bribe the Chinese in this manner to stay on our side of the line.

Before throwing this out entirely, we ought to note that in a triangular international system, the most wicked of all international systems, the United States might be forced to up its ante constantly, merely to garner constant Chinese support. Indeed, the Chinese might find it to their advantage to blackmail us. Thereby we could get into a vicious circle with them: bribery, blackmail, and bribery.

I do not think this will occur, because both sets of policymakers will probably be forewarned about the viciousness of such a vicious circle, and they would thereby try to avoid it. But the fact is that we and the Chinese might well find ourselves moving along these lines willy-nilly.

Fifth, is the argument that there are penalties for withdrawal. We have heard in these 2 days that the penalties for withdrawal from a military relationship with China are already too high, and thereby we have to go along. This argument stressed that we should not seem to be fickle, since constancy is what is needed with the Chinese.

Moreover, how can we avoid a military relationship with the Chinese when that would belie the global nature of our anti-Soviet policy. The logic is that if we are anti-Soviet, then we must be pro-Chinese, and if we are pro-Chinese, then we have to establish military ties with them because the Soviet threat is a military one.

The logic is unassailable but we should look at the politics of it more closely. If it is judged to be the American interest not to have strong military ties with China, that is, if we want to back out, then we had better back out at the beginning rather than later.

Also, the consequences of a stillborn Sino-American military relationship are not necessarily fatal. There would remain all the other Sino-American ties that have been developing so well. They could weather the storm. Indeed, if we were not to go ahead with Sino-American military ties, there might be a beneficial influence on Soviet-American relations. It might be the break in the vicious circle with the Russians that would enable us to move ahead more positively with the Russians.

So the net assessment is that we ought to look before we leap, that we should walk rather than run.

A sixth argument is that military ties with China keep the People's Liberation Army in its rightful place in the Chinese political system. They are now last and they should remain last in the four modernizations. Also, keeping the military back would enhance prospects for Chinese economic success, and would keep the

PLA from pressuring the Party to accommodate with the Soviet Union. Some think that such pressure as has been evidenced so far stems to some extent from the military.

Military ties would also keep China on the straight and narrow path of internal economic expansion, thereby enhancing a peaceful Chinese foreign policy. In turn, this would allow other nations to not worry unduly about the Chinese, while the United States could then concentrate on the Soviet danger.

There is no any direct counter-argument to this possible advantage to Sino-American ties. The only question is the appropriate pace and the level of American military assistance to China if we are to influence relations inside China to the extent just noted. Of course, that begs the question.

In general, however, I would say that, if we are going to develop military ties with regard to China, they should be slow in pace and low, at least initially, in level.

Seventh, there is an argument essentially that says *carpe diem*, "seize the day." We have an opportunity now and we ought to take it—opportunity not only to help configure the PLA and Chinese military policy in the way that we would like, but also to encourage Chinese foreign policy along defensive lines. If we transfer, for instance; defensive weapons systems to them; if we emphasize nonlethal systems; if we look to the enhancement of personal contacts with the Chinese military so they get used to working with us and so they don't have the kind of xenophobia that they are often said to have; if we emphasize science and technological relations that have long term, not short term military applications, these are the things that we can do to influence how the Chinese look on the battlefield.

The question, however, is: Can the United States input be limited in this manner, and will it have the effect desired? I do not think that it can, at least not entirely. If the Chinese want an offensive military machine, as they surely do, they are going to provide themselves with it, and American military relations with them is only going to slow that down, certainly not stop it. The Chinese are not going to let the Americans decide for them how to configure their own military.

It does not follow that America should do nothing. Rather, we should use this instrument of policy, but only with the idea that it is not going to have fulsome results.

A distinction is often made between offensive and defensive military systems. This distinction is often denigrated, particularly among military people, and I would be the first to admit that the difference is often overdrawn. But I do not think it is counterfeit and I think we should hold to it to the extent that we can. It is defensive systems that the Chinese need—antitank weapons, surface-to-air missiles, radars, et cetera. The Chinese in any case will tend to deploy their systems with regard to the Soviets first and other problems that they have, such as Taiwan, only second.

There is an eighth argument, which is that military ties are said to be advantageous to the United States because they are not very harmful. This is the argument that military ties have a long lead time, and hence one does not have to worry much about what happens in the meantime. Also, the Chinese are likely to get only

second line equipment, and that is not so bad for us, since it will take 15 years or so before the Chinese will have this equipment in the field in the numbers required. Meanwhile, we, to say nothing of the Russians, will be able to move even farther ahead, technologically, than we are now. Hence the Chinese will at least be as far behind.

Moreover, the Chinese cannot produce or utilize equipment at the forefront of military technology. China knows what is of benefit to the United States, however, is the fact that costs to the Soviet Union of military action against China would rise, and deterrence would be enhanced if we transfer the type of military equipment just noted. And we would force the Russians to augment their own China border force and keep their other forces away from Europe.

Although this argument is difficult to beat, it all depends on how it works out. If it does not work out right, if assumptions prove wrong, then the damage is already done and we cannot reverse course.

One important point is brought out, however. Prudence should be the tailsman of Sino-American military relations. Maybe it is better to limit Sino-American military ties to cooperation, or largely to cooperation, rather than go heavily into the technological field.

The trouble is that military cooperation and transfer of military technology are difficult to separate. China makes technology transfer a test of American fidelity. Technology transfer may force enough of a Soviet reaction to force America and China into military cooperation. Thus, it is difficult to isolate the question of military technology transfer from the large issue of military relations as a whole.

Set against these eight advantages are at least these disadvantages of Sino-American military relations.

First, assisting China militarily might create a too-strong China too rapidly. Such a China could betray America by settling its differences with the Soviet Union, since it could drive a better bargain with Moscow. And it is in Beijing's interest to do so, since its best foreign policy position is equidistant from Washington and Moscow. A strong China could attack Taiwan, once the Soviet threat were negotiated away. That would require America to defend Taiwan and the United States would be in the position of having armed both sides with our own weapons.

A strong China would also pursue other interests, such as recovering South China sea islands and establishing a sphere of influence in Southeast Asia that are not unnecessarily to America's advantage. New interests are discovered on the basis of augmented national power. Eventually, China would wish to exclude the United States from Asia. The United States would then have helped create an imperialist monster. Why hasten that day?

As against that, several counter arguments can be advanced. First, Sino-Soviet rapprochement depends on many factors, not just the military balance. Second, if the United States does not establish military ties with China, Beijing could just as well conclude that coming to terms with Moscow is in its interest. Third, the right kind of Sino-Soviet agreement is not necessarily against American interests. Indeed, a China equidistant from America and

Russia may act more positively toward all. As for Taiwan, the outcome depends on many factors: The military balance in the Straits, mainland-Taiwan negotiations, the degree of American support for Taibei. Moreover, if China did threaten Taiwan militarily, it could lead to many other Asian States coalescing against China and supporting the Nationalists. Finally, a strong China can be countered well enough by a combination of other Asian States and the United States. And since most Asian States are also rapidly growing in strength, a new balance of power could probably be constructed in time.

A second disadvantage is the analogy recalling the causes of World War I. Taking the first steps in military cooperation in 1898 brought Britain and France, finally, into alliance and brought Germany to the decision, in 1914, to initiate war.

The same could happen as between America, China, and Russia, only this time there would be a nuclear catastrophe. In any case, it is not in the American interest to defend China in all circumstances, nor does the United States have the resources to do so. At the least, the prospect of military ties with China begs the question of China's ultimate importance to America and forces American policymakers to specify the circumstances under which we would assist China in a war with the Soviet Union. This cannot be done at the outset.

On the other hand, it does not follow that no military relationship is better than some. The right kind of ties ought to avoid war, not hasten it. No ties at all might hasten war. It is better to have a rough balance of power than none, and it is best to have one where commitments are spelled out ahead of time. Moreover, China does not want an alliance with the United States, nor does the U.S. Congress, which at the least ought to require explication of American commitments to China. Thus, it is imperative to find the proper middle ground between the too-tight alliance system of 1914 and no ties whatsoever.

The last alleged disadvantage is that Sino-American military ties may lead to more trouble with the Soviet Union at the most critical juncture. Why not keep the China question out of Soviet-American relations? This is a powerful argument as far as it goes. But it would allow Moscow to exercise a veto over the development of Washington-Beijing relations. Moreover, the absence of American-Chinese military cooperation will not change American-Soviet rivalry. Further, the 2 to 5 year midterm is just the time when the United States and China will need each other most against the Soviet military threat. Finally, Moscow has already discounted Sino-American military ties. There will be some reaction, but not extreme retaliation. Once again, the question is finding the right balance: Between no military ties and too close security relations.

I have three conclusions. First, it is wrong to add up advantages and disadvantages. Some factors count for more than others. The final reckoning can take place only in the mind of the policymaker. American-Chinese military relations must be weighed along with all other relevant factors. Exigencies of the moment are always of great importance.

Second, much depends on Chinese internal politics, a factor which we cannot affect. We would be foolish to try to use offers of

military assistance to support one group or another in the Chinese leadership. We should make our decisions on the basis of our own interests, not on how Chinese politics may be affected.

Third, my own net assessment is that we have no choice but to move ahead with military ties with China. The United States needs the added insurance of keeping China firmly anti-Soviet at a time when the American-Soviet military balance is too threatening. Risks do exist, but they must be run. There is momentum in Sino-American military relations, but this is not a bad thing if handled properly. A strong China is good for America if we can play a major role in its creation. We can help make China a reasonably open society, reasonably peacefully inclined, and devoted to bettering the life of its people. If we approach the issue in a case-by-case manner, breaking the problem apart and proceeding with prudence and caution, we will maximize our gains and minimize our costs.

[Mr. Robinson's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS W. ROBINSON

SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PROCEED WITH MILITARY TIES WITH CHINA?

Introduction

In the late 1970's contacts directly relating to the mutual security of the United States and the People's Republic of China were initiated and by 1981 had developed to the point where they could be termed military ties. There have been reciprocal visits by defense ministers or their representatives, a flow of military delegations, conversation on how best to deal—jointly or separately—with the Soviet Union in Asia and elsewhere, a major shift in American policy allowing arms transfers and military technology to China, an equally great change in Chinese policy from total self-reliance to at least an interest in a military supply relationship with American and other Western countries, loosely coordinated policies in regard to Vietnam and Afghanistan, and the establishment of a joint facility on Chinese soil for monitoring Soviet strategic missile tests. There has been broad agreement among the last four American Administrations on the general desirability of such ties. By late 1981 matters had proceeded to a point where major new departures could be made that would, in all probability, set the course of Sino-American relations for the rest of the 1980's and impact greatly on the two countries' relations with the Soviet Union.

There are costs as well as benefits of military ties, disadvantages as well as advantages, and these need to be specified, as well as, if possible, a rough balance drawn. However, several cautions should be entered. For one, it should be noted that the set of disadvantages is not necessarily the converse of the list of advantages; that is, a given benefit to the United States of military ties with China cannot necessarily be set opposite a given cost and a balance then taken. The "totals" on each side must be "calculated" and an overall balance struck. That final evaluation, it should be further noted, must be an entirely subjective one and, being so, must vary from observer to observer. Hence, what is said in these pages may lead to quite different conclusions on the part of others. Further, even were all analysts by some miracle to agree on this, or any other, assessment of American-Chinese military ties, it would not necessarily follow that their conclusions should be followed. The United States must formulate its policy on the basis of a weighted average of its calculated interests in every region of the world and with regard to all issue areas taken together. The Sino-American component cannot be artificially separated from that larger evaluative process.

Finally, the calculation of those interests themselves are slave to the procession of events, the sequencing of which can never be foretold with much accuracy and which are, in any case, subject to instantaneous interruption and redirection by entirely unpredictable occurrences, domestic and international. The history of international relations and foreign policies is, in fact, largely made up of the stringing together of such unforeseen and often untoward events. So also it will be with Sino-American military relations. The evaluation of their costs, benefits, pace, goals, and general direction must be placed in the context and sequencing of overall American-Chinese relations, Washington's and Beijing's relations with the Soviet Union and other relevant states, the general evolution of world politics and international economic relations, the range of global issues affecting all in a relatively equal manner, and (most importantly) the character of and changes in the domestic

political scene in both countries. Since no one can foresee with accuracy how all of these factors will relate to each other over the course of the next several years (or, if he could, he would not be believed except after the fact), no assessment of Sino-American military ties can be made *in abstracto*.

Having entered these cautions, let us nevertheless proceed with our own evaluation.

Advantages to the United States of military ties with the People's Republic of China

1. Perhaps the argument most often advanced in favor of military ties is that the result would be an important contributant to alleviating the heavy weight of deterring the Soviet Union from global aggression. If the United States materially assists China in facing the Soviet threat to its own territorial integrity, and the Chinese are able thereby to defend their borders and their air and sea space more effectively, this argument has it that the Russians will be less willing and able to use their military forces elsewhere, particularly in the Middle East and Europe where the United States has vital interests. Presumably it is more efficient for the United States to assist China to defend itself against the Soviet Union than it would be to spend an equal amount of American military resources on protecting its interests, in whatever manner, in these other regions (or, in the case of strategic forces, globally). The argument for military ties does not depend very much on this presumed efficiency, however. Rather, the political consequences of military ties are thought to be more important. With China and America in the same camp, and with the strengthening and even the broadening of American alliances and other security ties to Europe, Japan and other Asian states, and relevant states in the Middle East, the Soviet Union will be confronted with an overall balance of power such that it will turn from an aggressive, expansionist policy to one of détente, negotiation, and conflict resolution. It is also asserted that a little military insurance in protecting the territorial integrity of China is a good thing, since the costs to the United States of having to come to the aid of the Chinese in the event of Soviet invasion would be horrendous, to say nothing of the domestic political and economic consequences of the very high level of expenditures in blood and treasure that would be required. Deterrence is always much cheaper than defense.

This argument for tying down Russian divisions, planes, missiles, and ships in the Siberian wilderness and the icy North Pacific is as good as its consequences. If it contributes to benign Soviet behavior toward America, its allies, and to China itself, well and good. But it will take at least a decade to find that out, and in the meantime, the costs in all senses to the United States might well be substantial. Moreover, helping China to arm itself better against Russia will undoubtedly cause the Kremlin to react in predictable manners. For one, it will increase its own strength against China. Although there is obviously an upper limit to that exertion, the most likely consequence of American military assistance to China is a general strengthening of the Soviet Union even beyond the point it now is and even further in the direction it is now heading. Since the United States feels itself behind the Soviet Union militarily and will remain so, according to most experts, for most of the 1980's, providing a given degree of military assistance to China will probably lead at least to an equal strengthening of the Soviet Union. And since military force can be turned in any direction, there is no guarantee that, in an American-Soviet crisis—global or regional—that Russia would not be in a comparatively better position vis-a-vis the United States and its allies than it would be were America not to enter into military ties with China.

A second counterargument stems from the joint military and economic consequences of Sino-American military ties. By strengthening China militarily at greater than marginal rates, the present Sino-Soviet arms race will accelerate. Presumably, China would have to look even more to the United States for support, thus assuring a position of increasing dependence on Washington, while the Soviet Union would be faced with the necessity to constantly augment its China-directed forces, thus raising its costs with no end in sight. If the United States is capable of employing such a Machiavellian strategy, perhaps it should. But it is not in the nature of America to be successful at such a game over the long period during which it would have to be employed, nor would it, in all probability, be "successful" in the end. For one, it would work against Washington's overall strategy of weakening Moscow; the United States does not need to provide the Soviet Union with yet another excuse for accelerating arms production. For another, there is no necessary advantage to the United States—as will be argued below—to accelerate the development of Chinese military power beyond the level and pace necessary to fend off the Soviet threat at a minimal cost to itself and to the United States. A third reason for America to avoid fostering a Sino-Soviet arms race is that it could well lead directly to the opposite, and undesired, result: Soviet-Chinese détente at American expense. Once it became clear to Beijing as well as Moscow that the United States was

actively encouraging them to contribute to the ruination of their economies, while gaining no greater measure of security against each other, and that control of events was gradually slipping into American hands, every incentive would be present to agree on thorough-going arms control measures. Since this is the central issue in Sino-Soviet discord, the continuation of which is, on balance, to the advantage of the United States, the consequence could be disastrous for the United States.

2. There is a subsidiary argument, although not often made, in favor of Sino-American military ties stemming from its presumed military effect on the Soviet Union. If the Soviets continue to find it necessary to station forces in Siberia and the Soviet Far East because of Sino-American military cooperation, those same forces have the potential to threaten non-Chinese Asian allies of the United States—principally Japan and South Korea—and, through the balance of power mechanism, to make it possible for Soviet client states—principally Vietnam but perhaps also North Korea—to threaten their own neighbors. In all probability, however, the Russians would not actually use this force to achieve further changes of the present status quo in their favor, since the Kremlin would be constantly busy worrying about the China issue itself, non-Asian regional issues, and global competition with America. The net resultant of a prolonged and increasingly severe Soviet military threat in Asia, according to this argument, thus is that it would usefully serve as the glue for bonding together all of American's Asian allies under Washington's leadership. If it is the American goal to build an anti-Soviet united front in Asia, and on that basis construct a viable balance of power there and usher in a prolonged period of regional peace, internal harmony among the various anti-Soviet Asian nations, more rapid Asian economic development and interdependence, and integration of China into a peaceful regional system, a constant Soviet threat may be an excellent means to those ends. Presuming that the American contribution is made through diplomatic leadership, military developments, trade, technology transfer, and (where necessary) a modicum of military assistance and cooperation, and all that it can be done at minimal cost, this strategy has much to recommend it. A China participatory in an Asia of this sort is obviously to America's advantage. Not only does it minimize the probability of Beijing returning to a too-isolationist, autarchic, and xenophobic posture (but this time with much enhanced power and possibly with the Soviet military threat minimized through agreement). It also could become the centerpiece of overall American policy toward Asia, on the basis of which several of the continously dangerous regional issues—the Korean and Taiwan problems being at the top of the list—could be addressed on their merits. A generalized but manageable Soviet military threat could thus become the means to achieving laudatory American goals for and in Asia all at reasonable cost.

This is a powerful argument for Sino-American military ties, for it places them in the broader context of general American strategy for Asia and for China's role as a peaceful participant in the region. Essentially, the success of the strategy, and thus of this argument, turns on the ability of the United States to manage the course of events, on the "agreement" of the various regional states—principally Russia and China themselves—to play their assigned roles, and on the presumption of reasonably low investment costs. The trouble with the strategy is three-fold. First, the United States has never been very good at overall management of regional affairs for extended periods, since it has rarely been able to arrive at a consistent policy and then stick with it. Second, it is not clear that, with minimal investment, Washington could do such a job, especially when dealing with a concentration of the world's top military powers (of the top ten, seven are in Asia) and economic giants (the Soviet Union, China, and Japan, not to speak of the "newly industrialized countries" as the two Koreas and Taiwan). Third, China and Japan have their own intentions and plans for Asia, not all of which revolve around how to deal with the Soviet Union and surely do not depend exclusively on American leadership. In that regard, America will be doing well to hold its own in Asia for the next decade. The "glue" provided by the Soviet military threat thus probably will not be strong enough by itself to bond together all of non-Soviet led Asia under American leadership (or even Sino-American or Japanese-American leadership). Nonetheless, as a contributant to a general strategic approach to Asia, use of the Soviet military threat and concomitant establishment of Sino-American military ties as a means to encourage overall cooperation and problem-solving in the region is probably not without merit.

3. Sino-American military ties would, it is argued, also bring specific benefits if American and Chinese policies and actions were to be coordinated against further Soviet military advances in Asia and even to force Soviet retreat or balance Russian presence in areas where they have already taken up advanced positions. Thus, for instance, it is sometimes thought desirable that Washington and Beijing coordinate their security policies toward the Soviet air and sea presence in Vietnam; that the

United States supply China with the kind of arms assistance that would, in conjunction with Chinese training, enable Kampuchean guerrillas gradually to increase pressure on the Vietnamese occupying army; do roughly the same with the Afghan resistance forces; and even coordinate and mutually support each other's air and sea patrols over and on waters of those portions of the North Pacific and the East China Sea where Soviet forces operate. The benefits to the United States would be assistance in dealing with the Asian portion of the Soviet threat at just the time (the first half of the 1980's) when American forces would be stretched thinnest; rendering concrete proof to the Chinese of American intentions to stop the Soviets in Asia (concurrently easing the Chinese military burden if only marginally but, more importantly, discouraging the Chinese from the temptation to settle their differences with the Russians); and providing both sides with experience with working with each other in case the Soviet threat suddenly enlarges to where large scale Sino-American military cooperation becomes necessary.

This is a strong argument in favor of military ties. It does, however, have several drawbacks. Any substantial degree of military cooperation and policy coordination would represent a loss of freedom of policy choice for both the United States and China. The benefits from cooperation would be only as good as American-Chinese interests in the various issues approached each other. As both sides have often noted, however, interests tend merely to be "parallel," which is to say, they are temporarily aligned. They will not necessarily continue so over the longer term and surely they will never be coterminal. Moreover, it is doubtful whether either party wants to allow the other to have an important say in setting the policies of the other. Events, i.e., Soviet actions, may impel them to greater degrees of cooperation, but rushing into closer cooperation than the situation called for would probably be a mistake objectively and balked at subjectively by decision-makers on both sides. If military cooperation with China is to America's advantage, then, it probably should be entered into cautiously and carefully, lest Chinese leaders take fright at approaching one of the "imperialist superpowers" too closely. Finally, broad-scale military cooperation is the very departure that will cause the Soviets to believe that China and the United States, together with their respective allies, have ganged up on them and that the Kremlin must take decisive defensive action. While neither America nor China can afford to allow the Russians to seize policy initiatives on all fronts, it is probably best not to go too far too rapidly in coordinating military policies against Moscow. If Washington and Beijing are to establish, through military cooperation, a de facto alliance (i.e., entente), they should probably drift into it over an extended period by iterating particular solutions to particular (Soviet-caused) problems. The essence of this counter-argument, therefore, is that military cooperation should enter only on cat's feet.

4. A further argument asserts that military ties will encourage China to remain strongly anti-Soviet over the coming years and that thereby the United States can count more reliably on China as a cornerstone of its own policy of opposing Soviet expansionism. This argument is based on the suspicion that someday China may leave America in the lurch and work a deal with the Russians. To avoid such an untoward possibility, insurance must be taken out in the form of acceding to Chinese requests for advanced arms systems, etc. Military ties then become a reward to Beijing for continuing to traverse the straight and narrow path of out-and-out anti-Sovietism.

This assertion should not be thrown out immediately. It is true that it sounds like a case of bribing the Chinese to stay good. On the other hand, in a triangular state system, the most wicked of all possible combinations in power politics, the weakest party can at any time offer to switch allegience or to threaten to do so if their demands are not met. And during the post-Maoist period, the Chinese have hinted more than once that they are prepared to do just that—although not yet, it should be added, on the issue of transfer of military technology. But if this propensity were to continue, and were it to be extended to the sphere of military ties, it could lead to ever-increasing Chinese demands on Washington which American Administrations might feel necessary to meet. Fortunately, things are not likely to go that far, for China probably will compromise with the Soviet Union only when it is ready, i.e., when Beijing is strong enough to drive a better bargain and when Moscow is willing to provide acceptable terms, or were the Americans to prove to be unreliable partners. The former is not likely for the next several years, the latter, hopefully, not at all. The possibility remains of a Sino-American vicious circle of bribery-blackmail-bribery, but leaders on both sides are probably aware that they would be playing with fire. Moreover, American institutional checks (e.g., claims that Chinese policy is not based on such unprincipaled behavior) would militate against such a development.

5. It seems to some that the United States must proceed with some further degree of military relations with China, since it has been Washington, under both Democratic and Republican Administrations, that has encouraged Beijing to believe that military assistance and other measures of cooperation would be forthcoming. At a point still relatively early in the new Sino-American relationship, it would not do to act in a fickle manner toward the Chinese, who are more than ordinarily sensitive to marchings up the hill and then down again on the part of the Americans. The penalties for withdrawal from even the promise of military ties with China thus might be substantial. Moreover, if military ties are not forthcoming, does not this pull the rug out from under the entire anti-Soviet base of American global stategy? If the United States is anti-Soviet (as, it would seem, it must be from Soviet-American power considerations alone), in a period of relative weakness, it must be pro-Chinese. And if it must be pro-Chinese, then America must cooperate militarily with China against Russia, since the Soviet threat is laregly a military on.

The logic of this argument appears to be unassailable. The only question is the consequences for Sino-American and Soviet-American relations were the United States at this point to back out of military relations with China. While they could be severe on both counts, if the case can be made for not proceeding, it is best to cut losses near the beginning rather than much later, when they could be much more severe. The parallel of the AWACS sale for Saudi Arabia, to say nothing of the Iranian example, should serve as a warning. The consequences, moreover, would not necessarily be entirely deleterious. The outcome would depend on the situation of the moment, which is hardly foreseeable, and on the general state of relations among the three powers. Thus, for instance, it does not follow that Sino-American relations as a whole will be stillborn if the military component remains relatively small. There is still the entire economic, non-military technological, cultural, and overall political component that, if not left intact, might not be fatally injured. Moreover, Soviet-American relations might well improve if Washington decided not to proceed with military ties with Beijing, although that is hardly likely given the totalistic nature of American-Russian differences. Whatever the outcome, it is difficult to argue for or against development of American-Chinese military relations on grounds of momentum. Rather, the argument should be placed in the context of innate interests of the two parties and the consequence for American and Chinese relations with the Soviet Union of developing or cutting military ties.

6. A political-economic argument exists in favor of military ties. Military assistance to and cooperation with the People's Liberation Army may tend, *paru passu*, to undercut opposition within the Chinese military to present prioritization of the Four Modernizations, which relegates military modernization to last place. That is where it should be, according to economists, if the Deng Xiaoping-led program of overall modernization and, concomitantly, relative liberalization is to succeed. And since, it is argued, economic modernization along those lines is to the advantage of the United States (e.g., the "strong China" argument), it is in the American interest to assist in the defense of China so that Beijing can concentrate its attention and resources on development. Moreover, by keeping the PLA in its place politically, pressure for approaching Moscow with offers to settle the border question and other differences would presumably be minimized, since such pressure allegedly emanates principally from the Army. Finally, a China devoting itself chiefly to economic development is less a danger to its neighbors, who can then also concentrate on solving their own domestic economic problems and on combining with China and America to address the only major international problem in Asia: Soviet (or Soviet-sponsored) expansionism.

I can see no direct counter to this argument, so far as it goes. Encouraging China by whatever means to move ahead as rapidly as possible with economic, and therefore presumably also socio-political, modernization, is surely in the American interests, at least in the short to medium term. If the relatively moderate group gathered around Deng Xiaoping is to succeed over the next two decades, especially when Deng and his present close supporters will have long left the scene, the program must be seen to be working in the immediate sense and hold great promise for the future. For all the well-known economic reasons, Chinese military modernization is best kept in its present mode. The only question remaining, then, is the kind and pace of American military assistance and cooperation with China against the Soviet Union. If, as I believe, a fairly low level of American military input, a self-strengthening movement within the Chinese military, and healthy Soviet inhibitions in the first place against military actions against China, combine to stabilize the Soviet Asian threat, there is probably relatively little harm in initiating military ties with China. The counter-argument, if it exists, must move along the lines of outlining the general disadvantages of such ties, which are taken up below.

7. If there are to be military relations between America and China, it is well to address the question of what sort of ties would be most helpful to the United States. One answer seems to be: ties that would configure the People's Liberation Army and overall Chinese foreign policy in a generally defensive, non-aggressive, mode. If military ties hold out the prospect for contributing to building that sort of Chinese Army and foreign policy, this argument holds that the opportunity should be seized. Such a critical opportunity comes only rarely and may not come again at all. Specific implications follow for the kinds of military technology that could be transferred and the kind of relations that might develop. Weapons systems that help China defend itself on the ground and in the air against Soviet attack would be emphasized, including, for instance, anti-tank PGMs, associated technologies for upgrading Chinese tanks, and surface-to-air missiles. There could also be stress on those non-lethal areas of military assistance where the United States possesses a comparative advantage over other suppliers: logistics; training in command, control, and communication; military management; combined forces tactics; service career structuring; and training in American military schools. Emphasis could also be on achieving a broad range of personalized military contacts to lessen innate Chinese military wariness against too-close contact with their American counterparts. In the technological realm, stress could be on dual use items and on establishing scientific-technological ties of a broad character that would deliberately carry the possibility of longer term military application. Such scientific and technological relations would be at least as useful in non-military areas and thus assist the general goal of overall Chinese economic modernization in the presently envisaged mode. Finally, it would be best to transfer only those technologies that the Chinese greatly need to defend themselves better against the Soviet Union, not those that would enhance the offensive potential of China generally.

The question at this point becomes: is it possible to limit military assistance to generally defensive armaments and otherwise to configure American military relations with China to provide a more than marginal impetus to impel the Chinese Army in more or less strictly non-aggressive directions? The answer is a modified no, for at least two reasons. First, if China decides that it will modernize its army not only to defend itself against potential Soviet attack but also to attain other national goals (recovery of Taiwan being the most obvious), a program of American military assistance can do but little to move Beijing in more benign directions. Of all states, China is not going to allow outsiders a major voice in formulating and carrying out its foreign policies, and this is particularly so in military affairs. Would the United States then do better by withholding any military assistance at all or do military ties at least provide some leverage, however marginal? The answer is that it is probably better to make use of this tool of foreign policy than abstain altogether. Moreover, the very act of contact, discussion, and cooperation probably would influence the Chinese in manners presumably to American benefit. That is better than no contact, etc., at all.

Second, the distinction between defensive and offensive armaments, and between lethal and non-lethal equipment, is overdrawn, although certainly not entirely counterfeit. Bullets kill, whether in defensive or offensive operations; local defensive tactics are often offensive; weapons systems purchased for one configuration or threat can be transformed or transported to another. Still, the general distinction can hold, at least for a while, and it is that time differential that counts. For instance, surface-to-air missile technology transferred with the intention of making China more defensible against Soviet air attack would probably be used, first and foremost, in that mode, and only later installed in Fujian Province to cover a possible buildup against Taiwan prepatory to invasion. The delay between the two events could be a decade or more, during which time the entire military and political situation between Taiwan and Mainland could have changed. The same probably is true for most other systems. Indeed, it may be useful to establish as a criterion for transferability that the time from initial agreement to full deployment be lengthy.

8. Consideration of this issue leads directly to the next purported advantage, the argument that military ties will not really harm the United States and its Asian allies and protectorates too much, because the lead time for transfer is so long. This is given added weight by China's own propensity to avoid both quick fix solutions to its present defense problem and overdependence on foreign suppliers. Beijing would rather domesticate the know-how, even if it takes longer, than acquire large numbers of copies of entire systems from abroad. Moreover, it is probably wiser in the objective sense that it do so, for rapid wholesale importation would cause much military disorganization and could bankrupt the country. The point is not so much China's propensities as the influence on the American security posture of transfer of military technology and military cooperation in other regions. One advantage of

military cooperation as opposed to technology transfer, is that it can be stopped quickly if relations go sour. The major advantage of technology transfer, according to this argument, is that results are long in coming. The flow of technology would begin only slowly and accelerate equally slowly. That provides time—several years—to assess the political situation. And if the spigot has to be turned off at that time, experience shows that the effects on the recipient military are noticeably much quicker than during the long start-up period.

Finally, this argument has it that even if the entire process of transfer does successfully proceed, the forefront of American military technology would have "progressed" at least equally far in the interim and, more likely, will have outdistanced any upgrading of the Chinese Army that would have come due to American military transfers. Indeed, if as is likely the United States does not transfer the most advanced levels of American military hardware but provides equipment, plans, etc., that are at least one military generation behind the pace, at the end of transfer cycle China may find itself at least as far behind as it is presently and perhaps further. This is because the pace and the complexity of military technology seems generally to be accelerating. It is thus no Machiavellian plot on the part of the United States to keep the Chinese permanently behind but rather the nature of military technology and the Soviet-American competition that drives the system ahead at ever-faster rates. Additionally, China would be foolish to insist only on state-of-the-art military technology since it may not be able to handle it successfully. Better to approach solution of the problem gradually, gaining experience in the present decade and then leaping ahead in the 1990's to Soviet and American levels. This seems the Chinese plan, which thus would accord well with the new American willingness to transfer certain military systems, lethal or not.

In sum, this argument purports that transfer of technology is relatively harmless to the United States, is manageable, and is beneficial to China in just the area (defense against the Soviet Union) of interest to Washington. Commensurately, equipping the Chinese Army in such a manner would have two real benefits to the United States as concerns its own efforts to hem in Soviet military power. First, American military technology in Chinese hands would impose a potentially higher toll on the Red Army if Moscow was so foolish as to invade China. And second, it would force the Soviets to reinforce their border with China more than otherwise, thus presumably preventing such forces from being transferred elsewhere as well as driving up Soviet military costs.

Evaluation of this argument depends on the congruence of its several assumptions, as stated above, with the "real world" of technological development, Chinese abilities to domesticate American military technology quickly, and its general contribution of Chinese military potential. These cannot be evaluated except by actually proceeding with military technology transfers to China or by analogy with experience gained in other instances. Since there seems to be little heuristically faulty with the argument, everything would depend on actual outcomes. That lays a heavy burden on policy-makers, however. What if calculations prove to be incorrect—that China moves ahead much faster than assumed; that Beijing deploys sophisticated hardware against Taiwan; or that Chinese military power in general increases rapidly enough that Beijing not only needs the United States less and is also more pugnatious in pursuing its own interests? Military ties can be cut at the point, to be sure, but by then the damage might be done. The only argument against transfer of military technology, then, is that of prudence; better safe then sorry. This does not hold, it should be noted, or at least to the same extent, for non-technology related military cooperation. That can be kept on a fairly short fuse by both sides. If prudence is the talisman of Sino-American military ties, both countries would be better advised to limit their ties to the non-technology, non-systems transfer area.

This begs the question, of course, because those ties themselves are dependent on both sides' assessment of the severity of the Soviet threat and their respective abilities to handle it. If non-technological cooperation alone falls short of doing the job, a technology and systems supply relationship must be initiated. It would be convenient were the process to be as separable in reality as it is in theory. Unfortunately it is not. Not only do the Chinese seem to make actual transfers a test of American faithfulness, and hence of their willingness to go further with the Americans in the realm of cooperative policies and actions. The very act of cooperation probably may also cause enough of a Soviet reaction to warrant, even on grounds of prudence, transfer of American military systems and technology to China. If that is so, then it would seem desirable to go ahead and reap the benefits of full-scale military ties, lest Soviet-induced cost rise too quickly. In any case, it seems that arguments for or against supply of military technology and equipment to China cannot be separated from the larger question of the overall extent of military ties.

Disadvantages to the United States of military ties with the People's Republic of China

As noted in the introduction, disadvantages are not necessarily the converse of advantages. Many shortcomings of the list of benefits to the United States have already been noted. In like manner, evaluation of the costs of military ties with China may turn up a range of benefits as well. The overall balance will thus have to be struck at the end, mixing back together ingredients that, for argumentative purposes, have been artifically pulled apart.

1. Perhaps the strongest argument against American-Chinese military ties is that a China that becomes too strong too rapidly can hardly be in the American interest. Specifically, three allegedly deleterious consequences would follow. First, if the United States assists in building up China militarily as a means of easing its own military burden against the Soviet Unon, Beijing may well betray Washington at the first possibility by coming to terms with Moscow. The reason is that a militarily strong China would be in a better position, and therefore more likely, to negotiate in earnest with Moscow. No state negotiates out of weakness if it can help it. The Sino-Soviet "negotiations" that have transpired so far are mere attempts on China's part to provide a lightening rod against the threat of Soviet military attack; the Chinese have never been serious in the twenty years of talks so far. But the issues separating the two states—principally the border question and how to maintain a rough military balance between the two sides in the border regions—are settleable on their merits whenever the Chinese decide they can get a good deal out of Moscow. Moreover, it would be to China's advantage to do so, since it would provide the basis for placing China in the best of all foreign policy positions: equidistant from Washington and Moscow instead, as it is now, dependent too much on the Americans. American military assistance would only hasten that day, which when it does come will be disastrous for the United States.

Second, a militarily strong China would not merely settle its problems with the Soviet Union; on that basis it would be in a much better position to attack Taiwan, America's protectorate. With the Soviet threat neutralized, forces could be sent back to the Fujian front, built up rapidly and, even though high casualties would be suffered in the invasion, investment of the island (without, it is assumed, American intervention) would be a foregone conclusion. But since the United States is still involved in the Chinese Civil War through the Taiwan Relations Act, a Chinese Mainland buildup against Taiwan would have to be countered, either through arming the Nationalists or by bringing in American forces. Whether war broke out or not, the United States would have to use its own weaponry to counter the weaponry and proficiency of the People's Liberation Army which, by that time, would at least partially have been supplied by America. Thus, Washington would hasten not merely the possible demise of Nationalist rule of Taiwan but find itself arming both sides of an internal Chinese conflict. It would do best, therefore, to obviate the possibility entirely by not arming the Mainland Chinese in the first place.

Third, once it had recovered its military strength, China would not stop at attempting to recover Taiwan but would use force to try to attain other foreign policy presently out of reach and go on to find other interests that will provide fitting exercise for its new-found prowess. Recovering the whole of the island groups in the South China Sea, now claimed by Beijing, would be the first such goal; dismembering the Vietnamese empire in Indo-China would be the second; making all of Southeast Asia into a Chinese sphere of influence would be the third; and recovery of Mongolia would be the fourth. In the long run, China would seek to oust both American and Soviet influence in Asia; replace it with her own; and on that basis dominate not only that portion of the world but claim superpower status and extend her influence to, and demand a say in the affairs of all the other regions of the world. The United States thus would have been of critical assistance in creating an imperialist Chinese monster, and Napoleon's famous comment on China would finally have come true. Nothing could be further from American interests with regard to China, Asia, and the world. And, the argument concludes, there is no way of avoiding such an outcome, for all states become imperialist once they attain great military strength. It is merely a question of time. So why hasten matters, especially when Washington has its hands full with the Soviet threat, to say nothing of the manifold pressures of being the only responsible superpower?

This argument against American-Chinese military ties is difficult to counter, to say the least. If it exists, however, the counterargument would depend on bringing to bear other aspects of American policy toward China and more generally. Thus, the possibility that American-induced Sino-Soviet rapprochement would occur depends on a host of factors, not merely the question of American military assistance to China. Over most of those factors the United States would have little control.

They include internal Chinese and Soviet policies, the overall character of Soviet and Chinese foreign policies, and the policies and assumed reactions of other states (e.g., Japan) were Sino-Soviet rapprochement to occur. Moreover, the argument cuts both ways. If the United States did not enter into meaningful military relations with China, Beijing might just as well conclude that its better bet would be to obtain whatever settlement it could with Moscow. Finally, a Sino-Soviet agreement would not be the end of the world for the United States. Economic and political relations might well continue as strongly as before. Indeed, a China equidistant from Washington and Moscow might feel it could act with less fear and thus greater confidence as a whole, thus placing American-Chinese relations on firmer ground. Everything would depend on the nature of the agreement and on the political circumstances, in China and internationally, at the time. No one can foresee that, so there may be no great harm in the meanwhile in using what means of policy the United States has to influence China in desired directions.

As to the Taiwan question, the outcome would again depend on the circumstances of the moment, as well as on the military balance between the Island and the Mainland that had been maintained—largely by American initiatives, it should be noted—in the meantime. If Taiwan were supplied with at least the minimum of defensive armaments during the approximately ten year period we are talking about, and if it were continually made clear that hostile acts against Taiwan would be met with American resistance as well, Beijing might not have motivation to use force. Moreover, the Communists would have to consider that use of force in that instance, after a lengthy period of abstention and a series of offers of political reconciliation, might shift much regional and world support against them and in favor of the Nationalists (who could then say "we told you so") and bankrupt other components of their foreign policy that depended heavily on the assumption of a peace-loving China. Chinese foreign policy as a whole might thus come apart at the seams, and with it such very important components as continued trade and technology transfer in support of economic modernization. If China were to seek an efficient device to destroy all of the good relations that it would have created during the twenty years previous to (say) 1990, an attack on Taiwan perhaps would do the trick better than any other. And a Mainland menace to Taiwan following upon Sino-Soviet rapprochement would guarantee reconstitution of a 1950's style bipolar world, leading in all probability to a new isolation of China and the consequent destruction of the Four Modernizations, which is so beneficial to Beijing.

This is not to say, of course, that China would not do such a thing. All it argues is that the costs would be very high and the benefits small by comparison. Hence, China would be foolish to try to fasten its overlordship on the rest of Asia and exclude America and Russia from regional affairs. The workings of the balance of power are often slow and uneven, but surely over the long run (which is what we are talking about in considering this possibility) there would be a tendency for the relevant states to join together to resist Chinese expansionism. And since Asia is composed mostly of strong states, militarily and economically (which states, it should be noted, will probably be much more so by the turn of the century), an anti-Chinese balance of power should not be too difficult to fashion. But if that were to be so, perhaps one need not worry too much about the interim effects of Sino-American military ties. The tendency of statesmen is to take what political gains can be obtained from the immediate situation and not be too concerned about what happens later. They can be criticized for that, but in this instance there appears to be enough systemic fungibility to be able to cope with an eventual surfeit of Chinese power.

2. Some regard military ties, even of the minimalist sort presently envisaged, as leading inevitably to greater and greater degrees of commiment to the defense of China. In international relations, once ties of this sort are established, a vicious circle often emerges between the contracting parties and their common opponent leading, through an action-reaction process, to tightening of boundary lines, perceiving collusion where none is intended, arms races between the two sides, and finally full-scale alliance, whether called that or not. The best example is British-French politico-military cooperation between Fashoda in 1898 and the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Step by step, London and Paris felt it necessary to concert against Berlin, while Germany for its part felt each additional degree of Franco-British military cooperation a threat against which it was necessary to prepare further. By 1914, all the slack in the international system had been taken up and war could not be avoided. The same process could well occur in the Sino-Soviet-American system. Once American-Chinese military cooperation begins in earnest, there will be no stopping matters until the Soviet Union perceives it has no choice but to attack America or China and the United States finds its commitment to the defense of

China is irrevocable. Sino-American military ties are thus a recipe for nuclear catastrophe.

Moreover, even if it were in the national interest of the United States to defend the territorial integrity of China in all circumstances (something that it is not), America will never have sufficient resources to devote to that end. Unless, of course, it decides to extend the nuclear umbrella over China and advertise the fact to Moscow, a move sure to involve the United States in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union even if the Russians attacked China (say by conducting a non-nuclear ground invasion) for limited objectives. So through military ties with China the United States would guarantee its own participation in a Sino-Soviet war, requiring either escalation to the nuclear level or permitting Soviet conquests to stand. America would have to choose between holocaust or *fait accompli*.

This is a very important objection to Sino-American military ties because in effect it asks what China's real importance is to the United States. If there are to be military relations of the broad sort proposed, it could easily take America several steps down the road to full commitment to Beijing's defense. Under what circumstances would Washington come to the aid of Beijing? The trouble with a military relationship is that it can never be limited to mere supply, training, and policy coordination in certain areas. A China linked to America even in that manner is a China at least partially integrated into American defense plans throughout the globe. It is difficult to envisage, for example, fitting China into American nuclear defense plans without affecting both American nuclear war options in general and defense of NATO in particular.

American-Chinese military ties thus lead to the need to clarify the entire defense relationship with Beijing. Of course, it does not follow that no defense relationship with China is desirable. For one thing, the very purpose of military ties with China is to deter Soviet attack, on China itself and elsewhere. To the extent that enhanced Chinese power is taken into account by the Kremlin (which is to say, to the extent that China contributes to the overall balance of power against the Soviet Union), the prospects for security presumably increase. It is better to have a viable though rough balance than none at all; it is better still to have such a balance in which commitments are spelled out in advance and in which changes in commitments are agreed on as the quality and kind of defense ties themselves evolve.

For another thing, the Chinese would undoubtedly be quite wary of initiating major defense ties with the United States that could be understood only in alliance or alliance-like terms. It is most certainly not Beijing's policy to take up such an offer from Washington, especially when there would certainly be political strings attached (such as no attack against Taiwan). On the other side, the American Congress is sure to require of the Administration an explicit statement of the nature of the American commitment to China concomitant with the extension of military assistance and cooperation. What, then, to do? If China would strongly prefer military ties that do not smack of alliance, no matter whether or not such ties eventually could lead to such a thing, should Washington remain silent (thus bringing on the 1914 danger)? Or should the United States insist on carefully stated publically communicated policy at every stage (thus risking Chinese objection and loss of the Chinese contributant to the cause of anti-Soviet deterrence)? Neither is satisfactory *in extremis*. It is the task of American and Chinese statesman to find, if it exists, some middle ground satisfactory to both sides. Otherwise, perhaps it is better that establishment of military ties be short-circuited at the very beginning.

3. The influence on the Soviet Union, and therefore on American-Soviet rivalry, of Sino-American military ties must be inspected more closely. Surely one consequence would be an even greater freezing up of Washington-Moscow relations than is projected on the basis of direct competition. Would it not be better to keep the China factor out of Soviet-American problems? Intrusion of this highly charged element can only exacerbate an already critically difficult situation. Why ask for more trouble? Why not attempt to divorce American-Chinese issues from those between the United States and the Soviet Union, however artificial that separation might be? Why not, indeed, use the "China card" in a negative sense by proposing to Moscow that Washington not go forward with military ties with Beijing in return for some worthy concessions on the Soviet's part?

It is true that American-Chinese military relations would deepen the gulf between America and Russia. But that does not mean that such relations need be forgone entirely or even that anticipation of Soviet reaction should be a veto-level element in their development. In all probability, the American-Soviet conflict will grow much worse of its own accord during the 1980s, since it is based on pure power rivalry between the two countries. American-Chinese military cooperation would not change the nature of that rivalry, nor would lack of such cooperation reverse the downward course between Washington and Moscow. Moreover, at least in the

short to medium term (two to five years), the United States and China need each other for mutual deterrence of Russian aggression. The penalties of Soviet negative reaction, to the extent there would be any, are better suffered than the penalties of having to fight a larger war against the Soviets were they to misjudge American and Chinese power and intent in the absence of Sino-American military ties.

Moreover, the Russians seem already to have accepted the strong likelihood of American-Chinese security relations. When in the past steps in that direction were announced, Moscow protested but did nothing, at least drastically and directly against China or the United States. Presuming that the pace of American-Chinese military developments is reasonably slow and agreements are made public (which in all probability will be the case), Moscow probably will not adopt extreme measures "in retaliation". This is not to say that there will be no Soviet reaction; no doubt Sino-American military ties will prompt some response from Moscow. But it is also reasonably clear that the Kremlin will not nor cannot take such strong measures as to transform the entire situation. The real issue for the United States is whether military ties with China, on balance, help or hinder the cause of regional and global security. The answer depends on a panoply of factors, of which the anticipated Soviet response is only one.

Conclusion

Where, on balance, does this long catechism of advantages and disadvantages, arguments and counterarguments, leave us? Is it actually possible to arrive at the bottom line? Because the puzzle is so complicated, it seems extraordinarily difficult to fit all the pieces together in a coherent picture. Nonetheless, several conclusions do seem warranted.

First, no matter what arguments are made, for and against, American-Chinese military ties, it is futile and politically erroneous to try and add them up in some pseudo-mathematical fashion. An engineering approach is a non-political approach, hence out of place, and just plain wrong. One or a few factors may, in the minds of decision-makers, outweigh the putative influence of all the others, no matter how strong the intellectual arguments in their favor might be. And only in the minds of decision-makers can such a subjective weighing be performed. To be sure, all of the arguments, on one side or the other, must be taken into account, but only in two contexts. First, the decision-maker must weigh this issue along with all the others—in Sino-American relations, regarding American-Soviet differences, as to the general drift of world politics and the configuration of the international system, and in relation to American interests as a whole. Second, exigencies of the moment are at least as important in decision-makers' minds as their own evaluation of the arguments recorded above. The contingent factor in foreign policy is often decisive, and by definition cannot be judged or even foreseen ahead of time. The "drift" of Sino-American relations and of Soviet-American troubles is definitely in favor of going forward with military ties with China. For that reason alone, it seems probable that things will move ahead. And momentum, once established, is difficult to halt or reverse.

Second, much will depend on other imponderables not subject to reasoned discussion. Here I refer to the political context in China in which the matter is being discussed and American proposals received. It is clear that Chinese leaders are fully aware of the consequences, in every department, of taking the next step in military relations with the United States. Broad implications follow for Beijing's policies towards the Soviet Union, Taiwan, the rest of Asia, and it's total foreign policy orientation for years to come. But more importantly, the issue will (as it must) be considered in the context of the politics of the Chinese Communist Party. That politics is thoroughly factional, and the question of what to do about the United States and the Soviet Union cannot but be addressed in the context of how it will affect the balance among the various factions. There is much to say in that regard, which would require another lengthy analysis. But that is not the point I wish to raise. Rather, it is that the United States should not and cannot allow its decisions about the military question to ride on presumed influence of the relative strength of various contending Chinese groups. It should not because that would effectively throw out the prime arguments in favor (or against) military ties and the benefits and costs they might bring to the United States. It cannot because it is impossible, even with an Embassy in Beijing and a highly developed reporting and analysis system, to peer into the Chinese political scene with sufficient clarity to come to accurate, timely, and policy-relevant conclusions. The United States must make its policy, as with most other issues, on the basis of its own interests, not on the presumed effects its decisions will have on the domestic orderings of other policies. There surely will be such effects, and known soon enough. But American decisions should be taken mostly on grounds of what is good for the United States, not how

they will influence the longevity in office (say) of the Deng Xiaoping group or other such possibilities.

Third, and having said that, the analyst would be undutiful if he were to refrain from providing his own net assessment. Mine is that the United States has no choice but to move ahead with military ties with China, both in terms of actual coordination of military policies where it seems mutually beneficial and in terms of assistance to China in strengthening its own military establishment. America must take out additional insurance to assure the continued anti-Soviet orientation of Chinese foreign policy over the long run. Military ties are a principal means thereto. Moreover, the tenuous and threatening nature of the American-Russian military balance impels America in the same direction. It is in the American interest, for this reason alone to contribute to the further development of a strong, stable, and anti-Soviet China. There are, to be sure, risks associated with such a politico-military strategy: Soviet over-reaction; exacerbation of the American-Soviet arms race; severe augmentation of Soviet military forces deployed against China, etc. These risks must be run in face of the Soviet threat as a whole and gains that will probably come by a thorough-going military association with China. Further, Washington can benefit from military cooperation with China in the several theatres noted above. Additionally, the momentum imparted to Sino-American relations, in the military sphere and in general, is not a bad thing. And if handled correctly, it can be kept in hand well enough. Finally, military ties will encourage China to pursue with greater confidence the present program of the Four Modernizations, which is so beneficial to the United States. The "new" China that eventually could emerge would not only be a bulwark to Soviet expansionism in Asia but would open itself progressively to intercourse of all sorts with the rest of Asia and the world. That kind of China, and the modified structure of Asian international relations that it would help produce, would maximize the prospects for the United States and all other states in and concerned with Asia (including the Soviet Union itself) to address and solve regional problems on their merits and in a peaceful manner.

Finally, it seems useful to recommend that the several particular issues of American-Chinese military affairs be approached on a case-by-case basis. It is best to take steps only when they are called for and do only what is necessary for the moment. If the problem is broken apart in this manner, decision-makers on both sides (to say nothing of the Russians) will not get overly-exercised about programmatic and long-term implications of military ties. Prudence and caution is what is called for, not leaping ahead. But so long as such attitudes are adopted by all concerned, I see no reason why the question should not be taken up in earnest.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you very much. I would urge everyone when this committee print is published to read this paper. It is a fascinating account of the different arguments and different ways of approaching this issue. It is impressively comprehensive.

Our next speaker will be Mr. Roger Sullivan, vice president of the National Council for United States-China Trade. Mr. Sullivan's career in Government is long and distinguished. He was a senior member of the President's National Security Council. He was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. He was a political adviser for the Commander in Chief of U.S. Pacific Forces.

Mr. Sullivan, please.

STATEMENT OF ROGER SULLIVAN, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR UNITED STATES-CHINA TRADE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you.

When I wrote this paper, I anticipated that there would be a surprisingly broad consensus on the general limits of what our military relationship with China should be, and I think we have seen that consensus emerging here. I think there is general agreement in the face of the heightened threat from the Soviet Union to the shared interests of both China and the United States that increased security cooperation between our two countries, in Harold Brown's words when he visited China, "can be an impor-

tant and is a needed element in the maintenance of global stability."

It is also generally agreed, as we agreed at Arden House a few months ago in a consensus statement, that a weaker and more vulnerable China could invite external pressures that could force the PRC to accommodate to another power.

There is broad support also for a continuation of the kind of security relationship that has already become institutionalized between the United States and China. These include consultations on Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia, some limited intelligence exchange, and an exchange of both high level and low level defense delegations.

I think the consensus also favors a greater liberalization of export controls on so-called dual use technology and defense-related industrial technology. As I said yesterday, both the Carter and Reagan administrations have proclaimed this to be their policy, although in both cases the intent of the policymakers has been effectively thwarted at the working level.

The Reagan administration has gone beyond the Carter administration now, the Carter administration authorizing simply limited categories of defense support equipment but not weapons, by removing China from the list of prohibited destinations for purposes of the munitions control list.

I should emphasize, and this is perhaps where some of the confusion comes as to what was happening with China and what is now happening with China in this area, that neither of these actions meant that any sales automatically took place. They simply removed the automatic prohibition against considering such sales. And whether security cooperation should indeed be expanded to include weapons sales is still the major unresolved issue in the continuing debate on the specifics of a United States-China security relationship.

It should be emphasized, and I think we have touched on this yesterday and this morning, that the issue is weapons sales. We are not talking about rhetorical flights of fancy such as arming China, nor is anyone seriously advocating an alliance, a formal alliance between China and the United States. An alliance requires a compatibility of values and a sense of "we-ness," or at least a partial identification of one's interests with the other that I think does not obtain in the United States-China relationship.

It would be ill-advised, then, for us to pursue with China the kind of policies one associates with the alliance concept, particularly involving interdependence and complementarity of military forces. I think it is in this area that Tom's point is valid: that if we were moving in that direction and really attempting to coordinate policy in an alliance sense of the word, there would be a loss of freedom. What we do now is not coordination, it is consultation, and where we see shared interests, where we see that we can work together, we do, and where we see we don't agree, we simply say we don't agree or they say they don't agree.

The effectiveness of our military forces may be enhanced because of the United States-China defense relationship, but that is incidental. We do not and should not in my view consider Chinese military strength or deployments as substitutes for forward deployed mili-

tary forces directly under the control of the United States and its military allies.

The reason this is part of the consensus, it seems to me, is not fear that China might suddenly turn hostile, but rather that the areas of mutual interest are too narrow, and the degree of confidence on each side that the other is playing China or America cards is insufficient to permit the kind of coordination that obtains in our relations with NATO or Japan.

Finally, the consensus includes agreement that a decision to improve new steps in United States-China security relations must take into account the likely effect on United States-Soviet relations, the attitudes and concerns of our friends and allies, and our own interest in continuing the process of broadening and strengthening what is still a fragile United States-China relationship, and avoiding actions that would tend gratuitiously to degrade that relationship.

Various kinds of cooperation have been suggested here and in other places. These include ship visits and training, joint planning, expanded intelligence sharing, and weapons sales. I am going to address for the rest of this just weapons sales, which would also involve training in a limited sense, at least, because I think this is the core issue. Indeed, I think that in the absence of arms sales, there is considerable question as to whether one can say we have a credible defense relationship at all with China, and this perhaps is why the issue is so controversial.

From the standpoint of our interest in strengthening the United States-China bilateral relationship, I think a strong case can be made for treating China normally and permitting the sale of carefully selected defensive arms. We ban the sale of arms only to potential enemies and pariahs. It is therefore reasonable for the Chinese to wonder in which category we have placed them.

I had the occasion to discuss this with a Chinese defense official at one point, and was in the position, since I was in the Government, of having to defend our policy of not going beyond selling nonlethal equipment. He found it difficult to understand why we were prepared to sell trucks and radar to the Chinese army but not weapons. With radar, he pointed out, the Chinese army would be able to see the Russians coming somewhat earlier than they could otherwise, and with the trucks they would be able to run away. [Laughter.]

He said civilians can do that, looking at me, but governments take a dim view of armies that run away. I think he was doing more than just underscoring the absurdity of a policy that draws the line at providing anything that might enable the Chinese to defend themselves. I think he was asking the fundamental question, which is, why is the United States hedging on this relationship? He was also asking himself the corollary question that if the Americans are hedging, perhaps we Chinese ought to hedge, too.

I think a policy of no weapons sales threatens damage to the United States-China bilateral relationship, also by inhibiting the sale of dual use products and technology which could conceivably have a military application. It has been advocated by others that we could maintain the ban on weapons sales but permit China to have greater access to defense production technology. Such a deci-

sion, it has been argued, would be more in accord with China's own interest in developing its defense industry, and would presumably be less provocative to the Soviet Union.

In fact, such a policy has proven impossible to implement. To separate weapons sales from technology simply doesn't work. The reason is that the export control system just can't come to grips intellectually with a proposition that you ban the sale of an item but you don't ban the technology that is going to enable the person to make it. This isn't a criticism of the level of intelligence in our export control bureaucracy. It simply does not compute. In fact it makes more sense from an export control standpoint to be more restrictive in the control of technology and more liberal in the export of the weapons themselves.

In fact, I think it is in large part because the system can't cope with this policy which seems to favor liberal treatment for technology while maintaining a ban on weapons that the policy decisions of the Reagan and Carter administrations to liberalize export control have for all practical purposes remained a dead letter.

I don't think it is possible to quantify the price that we might pay for hedging this way on our relationship with the Chinese, and so inducing the Chinese to hedge on their side. We should keep in mind, however, that the Chinese are not passive partners waiting to agree to whatever we decide is possible in the United States-China security relationship. They have their own cost-benefit calculations, and cooperation with the United States in the security area poses risks for any Chinese Government, not merely in terms of the Soviet Union, but in the context of Third World policy and domestic politics as well. The more we hedge, the more risky and I think the more difficult to justify internally is any cooperation with the United States that is not demonstrably linked to some immediate and critical Chinese national interest.

But, of course, decisions in this area cannot be made solely on the basis of the bilateral relationship, where concerns have been expressed by several friendly nations in Asia. We also must, as a matter of honor, as well as of law, stand by our pledge that we will not jeopardize the well-being of the people of Taiwan.

To take into account the views and concerns of our friends, however, is not to give them a veto power. Our obligation is to keep them informed, explaining clearly what we are doing, and particularly what we are not doing, and to satisfy their legitimate concerns. These concerns and vague worries vary somewhat from country to country, but I think they have a single cause, and that is uncertainty as to what our policy on defense ties with China actually is, and what it might mean for their relationships with us.

The uneasiness the Japanese were expressing a year or so ago over the prospect of arms sales to China I think has subsided quite a bit, as the Japanese have come to understand that no one in authority in the United States is thinking of arming China or engaging in a massive program of military aid.

The prospect of sales to China of carefully selected defensive arms, limited in quantity by China's ability and willingness to pay does not in my experience particularly alarm the Japanese or evoke their opposition, provided it is clearly understood that the

usual obligations of our alliance, including particularly consultation, are met.

There is still, though, a vague uneasiness in Japan over what our decision to move in this direction might imply for the future of United States-Japanese relations. Some Japanese wonder if Americans after a 30-year period of close relations with Japan and a brief span during which we boasted of good relations with both China and Japan, are about to revert to what the Japanese believe is the historical American stance in Asia of alliance with China. Some in Japan say they fear this trend in American policy may have been accelerated by Japanese reluctance to assume what Americans would consider to be an adequate security role in Asia for Japan.

I think we need to be aware this concern exists, but we do not assuage it by remaining in our current position with no clear policy. That only exacerbates Japanese worries. A clear decision on what our policy is with China coupled with consistent adherence to our promises to consult with the Japanese would go a long way toward reassuring Japan that we in no way consider our defense relationship with China as a substitute for the mutual security link we share with Japan.

The nations of Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, express a similar concern. Even when, as in the case of Thailand and Singapore, they acknowledged the value to Southeast Asian security of a closer United States-China defense relationship, they wonder what we have in mind over the longer term. What they fear is that we might be considering some sort of division of labor with China, in which we would accept that Southeast Asia was China's sphere of influence while we concentrated our efforts in Northeast Asia.

Fear that the United States is about to withdraw from the area and turn its responsibilities over to another power is not a new fear in Southeast Asia. In fact, in the late 1960's, senior Indonesian Government officials were talking about Japan in the same way they now talk about China. Then, in the various analyses we did on why the Indonesians were so anti-Japanese, one conclusion was that fear of Japan was a legacy of World War II, which showed how much people attribute Indonesian worries about China to memories of the 1965 Communist coup attempt.

In fact, however, the anti-Japanese attitudes of the Indonesians then and the anti-China attitudes of today stem from a long-standing Indonesian fear that we might, as one Indonesian told me over 10 years ago, try to "cram the Japanese"—read now Chinese—"down our throats" to cover a U.S. withdrawal from the area.

Indonesian concern exceeds that of any nation in the area because it has long been their ambition to be the dominant nation in this subregion, a position they would have no hope of assuming if another stronger Asian power were to supplant the role now played by the nonregional and therefore nonthreatening United States.

As in the case of Japan, there is no way we can fully answer all these fears, but the answer is not to sacrifice our interests with China, which would not satisfy them, either, but to explain that we plan to cooperate with China, recognizing that China has legitimate interests in the area, but that our policy will remain one of

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seeking to prevent any single power or group of powers from dominating the subregion.

The most serious objection, though, to a policy permitting arms sales to China is that it would be provocative to the Soviet Union, thereby adding to the risk of conflict on the China border or elsewhere, without materially strengthening China or the United States. Some even suggest while condemning the playing of China cards on principle that the arms sales card is valuable only when not played, although how one can exercise leverage over the Soviet Union with a policy one promises in advance never to implement is not explained.

The basic objection, though, must be dealt with. As noted earlier, it is an important part of the consensus that we weigh the effect of our actions on the Soviet relationship, and if one were to conclude that arms sales to China would complicate our security problem with the Soviet Union, or provoke it, with no counterbalancing strategic benefit, then of course one should oppose such sales.

I do not agree that our selling arms to China would provoke aggessive action by the Soviet Union. I am more concerned that United States timidity in moving toward a normal defense relationship with China might tempt the Soviet Union to exploit the suggestion of weakness. I am convinced that the Soviet Union would be amazed if the United States were to shrink from normalizing its defense relationship with China, and that Soviet amazement would translate into increased danger for both China and the United States.

Mr. SUTTER. Excuse me, Roger, but length must be in the nature of this subject. I would ask you please to sum up in the interest of time.

Mr. SULLIVAN: I would sum up, but this, of course, is my most important point, I warn you. [Laughter.]

I will try to skip all of the less important parts and just give you the meat.

My thesis here is that it is not selling weapons to China that increases our danger, but a policy of refusing to sell weapons to China that increases our danger. Of all of the interests we share with China, the most important is our interest in the security and territorial integrity of China, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

Thomas Schelling, in his book, "Arms and Influence," noted that a country can have an implicit obligation to support another in a military crisis, not because of policy but because of prediction. This predictive relationship constitutes a form of commitment, and perhaps the more real commitment, because it is a function of real relationships and interests, and unlike policy commitments, it cannot be created or changed by words.

Schelling cited Yugoslavia as an example. He said the answer to the question of what the United States would do if the Soviet Union invaded Yugoslavia lies not in policy statements but in your prediction of what you think the United States would actually do if faced with that contingency.

I maintain that the United States has a similar commitment of prediction in the case of China, an obligation not to the people of China but to the people of the United States. The danger in international relations comes not from having such commitments and

acting in a way that conveys that one understands his country has a commitment. Rather the danger lies in acting in a way that suggests that you either don't know you have the commitment, you don't have an interest, or that you are trying to get out from under them.

The famous Acheson statement on Korea is a good example of what Schelling was talking about, that commitments are a function of real world relationships and not policy statements.

One other quick point. I want to emphasize that we are talking here not about defense; what we would do if the Soviet Union attacked China, or launched a punitive raid against China. We are talking about deterrence, and how we can reduce the likelihood that we will ever have to face that decision. To accomplish this it is not necessary that we provide China with massive amounts of weaponry, or even that we build Chinese defenses to the point where they could repel Soviet attack. It is sufficient for deterrence that the cost of attacking China be perceived as unacceptable, and to meet this, it is essential that we act in a way so that the Soviet Union sees that we understand we have a real world commitment to act in response to a Soviet attack on China, and that the Soviet Union would run a high risk of challenging it.

If we suddenly said, after all these years of talking about our strategic relationship with China, that we were going to confirm our prohibition against selling arms to China, I do not believe the Soviet Union would react benevolently. On the contrary, I think they would conclude, with their propensity to respond aggressively to presumed signs of weakness, that they could at a time of their own choosing punish China without serious risk of American response.

In conclusion, I would say that the tragedy of all this would be that it would have been our own policy that misled the Soviet Union into believing it could attack China with impunity.

[Mr. Sullivan's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROGER W. SULLIVAN

UNITED STATES-CHINA MILITARY COOPERATION—HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?

The United States-China defense relationship is widely regarded as a contentious issue about which emotions run high and opinions sharply differ. And yet, controversial as the subject can be in some of its aspects, there is a surprisingly broad consensus on what the general limits of that relationship should be and what must be some of the major considerations which will guide decisions in this area.

Perhaps most important of all there is general agreement that in the face of a heightened threat from the Soviet Union to the shared interests of China and the United States, increased security cooperation between our two countries "can be an important—and is a needed—element in the maintenance of global stability." [1]

It is also generally agreed that "a weaker and more vulnerable China could invite external pressures which could force the PRC to accommodate to another power." [2] There is broad support as well for continuation of the kinds of security cooperation which have become institutionalized parts of the United States-China relationship. These include regular consultations on Southeast Asian and Southwest Asian developments seen as challenging shared interests in those areas, limited intelligence exchange and exchanges of both high level and working level defense delegations.

The consensus also favors greater liberalization of export controls on the sale of so-called dual use technology and defense-related industrial technology. Both the

[1] Harold Brown, January 6, 1980, Toast at Beijing Welcoming Banquet, New York Times, January 7, 1980.

[2] Arden House, Final Report of the Fifty-Ninth American Assembly on the China Factor, March 19–22, 1981, pg. 6.

Carter and Reagan Administrations have proclaimed this to be their policy but in both cases the intent of the policy-makers has been effectively thwarted at the working-level. The Reagan Administration has even gone beyond the Carter Administration, which authorized sale of limited categories of defense support equipment but not weapons to China, by removing China from the list of prohibited destinations for purposes of the Munitions Control List. Although this decision does not automatically mean that weapons will be sold to China, it permits such sales to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Whether security cooperation should be expanded to include weapons sales is perhaps the major unresolved issue in the continuing debate on the specifics of a policy on defense cooperation with the PRC.

It should be emphasized that the issue is weapons sales not such rhetorical flights of fancy as "arming China", which neither the United States nor China could afford to undertake. Nor is there serious advocacy in either China or the United States of an alliance between the two countries. An alliance requires a compatibility of major values and a sense of "we-ness", or at least a partial identification with one another's interests and needs, none of which obtains in the United States-China relationship.

We would therefore be ill-advised to pursue with China the kinds of policies one associates with the alliance concept, involving particularly interdependence and complementarity of military forces. The effectiveness of our military forces may be enhanced because of United States-China defense cooperation but that is incidental. We do not and should not consider Chinese military strength or deployments as substitutes for forward deployed military forces directly under the control of the United States and its military allies. The reason this view is also part of the consensus is not fear that China might suddenly turn hostile, but rather that the areas of mutual interest are too narrow and the degree of confidence on each side that the other is not simply playing China (or America) cards is insufficient to permit the kind of cooperation that obtains in our relations with NATO and Japan.

Finally, the consensus includes agreement that a decision to approve new steps expanding security cooperation between the United States and China must take into account the likely effect on United States-Soviet relations, the attitudes and concerns of our friends and allies, and our interest in continuing the process of broadening and strengthening what is still a fragile United States-China relationship and avoiding actions which would tend gratuitously to degrade that relationship.

Various kinds of cooperation with China in the defense area have been suggested at one time or another over the past 2 years.

These include, *inter alia*, ship visits, training, joint planning, and expanded intelligence sharing as well as weapons sales. I will address only the question of arms sales (which would also involve training normally associated with such sales) because this is the core issue. Indeed, in the absence of arms sales, there is considerable question as to whether a credible defense relationship exists at all, which may be why the issue is so controversial.

From the standpoint of our interest in strengthening the U.S.-China bilateral relationship, a strong case can be made for treating China "normally" and permitting the sale of carefully selected defensive arms. We ban the sale of weapons elsewhere in the world only to potential enemies and pariahs. It is therefore reasonable for the Chinese to wonder in which category we have placed them. I recall one occasion when I was placed in the position of trying to explain to a Chinese defense official why our reluctance to go beyond selling non-lethal support equipment did not mean what it seemed to him to mean. He found it difficult to understand why we would be willing to sell trucks and radar to the Chinese Army but not weapons. With the radar, he pointed out, the Chinese Army could see the Russians coming somewhat earlier, but with the trucks all they could do would be to run away. Civilians can do that, he said, but governments take a dim view of armies that run away. My interlocutor was doing more than underscoring the absurdity of a policy which drew the line at providing anything that might enable the Chinese to defend themselves. He was asking the fundamental question: Why is the United States hedging on the relationship? He was also doubtless asking himself the corollary question: If the Americans are hedging, perhaps China ought to hedge too.

A policy of no weapons sales threatens damage to the United States-China bilateral relationship also by inhibiting the sale of dual-use products and technology which might have a military application. It has been advocated that we could maintain the ban on weapons sales, but permit China to have greater access to defense-production technology. Such a decision, it has been argued, would be more in accord with China's interest in developing and improving its own defense industries and weapons and would be presumably less provocative to the Soviet Union than would arms

sales. In fact, it has proven impossible, as a practical matter, to separate weapons sales and the sale of dual-use equipment or military related technology. As one who has wrestled with the export control bureaucracy several times, winning the policy fights but losing on implementation, I can testify that it does not work. The reason is simply that the export control system cannot deal with the proposition that we should ban the sale of a particular item while agreeing to license the technology that would enable the recipient to manufacture the banned item. This is not a criticism of the export control bureaucracy; the concept simply does not compute. It makes more sense, from an export control standpoint, to be liberal in the sale of items, including weapons, but restrictive in the sale of the technology needed to manufacture them. Indeed it is in large part because the system cannot cope with a policy which seems to favor liberal treatment of technology transfer to China while maintaining a ban on weapons sales that the successive policy decisions of the Reagan and Carter Administrations to liberalize export controls to China have for all practical purposes remained a dead letter.

One can not quantify the price we pay for hedging in this way on the relationship and so inducing the Chinese to hedge on their side. We should keep in mind, however, that the Chinese are not passive partners waiting to agree to any form of security cooperation the United States might propose. They have their own cost/benefit calculus. Cooperation with the United States in the security area poses risks for any Chinese Government not merely in terms of the Soviet relationship but in their third world policy and domestic politics contexts as well. The more we hedge, the more risky and the more difficult to justify internally is any cooperation with the United States that is not demonstrably linked to an immediate and critical Chinese national interest.

But decisions in the security area cannot be made solely on the basis of their effect on the United States-China bilateral relationship. We are all aware of the concerns that have been voiced by several friendly nations in Asia. We must also, as a matter of honor as well as law, stand by our pledge that we "will not jeopardize the well-being of the people of Taiwan."[3] To take into account the views and concerns of our friends, however, is not to grant them a veto over our actions. Our obligation is to keep them informed, explaining clearly what we are doing and what we are not doing, and to satisfy their legitimate concerns. These concerns and vague worries vary somewhat from country to country but most have a single cause: uncertainty as to what our policy on defense ties with China is and what it might mean for their own relationships with us.

The uneasiness the Japanese were expressing a year or so ago over the prospect of U.S. arms sales to China subsided considerably as the Japanese came to understand that no one in authority in the United States was considering "arming China" or extending military aid. The prospect of sales to China of carefully selected defensive arms, limited in quantity by China's ability and willingness to pay, does not alarm the Japanese or evoke their opposition provided all the usual obligations of our alliance, including consultation, are met.

There is, nevertheless, a vague uneasiness in Japan over what our decision to move in this direction might imply for future United States-Japan relations. Some Japanese wonder if Americans, after a 30-year period of close relations with Japan and a brief span during which we boasted of good relations with both China and Japan, are about to revert to what Japanese believe is the "historical" American stance in Asia of alliance with China. Some in Japan say they fear this trend in American policy may have been accelerated by Japanese reluctance to assume what Americans would consider to be an adequate security role in Asia. We need to be aware this concern exists, but we do not assuage it by remaining in our current position with no clear policy. That only exacerbates Japanese worries. A clear decision, coupled with consistent adherence to our promises to consult closely with the Japanese on this as on other security issues, would go a long way toward reassuring Japan that we in no way consider our defense relations with China as a substitute for the mutual security link we share with Japan.

The nations of Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, express a similar concern. Even when, as in the case of Thailand and Singapore, they acknowledge the value to Southeast Asian security of a closer United States-China defense relationship, they wonder what we have in mind over the longer term. They fear that we might be considering a division of labor with China according to which we would eventually accept that Southeast Asia was in China's sphere of influence while we concentrated our efforts at sea and in Northeast Asia.

Fear that the United States is about to withdraw from the area and turn its responsibilities over to another power is not a new fear in Southeast Asia. In the

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[3] President Carter, statement, New York Times, December 16, 1978.

late 1960's, senior Indonesian Government officials were talking about Japan in the same way they now talk about China. Then many people assumed this fear of Japan was a legacy of World War II just as some now attribute Indonesian worries about China to memories of the 1965 Communist coup attempt. In fact, however, the anti-Japanese attitudes in Indonesia during the late 1960's and the anti-China attitudes of today stem in large part from a long-standing Indonesian fear that we might as one Indonesian told me over ten years ago, try to "cram (the Japanese/Chinese) down our throats" to cover a U.S. withdrawal. Indonesian concern exceeds that of any other nation in the area because it has long been their ambition to be the dominant nation in the sub-region, a position they would have no hope of assuming if another stronger Asian power were to supplant the role now played by the non-regional, and therefore non-threatening, United States.

Again, as in the case of Japan, there is no way we can fully answer all the fears or totally satisfy the uneasiness expressed by Indonesia and other countries in the region. Knowing the root causes of the worry, however, offers some guide for policy. The answer is not to sacrifice our interests with China, which would not satisfy Southeast Asian countries either, but to make clear to the ASEAN nations that while we plan to cooperate with China, recognizing that China has legitimate interests in Southeast Asia, our policy will remain one of seeking to prevent any single power or groups of powers from dominating the area.

The most serious objecton to a policy permitting arms sales to China is that it would be provocative to the Soviet Union, thereby adding to the risk of conflict on the China border or elsewhere, without materially strengthening China or the United States. Some even suggest, while condemning the playing of China cards on principle, that the arms sales card is valuable only when not played. How one can exercise leverage over the Soviet Union with a policy one promises in advance never to implement is not explained. But the basic objection must be dealt with; as noted earlier it is an important part of the consensus that we weigh the effect of our actions on the Soviet relationship. And if one were to conclude that arms sales to China would complicate our security problem with the Soviet Union or provoke it with no counterbalancing strategic benefit, then of course one should oppose such sales. I do not agree that our selling arms to China would provoke aggressive action by the Soviet Union. I am more concerned that United States timidity in moving toward a normal defense relationship with China might tempt the U.S.S.R. to exploit that suggestion of weakness. I am convinced the Soviet Union would be amazed if the United States were to shrink from normalizing its defense relationship with China. And that Soviet amazement would translate into increased danger for both China and the United States.

It was more than rhetoric which prompted then Vice President Mondale to declare to a nationwide audience in China on August 27, 1979, that "any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate (China) in world affairs assumes a stance counter to American interests." These words underline a key point: that of all the interests we share with China the most important is our interest in the security and territorial integrity of China itself. Anyone inclined to disagree with this before giving the proposition the thought it deserves should consider the dilemma we would face if the Soviet Union were to invade or seek to humiliate China militarily. Could we simply look the other way? I think not unless we were prepared to accept humiliation ourselves and to be relegated in the eyes of the Soviet Union and the world at large to the status of a second class power.

Thomas C. Schelling, in his book "Arms and Influence",[4] noted that a country can have an implicit obligation to support another in a military crisis not because of policy but because of prediction. This predictive relationship constitutes a form of commitment and perhaps the more real commitment because it is a function of real relationships and interests. Unlike policy commitments, it can neither be created nor changed by words. Schelling cited the example of Yugoslavia pointing out that the answer to the question what would the United States do if the Soviet Union invaded Yugoslavia lies not in policy but in the prediction of what the United States would actually do when faced with that contingency.

The United States has a similar commitment of prediction in the case of China—an obligation, I would add, not to the Chinese but to ourselves. Danger in international relations does not come from such a commitment or from acting in such a way as to convey that one understands his country has a commitment. The danger lies in the other direction. A country which has a commitment whether implicit or explicit—policy or prediction—places the peace of the world and its own security in serious jeopardy if it behaves in a way that suggests it either does not know its own interests or is trying to escape its commitments. As the famous Acheson statement

[4] Thomas C. Schelling, "Arms and Influence" (Yale University Press, 1966).

on Korea underlined so clearly, commitments are function of real world interrelationships which cannot be undone by words. Acting as if one wished he did not have a commitment only tempts a potential enemy into believing he can exploit your weakness at low risk gaining both a local advantage and discrediting your commitments elsewhere.

The question is not one of defense: what would we do if the Soviet Union attacked China or launched a punitive raid against China, but of deterrence: how do we reduce to the minimum the likelihood that we will ever have to face that decision. Whatever other purposes our defense cooperation with China may serve, it must above all be successful in deterring the Soviet Union from attacking or punishing China militarily. To accomplish this objective it is not necessary that we provide China with massive amounts of armaments or even build Chinese defenses to the point where they could repel Soviet attack. It is sufficient for deterrence that the costs of attacking China be clearly perceived by the Soviet Union as unacceptable. To meet this condition it is essential that we act in such a way that the Soviet Union sees that we understand we have a real world commitment to act in response to a Soviet attack on China, and that the Soviet Union would run a high risk in challenging it.

Would the Soviet Union come to this conclusion if we were to decide, out of deference to Soviet concern and after 10 years of U.S. leadership pronouncements about the importance of the United States-China relationship to our strategic interest, to confirm the prohibition against the sale of weapons to China? I doubt it very much. On the contrary the U.S.S.R. would be more likely to conclude, with their propensity to respond aggressively to presumed signs of weakness, that they could at a time of their own choosing punish China without serious risk of American response. The tragedy would be all the greater because it would have been our own policy that misled the Soviet Union into believing it could attack China with impunity. By our actions we would have communicated to the Soviet Union that we granted them special rights in China (as we have in Eastern Europe). In effect, we would have been deterred from entering a defense relationship with China when the objective of our policy should have been to deter the Soviet Union from believing it could, at relatively low cost, humiliate a nettlesome neighbor and discredit the United States.

Our interest in maintaining a credible defense relationship with China must also be factored into our decisions on arms sales to Taiwan. The indefinite postponement by the Chinese of the August visit to Washington of PLA Vice Chief of Staff Liu Huaqing demonstrates once again that our seemingly separate interests in deterring Soviet military aggression against China and encouraging a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese themselves cannot be pursued in isolation. Sales to Taiwan of military equipment that exceeds the level of sophistication both China and the United States have regarded over the past several years as "prudent" would certainly mean no further expansion or broadening of the defense relations and would most probably result in a Chinese decision to terminate or allow to atrophy those important areas of cooperation already in operation.

What we must particularly guard against is accepting uncritically the "fairness" argument which urges balancing sales to China with equally sophisticated weapons transfers for Taiwan. That, it seems to me, is a prescription for failure of both policies. Instead, we need a more sophisticated calculus which considers the effects of any sale to either Taiwan or Beijing on all our interests, and satisfies the test of fairness, not by artifical balancing, but by our willingness to consider for sale to each those weapons which meet their limited and separate needs as well as our own requirement to demonstrate, by the arms transfers we approve and those we prohibit, where we share interests with each and where our interests diverge.

Obvious examples of weapons that convey our expressed interest in helping China to defend itself against attack include anti-tank missiles and anti-aircraft weapons. According to this principal, we should not approve weapons that do not clearly relate to this objective, such as landing craft or bombers regardless of how confident we may be that China would not use such weapons against Taiwan or friendly countries in the area. The decisions on specific weapons systems will not always be easy to make for the distinctions are far more subtle than the offensive versus defensive weapons categories so popular with those who have little experience with weaponry. But the guiding principle and public perception must be of a carefully balanced policy that accurately expresses our shared interests with China, shows sensitivity to the concerns of our friends and allies, and most important of all avoids tempting the Soviet Union into believing that it has another target of opportunity.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you very much. Our next discussant will be Prof. Allen Whiting. Professor Whiting is professor of political

science at the University of Michigan. He has had broad government and academic experience in Chinese and Soviet affairs and in Soviet and Chinese relations with the United States. This has included a position as Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State, and Deputy Consul General in Hong Kong.

He is the author of a variety of studies dealing with China and the Soviet Union and U.S. relations with those countries. His most recent study is entitled "Siberian Development and East Asia: Threat or Promise," which was just released from the Stanford University Press.

Professor Whiting, please.

STATEMENT OF ALLEN S. WHITING, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND ASSOCIATE, CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, ANN ARBOR, MICH.

Mr. WHITING. As the final speaker, on behalf of my colleagues as well as myself, I would like to express our thanks to Senators Percy and Hayakawa, and to Dr. Sutter for giving us an opportunity to address this subject. Its far reaching implications were properly stressed by Senator Percy yesterday and need no further emphasis.

Also as the final speaker I have been appropriately preempted by my colleagues and the audience, but perhaps some reiterative summary is justified, given the importance of the argument.

I trust also that the earlier hearings on this matter by Congressman Lester Wolff last summer, conducted before Secretary Haig's trip to Beijing, with the remarks of Doak Barnett, Harry Harding, and others will be reviewed by this committee together with our remarks this week.

There has been considerable discussion yesterday and today on the Soviet factor and how it should affect our decision. As noted by others, in objective terms, there is little reason for the Kremlin to fear Beijing's present or prospective military capabilities. Soviet forces confronting China constitute one-fourth of Moscow's military might. The total panoply of power promises so devastating a retaliation for a Chinese attack as to guarantee against any such contingency, barring a wholly irrational leadership in Beijing.

Moreover, nothing within the reasonable limits of Sino-American military cooperation could reverse this imbalance of power over the next decade. Moscow's technological lead cannot be overcome by the PLA during this time nor probably within this century.

These circumstances should reassure Soviet leaders that they have nothing to worry about so far as Sino-American military ties are concerned. Nevertheless, they express concern in public and private polemics. Much of this is undoubtedly smart defensive politics. Any limits which can be imposed on China's military modernization are to the good, so far as Soviet interests are concerned.

Beyond this tactical consideration, however, certain subjective factors can offset the foregoing objective aspects. First, since the early 1960's Beijing has tabled accusations of border violations and demands for negotiations to rectify an allegedly disputed frontier. During the turbulent cultural revolution, serious incidents oc-

curred, culminating in armed clashes along the Ussuri River and the Xinjiang border in 1969.

Second, this continuing controversy over the Sino-Soviet border touches on the most vulnerable area of the U.S.S.R., Siberia, and the Far East. Moscow's only land route to Vladivostok, its main base of power in the Pacific, is the Trans-Siberian Railroad. For 175 miles along the Ussuri River it lies less than 10 miles from the Chinese border. At one point it runs within 1½ miles.

Even after completion of the Baikal-Amur Railroad in the mid-1980's, this logistical lifeline will remain important, but it is easily interdicted by air, artillery, and in some instances ground assault.

Third, Soviet perceptions are colored by crude demographic comparisons. East and Far East Siberia contains slightly more than 11 million persons, as against roughly 75 million in northeast China. This combines with a gross population disparity of nearly 4 to 1 overall. Korea and Vietnam provided dramatic examples of how superior technology can fail to break the resistance of a determined regime willing and able to accept the necessary costs in lives.

Finally, subjective calculations of worst case warfare are commonplace among those responsible for a nation's defense, either as their legitimate responsibility or as bureaucratic arguments for preserving and enlarging their share of the budget. Japan's stunning victories in 1904–05, its intervention and occupation during the Bolshevik revolution and civil war in 1919–25, and full-scale battles waged in 1938 and 1939 are a more recent reminder of the potential threat from the East experienced in the historic Mongol invasion by Genghis Khan's legions.

Japanese belligerence in the 1930's has a double relevance for worst case Soviet scenarios of the 1990's. A military coalition of China and Japan and the United States could pose a threatening combination of population and technology. A lesser alinement of only China with the United States still raises the prospect of a two-front war on the European and Asian ends of the U.S.S.R.

The key question remains, however, what is the range of likely Soviet behavior, and how might it be affected by various types of Sino-American military cooperation? Moscow's buildup over the past decade falls far short of that needed for offensive action. The modest strengthening of China's defensive capabilities is unlikely to change the situation.

Soviet strategic doctrine and practice are characterized by extreme caution and risk avoidance. A conventional war with China has no certain end, as dramatically demonstrated by Japan's experience. Chinese nuclear missiles may not be completely destroyed in a first strike. Prolonged fighting would invite uprisings in East Europe, possibly with intervention from West Europe.

But while there is no likelihood of a Soviet attack, this does not exclude lesser reactions. For example, Soviet defense expenditure is certain to increase in response to any significant strengthening of Chinese capabilities. This might be beneficial to our interests because it further burdens Moscow's budget, strains its resources, and possibly arouses greater resentment in the civilian sector.

Unfortunately, another probable consequence is an increase in our own military spending. The Pentagon tends to aggregate all

Soviet weapons and expenditures, whether opposite China or elsewhere, in arguing for a comparable and preferably superior capability for ourselves and our allies.

In addition, arms control agreements with the U.S.S.R. will be further obstructed by our participation in China's military modernization should that go beyond such limited steps as antitank, antiaircraft, and antisubmarine systems.

The difficulty of establishing the degree of confidence and trust necessary to arrive at such agreements is immeasurably worsened, to the degree that Sino-American relations include anti-Soviet military cooperation.

Moreover, at some point China will have to be directly included in future negotiations, if they are to focus on strategic systems in any credible and comprehensive manner. Whether this proves possible would depend in the first instance on the bilateral Sino-Soviet relationship. Should China's strategic capability be strengthened by American assistance, such triangular negotiations might well be ruled out altogether.

Of course, I assume that the existing balance of forces behind the Sino-Soviet frontier will not be appreciably altered by Moscow, but should the upgrading of weapons, the improvement of force readiness, and the allocation of manpower markedly increase or accelerate so as to signal probable offensive intent, China's defensive needs would justify assistance from whatever source, including the United States, that could help deter a Soviet attack.

Fortunately, sufficient leadtime would be provided by the nature and magnitude of such a Soviet buildup so as to permit an adequately measured response.

So far, I have focused exclusively on the triangular Sino-Soviet-American interactions. However, developments outside the triangle are often cited as justifying Sino-American military ties, Afghanistan and Indochina being cases in point. The so-called ratchet effect links levels of Sino-American military cooperation to Soviet expansionist activity elsewhere.

Signaling to the Soviet Union that undesirable behavior will result in a militarily stronger China may make sense if we believe that there is genuine fear in Moscow of an eventual Chinese attack, and that this fear will prompt compliance rather than provoke a more belligerent response. But if such a fear exists, do we want to make paranoia credible? Long-term stability in international relations can hardly be based on exaggerated perceptions of hostility or irrational calculations of potential enemies. Certainly a Sino-Soviet conflict cannot be in our interests, let alone those of our friends and allies in Asia.

Aside from the problematic question as to whether Soviet behavior elsewhere can be determined by Sino-American military cooperation, a policy of linkage would make that cooperation hostage to such behavior. Should it improve, presumably the cooperation would diminish, thereby worsening Sino-American relations. Should it not improve, the United States would be committed to increase the cooperation regardless of the cost or material consequences.

Yet the level of Chinese military capability is not exclusively of concern to Moscow. It also affects China's neighbors, many of

whom are either allies or friends of the United States. The U.S.S.R. is not the only country with whom China's territorial claims are in dispute. The Sino-India border controversy triggered a brief but bloody war in 1962, and remains unsettled. Border differences with Vietnam purportedly provided some basis for China's defensive counterattack in 1979 and continue to spark incidents.

Ocean boundaries may be more volatile in the future. China's claims in the South China Sea are contested by the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. A different basis for disputes exists in the East China and Yellow Seas, where Beijing claims control over the Continental Shelf. It has already protested Korean and Japanese exploration for oil in the Tsushima Straits between these two countries. Finally, China and Japan differ over ownership of the Senkaku Islands or Daioyudai northeast of Taiwan.

In short, China is not a status quo nation with respect to its claims of sovereignty on land and at sea. So long as these disputes offer a potential source of conflict, any increase in Beijing's ability to pursue its claims by force will be of concern to its neighbors. There is no likelihood of these issues being pressed while the PRC is dependent on foreign trade and technology transfer for economic modernization, and while it competes with the U.S.S.R. for the friendly alinement of countries in the region.

However, these two constraints may not remain operative throughout the coming decade. The uncertainty requires that American participation in China's military modernization be the subject of close consultation on a case-by-case basis with our friends and allies in Asia, contrary to the manner in which the announcement on arms sales being considered was made by Secretary of State Haig during his visit to Beijing earlier this year.

The effect of Sino-American military ties on our relations with the PRC is sometimes advanced as the most important factor supporting further cooperation in this area. Improvement of relations is posited as dependent on strengthening such ties. Failure to do so is seen as lessening Chinese confidence in the American relationship, perhaps triggering an internal debate over the wisdom of leaning toward Washington as compared with a greater tilt toward Moscow.

Whatever Chinese dissatisfaction that may emerge over the level, pace, and terms of a limited military tie is unlikely in itself to ruin our overall relationship, which is and should remain predicated on a much broader basis of interaction. Our involvement, together with that of our ally, Japan, in China's economic modernization, will grow apace over the coming years. The strategic convergence of Chinese and American policy in opposition to Soviet expansionism will call for continuing consultation regardless of the nature of military relations.

We can only speculate about the future role of the PLA in Chinese politics and its possible orientation as a result of closer Sino-American military relations, but we must remember that such speculation rests on scant evidence at present and none for the important period 5 or more years hence, when these relations presumably will carry more concrete consequences.

The precedent of Sino-Soviet military relations from 1950 to 1960 cautions against any optimistic speculation. When the final deci-

sions were made to end the realtions, it was the civilian sector which determined policy, not the military. Indeed, this primacy of civilian influence is consonant with U.S. interests in the broadest sense of our overall principles.

As a final observation, we seem unable to maintain a balanced approach to China, at least for very long. Within a decade we moved from a war in Vietnam ostensibly begun to contain Chinese expansion to a Mao-Nixon handshake in Beijing while that war continued. The following decade saw us replace a China card originally designed to strengthen negotiations in Moscow with arms sales talk aimed at strenghtening Beijing against Moscow.

Having convinced Southeast Asian Governments of the need for collective defense against an alleged Chinese threat in the 1950's, we now assure them that a stronger China is in their interests as well as in ours.

Admittedly, the world does not remain the same over time. Soviet actions have prompted a major reappraisal of Moscow's intentions, and our exaggerated fears of China were never justified in the first place. Yet we should be able better to balance our apparent hate-love relationship with China. A policy which simplistically declares "a strong and secure China" is in our interest ignores and may insult the interests of other countries who must live with that strength.

In addition, bureaucratic inertia and an American activist proclivity to do something combined with the rapid change of successive administrations make control and continuity a serious problem for a policy initially designed with specific limits. Incremental change can cumulatively carry far-reaching consequences, both for expectations of the other party and for substantive interaction.

It is easy to devise a list of defensive weapons to be made available on a case-by-case basis for cash and carry terms in 1981–82. It is impossible to determine now what will be agreed to in 1986. The American tendency is to do a little bit more than before, so as to show progress and movement. Official delegations to Beijing do not like to arrive empty-handed, perhaps unconsciously emulating their historic predecessors who traditionally bore tribute to the Middle Kingdom. [General laughter.]

Meanwhile, Chinese pressures work to assure that these practices continue.

Last but not least is the compulsion in Washington to comment publicly on matters that otherwise might lie sensibly quiet or be considered in a calmer context bereft of public politics, what I call the Sunday syndrome. When a Secretary of Defense speculates to the media that a Soviet invasion of Poland might result in arms transfers to China, a chain reaction of support and opposition at home and abroad is needlessly triggered. Once uttered, official comments cannot be erased into oblivion like computer tapes. Their reproduction and circulation for select audiences in Moscow and Beijing provides evidence for assumptions and expectations that often have little or no accord with actual policy decisions.

In conclusion, I urge that we err on the side of caution in limiting our military ties with the People's Republic of China. Fortunately, this is not yet a pressing issue in our relationship. Beijing faces no imminent threat. It has higher demands on its

material, financial, and human resources in the civilian sector. We have ample time to work out a policy and its implementation in the context of larger policy considerations that integrate our interest in better Sino-American relations with an improvement in Soviet-American relations, as well as with our friends and allies in Asia.

Thank you.

[Mr. Whiting's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROF. ALLEN S. WHITING

INTRODUCTION

It is impossible in a brief paper to strike an accurate balance between the advantages and disadvantages of closer U.S.-Chinese military ties. The various combinations of the international context within which these ties might evolve and the actual content of the ties themselves preclude an adequate assessment in the space at our disposal. These uncertainties and complexities deserve attention at the very outset, lest subsequent remarks be mistaken as hard conclusions rather than as estimates of alternative future developments.

If, for example, a time-frame of 5 to 10 years is projected, as compared with one of two to three years, the politics of succession in Moscow, Pyongyang, and Taibei can affect the foreign policies of Beijing and Washington. The passing of Leonid Brezhnev, Kim Il-sung, and Chiang Ching-kuo may present opportunities or pose threats for Chinese and American interests. Events elsewhere and the reactions thereto of the Soviet Union, China, and the United States can also impact on Sino-American military relations, as occurred in Afghanistan and Indochina. Yet it is incumbent on decisionmakers to look beyond the immediate future when implementing a policy that carries the potential for a continuing commitment to another country.

This in turn raises the question of content in Sino-American military relations. Others have explored the various options for U.S. policy and they require no repetition at this point. Suffice to say that the range of interaction subsumed under the vague rubric of "military ties" can extend from the present level of periodic consultation and intelligence sharing to the wholesale modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), including the sale of equipment on concessionary credit, the training of technical personnel in highly sophisticated weapons systems, and the provision of American advisers for Chinese ground, sea, and air units. There is precedent for this fulsome a program of Chinese dependence on foreign military assistance, namely, the Sino-Soviet alliance as it functioned during the first decade of the People's Republic.

That precedent is suggestive both for its extent and its results. From 1950 to 1960 the U.S.S.R. helped to replace a hodgepodge of obsolescent equipment transferred from Japanese stockplies by the Red Army and captured from the Chinese Nationalists with an impressive inventory of modern weapons. Moscow also provided the foundation for Beijing's nuclear capability through the transfer of technology and information on a much greater scale than either side has publicly admitted. In addition, thousands of officers moved between the two countries in advisory and training missions. Thanks to Soviet aid, the Yanan guerrilla forces of 1945 were a far cry from the PLA of 1960.

Nevertheless despite the scope and significance of this assistance, Mao Zedong challenged Nikita Khrushchev's foreign policy and ultimately split the alliance. His behavior does not necessarily predict what will happen ten years hence. However it cautions against single-iine projections based on an assumption of how military aid affects international relations.

While admitting these uncertainties and complexities of context and content, we can still attempt at least a tentative assessment of the potential risks and gains in alternative Sino-American military ties. Two areas of concern will be addressed: Soviet reactions, and those of our friends and allies in Asia. A third factor, Chinese domestic politics, will not be examined. This is so speculative an area, particularly when projected five to ten years hence, as to be unsusceptible to systematic analysis. Fortunately it also is probably less relevant a factor in American policy considerations. This does not deny the possibility of such military ties being utilized by political factions, including the PLA. But our inability to discern the future players, much less determine how they will play the game, precludes giving this aspect serious consideration at this point.

THE SOVIET FACTOR

In objective terms there is little reason for the Kremlin to fear Beijing's present or prospective military capabilities. Soviet forces confronting China exceed 700,000 troops and supporting personnel, constituting one-fourth of Moscow's military might. This includes Backfire bombers, SS-20 and medium range nuclear missiles, and a deployment designed to seize or destroy all of northeast China (Manchuria), thereby denying a major source of oil, iron, and steel. The Soviet Pacific Fleet can easily blockade all Chinese ports. Well developed logistical systems provide ready access across the 4,650-mile border, whether from Central Asia, Mongolia, or Far East Siberia. This total panoply of power promises so devastating a retaliation for a Chinese attack as to guarantee against any such contingency, barring a wholly irrational leadership in Beijing. No such leadership is likely in the immediate or near-term future.

Moreover nothing within the reasonable limits of Sino-American military cooperation could reverse this imbalance of power over the next decade. Moscow's technological lead cannot be overcome by the PLA during this time nor probably within this century. The production of conventional as well as nuclear weapons which continues to increase the already swollen supply of weapons available to the Kremlin also cannot be matched by China, given its desperate shortage of funds and pressing priorities on the civilian front. There is little the U.S. could do to reverse the balance of power except through a massive long term transfer of capital and technology on a scale unprecedented in history.

These circumstances should reassure Soviet leaders that they have nothing to worry about so far as Sino-American military ties are concerned. Nevertheless they express concern in public and private polemics. This concern has at times verged on threat. Much of this is undoubtedly smart defensive politics. A stronger China cannot be a gain for Soviet policy under any conditions other than the alliance which existed in the 1950's but the restoration of that alliance is inconceivable now or in the future. Therefore any limits which can be imposed on China's military modernization are to the good so far as Soviet interests are concerned.

Beyond this tactical consideration, however, certain subjective factors can offset the foregoing objective aspects, at least to some extent. First, since the early 1960's Beijing has tabled accusations of border violations and demands for negotiations to rectify a disputed frontier. Mao enlarged on these informally in a celebrated 1964 interview and during the turbulent Cultural Revolution serious incidents occurred, culminating in armed clashes along the Ussuri River and Xinjiang border in 1969.

Second, this continuing controversy over the Sino-Soviet border touches on the most vulnerable area of the U.S.S.R.: Siberia and the Far East. Moscow's only land route to Vladisvostok, the main base of power in the Pacific, is the Trans-Siberian Railroad. For 175 miles along the Ussuri River it lies less than ten miles from the Chinese border; at one point it runs within 1.5 miles. Additional areas of vulnerability extend along the Amur River in the north. Not until completion of the Baikal-Amur Railroad in the mid-1980's will this logistical lifeline be relieved of its vital role and even then it will remain important, albeit no longer unique.

Third, Soviet perceptions are colored by crude demographic comparisons. East and Far East Siberia contain slightly more than eleven million persons as against roughly seventy-five million in northeast China. This combines with a gross population disparity of nearly four to one overall. Korea and Vietnam provided dramatic examples of how superior technology can fail to break the resistance of a determined regime willing and able to accept the necessary cost in lives.

Finally, subjective calculations of "worst case" warfare are commonplace among those responsible for a nation's defense, either as their legitimate responsibility or as bureaucratic arguments for preserving and enlarging their share of the budget. The distant Far East has long been the concern of the European oriented capital, whether in St. Petersburg or Moscow. Japan's stunning victories in 1904–05, its intervention and occupation during the Bolshevik Revolution and civil war in 1919–25, and the full-scale battles waged with the Kwantung Army in 1938–39 are a more recent reminder of the potential threat from the East experienced in the historic Mongol invasion by Genghis Khan's legions.

Japanese belligerence of the 1930's has double relevance for "worst case" Soviet scenarios of the 1990's. A military coalition of China, Japan, and the United States could pose a threatening combination of population and technology in a regional preponderance of hostile power. A lesser alignment of only China with the United States still raises the prospect of a two-front war on the European and Asian ends of the U.S.S.R. These subjective fears may be of low probability but their plausibility, however remote, can contribute to genuine Soviet apprehension over Sino-American military ties.

The key question, however, remains: what is the range of likely Soviet behavior and how might it be affected by various types of Sino-American military cooperation? Judging from Beijing's reductions in defense spending over the past 2 years, the low priority given to military modernization, and the failure to make any significant weapons purchases abroad since 1975, Chinese estimates clearly rule out an imminent conflict. This accords with the relative power aligned along the Sino-Soviet frontier, Moscow's buildup over the past decade falling far short of that needed for offensive action.

The modest strengthening of China's defensive capabilities is unlikely to change this situation. Soviet strategic doctrine and practice are characterized by extreme caution and risk avoidance. A war with China has no certain end, as dramatically demonstrated by Japan's experience. Chinese nuclear missles probably cannot be completely destroyed in a first strike. Prolonged fighting would invite uprisings in East Europe and possibly intervention fron West Europe. Clear evidence of an imminent Chinese attack might trigger a preemptive strike but this is far removed from a preventive war aimed at a potential Chinese capability which could only be realized in the distant future.

This should leave considerable latitude for improving ground, sea, and air defenses, given the present state of the PLA compared with the Red Army. However we cannot be confident of how subjective factors weigh in Soviet assessments, particularly as the line between defensive and offensive weapons becomes blurred. While there is no likelihood of a Soviet attack, this does not exclude other reactions. For example, Soviet defense expenditure is certain to increase in response to any significant strengthening of Chinese capabilities. In one sense, this might be argued as beneficial to our interests because it further burdens Moscow's budget, strains its resources, and possibly arouses greater resentment in the civilian sector. Unfortunately, another probable consequence is an increase in our military spending. We seem unable or unwilling to account for that proportion of Soviet power which is allocated to China as compared with NATO, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Instead the Pentagon tends to aggregate all Soviet weapons and expenditures in arguing for a comparable, and preferably superior, capability for ourself and our allies.

In addition, we remain committed to seeking arms control agreements with the U.S.S.R. and ideally would like to move toward arms reduction. Remote as these objectives appear at present, they will be further obstructed by our participation in China's military modernization should that go beyond such limited steps as anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and anti-submarine systems or strictly defensive fighter aircraft. At a minimum, so long as China demands the cessation of strategic territory in the Pamir mountains adjoining Afghanistan and at the confluence of the Amur-Ussuri rivers opposite Khabarovsk, Soviet contingency planning must allow for the possibility of border disputes escalating into local warfare. More generally, however, the difficulty of establishing the degree of confidence and trust necessary to arrive at agreements on arms control, much less arms reduction, is immeasurably worsened to the degree that Sino-American relations include anti-Soviet military cooperation.

The China factor was already present in the minds of the negotiators at SALT I, as evidenced by the concesssion of antiballistic missile defenses around Moscow. At some point China will have to be directly included in future negotiations if they are to focus on strategic systems in any credible and comprehensive manner. Whether this proves possible will depend, in the first instance, on the bilateral Sino-Soviet relationship. Should China's strategic capability be strengthened by American assistance, however, such triangular negotiations might well be ruled out altogether.

In short, I do not subscribe to the more dramatic speculation which posits a danger of provoking a Soviet attack on China by assisting in China's military modernization. The circumstances which would make this a serious possibility are so far removed in time from the likely nature of our assistance as not to concern us at present. But there are costs and risks of a less dramatic nature which deserve consideration as against the possible gain of diverting Soviet military deployments to Asia from their possible positioning elsewhere.

This examination of potential Soviet reaction is based on the assumption that the existing balance of forces aligned behind the Sino-Soviet frontier is not appreciably altered by Moscow. Should the upgrading of weapons, the improvement of force readiness, and the allocation of manpower markedly increase or accelerate so as to signal probable offensive intent, China's defensive needs would justify assistance from whatever source, including the United States, that could help deter a Soviet attack. While no last minute "quick fix" could cope with so massive a threat, sufficient lead time would be provided by the nature and magnitude of such a Soviet buildup to permit an adequately measured response. As already noted, nothing in

China's present declaratory or budgetary posture suggests anticipation of such a threat in the near future.

So far we have focused exclusively on the triangular Sino-Soviet-American interactions. However developments outside the triangle can affect these interactions and are often cited as justifying Sino-American military ties, Afghanistan and Indochina being cases in point. The so-called "ratchet effect" whereby levels of Sino-American military cooperation are linked to Soviet expansionist activity elsewhere has an attractive logic that goes well beyond the earlier "China card" cliche. Signalling to the Soviet Union that undersirable behavior will result in a militarily stronger China may make sense if we believe that there is genuine fear in Moscow of an eventual Chinese attack and that this fear will prompt compliance rather than provoke a more belligerent response.

But if such a fear exists, do we want to make paranoia credible? Long-term stability in international relations can hardly be based on exaggerated perceptions of hostility or irrational calculations of potential enemies. Certainly a Sino-Soviet confict cannot be in our interests, let alone those of our friends and allies in Asia. The consequences of war between these two nuclear powers cannot be contained within their boundaries nor would humanity benefit from the devastation of either country much less both.

Aside from the problematic question as to whether Soviet behavior elsewhere can be determined by Sino-American military cooperation, a policy of linkage would make that cooperation hostage to such behavior. Should it improve, presumably the cooperation would diminish, thereby worsening Sino-American relations. Should it not improve, the United States would be committed to increase the cooperation, regardless of the cost of material consequences. Yet the level of Chinese military capability is not exclusively of concern to Moscow. It also affects China's neighbors, many of whom are either allies or friends of the United States. To appreciate this aspect, therefore, we must enlarge our focus.

ASIAN ALLIES AND FRIENDLY NATIONS

The U.S.S.R. is not the only country with whom China's territorial claims are in dispute. The Sino-Indian border controversy triggered a brief but bloody war in 1962 and remains unsettled, although recently New Delhi and Beijing agreed to reopen discussions on the matter. Border differences with Vietnam, by comparison, are minor. Nevertheless they purportedly provided some basis for China's "defensive counterattack" in 1979 and continue to spark incidents.

Ocean boundaries may prove to be more volatile in the future. China's claims in the South China Sea are contested by the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. When asked privately why Beijing's maps portray the entire area as lying within PRC boundaries, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied somewhat lamely, "These lines are simply taken from the old Guomindang maps," adding, "Of course some of the water in between the islands, reefs, and shoals do not belong to China so we do not claim the entire area." As a token of its ownership, Beijing officialy protested to Manila over Philippine concessions for offshore exploration of the Reed Bank. More seriously, in January 1974 the PLA seized the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam in a brief battle, a possible precedent for future action against the Spratley Islands further south.

A different basis for disputes arises in the East China and Yellow Seas where Beijing claims control over the continental shelf. It has already protested Korean-Japanese exploration for oil in the Tsushima Strait between those two countries. Whether Beijing ultimately will settle for division along the median line or forcibly defend its ownership of the entire shelf cannot be determined at this time. Either stance would be in accord with current international law.

Finally, China and Japan differ over ownership of the Senkaku Islands (Daioyudai) northeast of Taiwan. These uninhabited outcroppings were administered by the United States during the occupation of Okinawa and reverted to Tokyo when the occupation ended. In May 1978 a fleet of more than one hundred Chinese fishing boats, some armed and with electronic gear, sailed around the islands with signs asserting Beijing's claim. However Beijing officials suggested that the issue be shelved to facilitate signing the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. During his visit to Tokyo in celebration of the Treaty's ratification Deng Xiaoping commented that "maybe the next generation" could resolve the matter more easily.

What difference another generation might make was unclear, unless perhaps in the meantime China would acquire sufficient force to press its claim more vigorously. There is precedent for this possibility. In 1954, Prime Minister Nehru called Zhou Enlai's attention to differences between Indian and Chinese maps on the Himalayan frontier, but was assured there was no need to discuss the matter when the two countries were agreeing on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Five

years later, the PLA had built a road through the disputed Aksai Chin plateau linking Xinjiang and Tibet. Nehru protested, only to be told that a settlement should run according to the "customary lines of control."

In short, China is not a status quo nation with respect to its claims of sovereignty on land and at sea. So long as these disputes offer a potential source of conflict, any increase in Beijing's ability to pursue its claims by force will be of concern to its neighbors. There is no likelihood of these issues being pressed while the PRC is dependent on foreign trade and technology transfer for economic modernization and competing with the U.S.S.R. for the friendly alignment of countries in the region. However, these two constraints may not remain operative throughout the coming decade. This uncertainty requires that American participation in China's military modernization be the subject of close consultation on a case-by-case basis with our friends and allies in Asia, contrary to the manner in which the decision on arms sales was reached prior to Secretary of State Haig's visit to Beijing earlier this year.

The foregoing situation calls for considerable discretion in the choice of technologies we must exercise and weapons to be made available to Beijing, particularly with respect to air and seapower. In due course China will clarify its offshore position on the ownership of ocean resources. Its boundary disputes will eventually be resolved. The Taiwan question will no longer remain. Given Beijing's present priorities and the pace of economic development, it may be that three of the four modernizations, i.e. agriculture, industry, science and technology, will move much more rapidly than will military modernization. Thus these various concerns may work themselves out before there is any serious likelihood of their becoming threatened by actual conflict. Until that time, however, it is incumbent on the United States to limit its military ties with the People's Republic of China so as not to jeopardize the status quo on China's vast periphery.

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

The effect of Sino-American military ties on our relations with the PRC is sometimes advanced as the most important factor supporting further cooperation in this area. Improvement of relations is posited as dependent on strengthening such ties. Failure to do so is seen as lessening Chinese confidence in the American relationship, perhaps triggering internal debate over the wisdom of leaning toward Washington as compared with a greater tilt toward Moscow.

Secretary Haig's announcement of our willingness to sell arms to China was an important change from the Carter administration's limiting such sales to "nonlethal" equipment. Having made this change, our relations with Beijing obviously would suffer from a reversal at this point. But this extreme position is not necessary because our examination of various contexts and contingencies shows that certain purely defensive equipment such as anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and anti-submarine systems can be sold without serious jeopardy to any U.S. interests vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. or other countries in Asia. In addition it is possible to upgrade the general PLA capability should changes in the Soviet military posture signal preparations for offensive action, a situation which does not exist at the present time.

Whatever Chinese dissatisfaction that may emerge over the level, pace, and terms of a limited military tie is unlikely in itself to ruin our overall relationship which is and should remain predicated on a much broader basis of interaction. Our involvement, together with that of our ally Japan, in China's economic modernization will grow apace over the coming years. Our cultural contacts, while less important, will develop islands of reciprocal interest in the two societies which can improve understanding over the long run. Finally, for the foreseeable future, the strategic convergence of Chinese and American policy in opposition to Soviet expansionism will call for continuing consultation regardless of the nature of military relations. Thus political cooperation will remain important in pursuing mutual interests in Asia and elsewhere.

As indicated at the outset of this paper, we can only speculate about the future role of the PLA in Chinese politics, its possible orientation as a result of greater or lesser support at home and abroad, and the likely advantages for U.S. interests in thickening Sino-American military ties. But we must remember that such speculation rests on scant evidence at present and none for the important period five or more years hence when these ties presumably will carry more concrete consequences. Our recalling the precedent of Sino-Soviet military relations from 1950 to 1960 cautions against such speculation.

When the final decisions were made to end the relations, it was the civilian sector which determined policy, not the military. Indeed, this primacy of civilian influence is consonant with U.S. interests in the broadest sense of our overall principles.

The repeated emphasis of this paper on limiting Sino-American military ties stems from one final consideration, in addition to those cited above. This concerns

certain bureaucratic and behavioral aspects in our handling of Sino-American relations which in some ways mirror our foreign policy in general. We seem unable to maintain a balanced approach to these relations, at least for very long. Within a decade we moved from a war in Vietnam begun ostensibly to contain Chinese expansionism, to a Mac-Nixon handshake in Beijing while that war continued. The following decade saw us replace a "China card" designed to strengthen negotiations with Moscow with arms sales aimed at strengthening Beijing against Moscow. Having convinced Southeast Asian governments of the need for collective defense against an alleged Chinese threat in the 1950's, we now assure them that a stronger China is in their interest as well as ours. One might note, in passing, parallel swings of extreme in Beijing's posture vis-a-vis the United States and the U.S.S.R. over the past thirty years.

Admittedly the world does not remain the same over time. Soviet actions have prompted a major reappraisal of Moscow's intentions and our exaggerated fears of China were never justified in the first place. Yet we should be able better to balance our apparent "hate-love" approach to China. We are dealing with the world's largest society and its oldest continuous civilization. Its neighbors have a long history of interaction with the Middle Kingdom. Right or wrong, their perceptions necessarily differ from ours at one point or another. They must be given careful consideration when our actions affect their interests, whether they are presently allied with us as in the case of Japan, aligned against us as with Indochina and the U.S.S.R., or trying to walk a tortuous path of self-defined "non-alignment" as with India. A policy which simplistically declares that "a strong and secure China" is in our interest ignores and may insult the interests of other countries who must live with that strength.

Whether the strength can indeed be achieved is a doubtful prospect in the short run but quite likely over time. It is not in our interest or that of most other countries to keep China weak by denying it access to the necessary ingredients for economic modernization. However this goal and its attendant difficulties is one that China shares with many others, as it admits by identifying itself with the Third World.

Beyond the phenomenon of extreme swings in attitudes concerning China, bureaucratic inertia and an American activist proclivity to "do something" combine with the rapid change of successive administrations to make control and continuity a serious problem for a policy initially designed with specific limits. Incremental change can cumulatively carry far-reaching consequences both for expectations of the other party and for substantive interaction. Thus it is easy to devise a list of defensive weapons to be made available on a case-by-case basis for cash-and-carry terms in 1981–82. But it is difficult to determine what will be agreed to in 1986. The American tendency is usually to do a little bit more than before so as to show progress and "movement." Official delegations to Beijing do not like to arrive empty-handed, perhaps unconsciously emulating their historic predecessors who traditionally bore tribute to the Middle Kingdom. Meanwhile Chinese pressures, similar to those experienced elsewhere, work to assure that these practices continue.

Last but not least of our bureaucratic difficulties is the compulsion to comment publicly on matters that otherwise might lie sensibly quiet or be considered in a calmer context bereft of public politics. For example, when a Secretary of Defense speculates aloud in a media interview on the possibility that a Soviet invasion of Poland might result in arms transfers to China, a chain reaction of support and opposition at home and abroad is needlessly triggered. Once uttered, official comments cannot be erased into oblivion like computer tapes. Their reproduction and circulation for select audiences in Moscow and Beijing provide evidence for assumptions and expectations that often have little or no accord with actual policy decisions.

In conclusion I urge that we err on the side of caution in limiting our military ties with the People's Republic of China. Fortunately this is not yet a pressing issue in our relationship. Beijing faces no imminent threat. It has higher demands on its material, financial, and human resources in the civilian sector. We have ample time to work out a policy and its implementation in the context of larger policy considerations that integrate our interest in better Sino-American relations with an improvement in Soviet-American relations as well as with our friends and allies in Asia.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you very much. We indeed have had a stimulating series of presentations here.

I would suggest that anyone who would like to get a cup of coffee should get up and help themselves. We won't take a formal break. We will proceed with discussions among the people around the

table here. Then, soon after, we will open this up for general discussion.

Let me begin the discussion. One thing that has impressed me over our three sessions is the seemingly—and this is just my impression—general acceptance of "limited transfers," "incremental steps," I have heard words like that constantly, but they always seem to be used in tandem with words like "uncertainty," "caution," "changing considerations" in United States-China-Soviet and other relations.

Maybe we should get down to brass tacks here, and in that context I would like to ask my colleague, Mary Locke, to offer a question in this regard, to see how much agreement we really have.

Ms. LOCKE. There is really nothing more important in this kind of workshop, in serving our members' interests and the interests of the committee and other congressional decisionmakers, than thinking through this kind of problem, the implications of United States-China military cooperation, before specific decisions have to be made. If there are any "thank you's" to be extended, they must come from us rather than from you.

Eventually, there may be specific congressional decisions that are required. I think it would be helpful to have our experts' counsel to the congressional committees involved on some hypothetical specifics that we may have to face in the future.

Let's assume, for example, that press reports are correct indicating that some of the items under consideration are antitank weapons and ground radar defense systems for purchase by China. Let's assume that there is an agreement. China requests such equipment and the administration grants it, and for any number of reasons a congressional decision is required. Perhaps there is modest FMS financing necessary, in which case you need a positive congressional decision, or perhaps the package to be sold hits that trigger limit in the Arms Export Control Act whereby the package is subject to a resolution of disapproval or perhaps some Member of Congress feels it important to introduce a resolution out of the blue prohibiting any kind of arms sales to China.

Under any of these circumstances, Congress will be involved, and some decisions will have to be made. Let's take that package, just for discussion's sake, antitank weapons and ground radar. If we were faced with that kind of decision, what would your counsel be? I would be especially interested in knowing whether any one of our experts would oppose that kind of package.

Mr. SLUTTER. Mr Sloan?

Mr. SLOAN. Let me reiterate I am expressing personal views, not those of the DOD or DIA.

I think a package such as you were talking about has been discussed for a long time now, and would not be any sort of dramatic proposal. It probably is something that everyone long has expected, and would not be provocative to the Soviet Union. It is probably very surprising that it hasn't occurred already.

I think this is something that the Chinese could use. They have expressed interest in it for a long time. I think it would not in any way upset the relative military balance.

I just wanted to make another general comment. I thought some of the questions raised yesterday by Ambassador Gleysteen with

regard to what can China do militarily and what can China accept politically, and some of the questions that I raised at the end of my paper regarding from a capabilities perspective what is it that we want from China, what is it that we want from our China policy, and do we understand what it is that China can do ultimately in terms of military capabilities were addressed quite well in the papers presented by Mr. Sullivan and Dr. Whiting, as well as by some of the observations made by Doak Barnett yesterday. They seemed to tie in with the implication that I was making, and this gets back to your question, in my paper yesterday, which was that I think the Chinese are going to need assistance of this sort, continued assistance of this sort in a limited fashion, modest packages, a cat's paw approach, if you will, in order to maintain the relative balance, and assuming a deterioration in that balance would not be to our interest.

Mr. SUTTER. I assume you meant cat's feet and not cat's paw. [General laughter.]

Mr. SLOAN. Yes.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Perhaps I should say, to link the 2 days together, that cat's feet can go up slippery slopes better than other kinds. [General laughter.]

I think I would answer yes to Mary's question. Yes, definitely those two should be approved. I would go somewhat beyond that and include antiaircraft weaponry as well and perhaps a few other things. But in answering yes to that question, I think we owe it to the Senators to put it into a context of how do we make these judgments? The rough offensive, defensive weapon separation is not very helpful. We need a much more sophisticated approach than that, and I think that the kind of weapons we should approve for China should be related to a real demonstrable need. We should take into account the other interests we have, to get to some of the points that Professor Whiting raised. We certainly are not going to provide them with landing craft, as an obvious example. [General laughter.]

But most important of all the real criterion here should be, as we have been saying, that we have some shared interests with China, but that there are some interests we don't share. It ought to be clear from the weapons we sell and the weapons we prohibit where those interests coincide and where those interests diverge.

Mr. SUTTER. Does anybody else want to follow up on that question? Professor Whiting.

Mr. WHITING. The problem is more complicated than we have had time to develop here. It can be assumed in a very narrow span of time that particular problems in Southeast Asia make it compatible with U.S. interests for Chinese pressures to be put on Vietnam. It may be questioned whether in the longer time framework that policy is to our interests and the interests of other countries in the region.

Certainly to the extent that Vietnam becomes increasingly dependent upon the Soviet Union and provides continued or expanded access to the Soviet Union for air and naval facilities in Southeast Asia, then my own assessment is that this is a long-term loss and not a gain. I find it difficult to distinguish in most cases

between the kinds of systems that the Chinese would need to provide a better defense against the Soviet Union as compared with those that would equip them for a better offense against Vietnam. I do not want to encourage them to try a second lesson or a more successful one. So, I don't think that the reference to landing craft really does more than finesse the problem.

It is, as Mr. Sullivan said, very complicated when one is talking about offense versus defense. There are certain kinds of systems that are so limited, such as antitank and antiaircraft, as to be almost without exception tolerable, and therefore in terms of the question you pose, I would give an affirmative answer.

Beyond that, however, I really am quite doubtful, until I am more confident about the nature of Chinese decisionmaking, risk calculation, and goal setting that has emerged since the death of Zhou Enlai. I would stress that in addition to losing Mao Zedong, China lost Zhou Enlai as a preeminent foreign policy planner. Until we have more confidence about that system, we should not think in terms of a strong China, strong in the sense of being able to project its power even in those very limited areas which it claims are in dispute on land and sea.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Werner?

Mr. WERNER. Bill Gleysteen's point was mentioned about what do we want from China. It seems to me that that is a question which has not really been firmly decided within either the Government or certainly the public at large. I don't particularly have any answer that I want to posit here. I just want to raise a specific defense planning point.

From the perspective of a military planner on the general staff in Moscow, versus, for example, the people of the Foreign Ministry, who correctly have a more political focus, the issue is real contributions to a warfighting mode that China can add to either side.

It seems to me when you talk about deterrence, at least as you focus on the military side, the underpinning of that is psychological concept, the capability to contribute. Captain Patton explicitly raised the question of a Soviet swing strategy. I think I probably would differ with him on that issue. There may be a small measure of it, but because of the uncertainty on the Sino-Soviet border, and the possibility—I wouldn't want to say probability—of air interdiction, it seems to be that the potential swing of Soviet forces even with the second rail line is probably limited.

But what it boils down to in my mind is the fact that if we do ever have a global conflict—I am presuming it would start on a conventional level—what we want from the PRC is an active contribution along the Sino-Soviet border to, at a minimum, keep those forces tied down.

I don't think anybody is so foolish as to think that means an invasion, but it does mean a specific set of military actions that make clear the need for the Soviets to retain those force levels at something close to their current deployments. This seems to me to be a very essential question that maybe Roger or Bill has some insight into, since I am not sure whether we have ever explicitly addressed this with the Chinese. If we want to talk about deterring the Soviets, that is one very important specific point to the question that Mary raised which needs to be examined more directly.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Garrett?

Mr. GARRETT. One useful distinction here might be between enhancing China's unilateral and its bilateral military capabilities. In the kind of scenario you are discussing, improvements in Chinese command, control, and communications, into which we could plug to coordinate with them better, might be useful, for example, and in some ways less provocative than sales of certain kinds of arms sales, which would enhance their unilateral capability to make war on their own. It would answer the question of what do we want from our military relationship with China, or at least it deals with that kind of question and sets out criteria: How would it help a global war effort, if it ever should occur, or help to deter war through enhancing the credibility in the United States and China cooperating should such a war take place by actually having something in place to do it with. This might be a way of looking at particular military items, and particularly at advanced technology that isn't necessarily lethal, such as in the C^3 area.

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Robinson, and then Mr. Jammes.

Mr. ROBINSON. I would be surprised were the list of items that came over to the Congress and that Mary Locke has set forth to be as short as you say. It seems to me that the Chinese would come, if they come at all, with a rather long shopping list. It may well be pruned down by the Defense Department, but it still will be quite a bit longer than what you have posited. It is still the duty of the Congress to consider it on an item-by-item basis, and to require of the administration—and of the Chinese for that matter—to say why it is in their joint interest to agree to this kind of thing.

How much you are going to draw the Chinese out is another question. You might well draw the administration out. But I do not think we are even going to get the Chinese to commit themselves ahead of time to certain kinds of operations on the Soviet border in a NATO contingency. And although we may try to encourage them by means of arming them with lethal or nonlethal systems, they are not, ahead of time, going to do anything or tell people they are going to do anything.

In fact, it is their propensity to sit tight and weather out such a storm rather than get into the fray.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Jammes?

Mr. JAMMES. If forced to answer the question that was posed, I probably would come down on the side of supporting such an arms sale. However, it would not be an easy or clearcut answer for me. There are a number of advantages and disadvantages to such a sale. One of the disadvantages which perhaps has not been addressed here is that a system such as antitank systems, most people consider as purely defensive weapons, and I wouldn't argue with that. However, the Chinese technical resources that do not have to be devoted to developing antitank systems could then be allocated to the development of offensive weapons, and I don't think that point will be lost by the other countries in Asia.

And so, even if you supply a defensive weapon, this gives them an opportunity if they so wish to put resources on an offensive weapon.

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Whiting?

Mr. WHITING. Your question was put to us, I know, sincerely. However, the experience of the last several weeks should remind us that there is a dilemma in an administration which makes proposals and then informs the legislature that there is no alternative but supporting those proposals; otherwise, the entire credibility of the Executive is lost at home and abroad.

Therefore, I am personally most unhappy about the way in which Secretary Haig's visit was handled, because in effect it preempted a good deal of the discussion. While in theory there is still an option of reversing the announcement that was made in Peking, it does, as I acknowledged yesterday, place a definite political constraint. I would not argue for reversal at this time. But there is a problem in the way that you presented the question that we have just experienced, and I hope that this is taken as a lesson for the future.

Mr. SUTTER. Are there any other questions or observations around the table?

Yes, Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Just a quick addendum to this. I hope no one is harboring the thought that it would be possible to get the Chinese to agree to things like providing us with contingency air bases and so forth in the event of a major war with the Soviet Union and other facilities while at the same time we said to them, we don't trust you far enough to sell you any kind of a lethal weapon.

Mr. SUTTER. Yes, Ambassador Gleysteen.

Ambassador GLEYSTEEN. I want to shift to a more general comment. I agree with the thrust of almost everything that was said this morning, and I think it has been very useful. There is one thing that has not been said clearly enough, although it has been implicit, and that is that there is no substitute, whether it is the Chinese or the Japanese or anybody else, for ultimately depending on ourselves for our own defense. Where we have a choice of expenditure, of political capital, and so on, that our first choice should be to strengthen U.S. forces and the deployment of them to cope with the problem that we are talking about.

Second, we do, and should continue intelligently to borrow others strength, but keeping in mind that this force is going to be governed ultimately by other people's decisions and objectives. I think Tom Robinson made a very good point on this just a minute ago. Ultimately, we cannot be sure the Chinese in a military contingency are going to use anything that we have provided them in the way that we want. To put a little addendum on Roger's point, even if they had trust in us, even if we had sold a great deal more than the consensus here would seem to allow for, you could not count on that in an actual contingency. The Chinese might or they might not act the way we wished. So that is another argument for caution.

The third thing is—and I am repeating what I said yesterday—that I believe talk of formal actions or even informal coalitions is undesirable. We are dealing with an uncertain situation in which military strength is only one feature. We cannot even predict how the relationship is going to evolve. It has bounced around so many times in the last decade that we need to have flexible responses to

it, to proceed cautiously, and to be able to stop or to reverse if necessary.

A few other quick points. One is that Roger made a very correct point about Japan. Having been in the Japanese area for a long time, and having been in Korea very recently, I think that the Asian reaction to discussion, let alone actual moves toward a U.S. military relationship with China is of greater concern than has been reflected here.

I have never heard anyone other than a maverick in his own country express real comfort over it. There is a tolerance, yes. The Koreans have been very polite about it, but they are very bitterly opposed to the supply of any arms to China. The Taiwanese are most uneasy, and we should also keep that in mind.

Finally, I wish to endorse a point that everyone has made. It would be nice if we could keep our rhetoric down, because then we could deal with realities in a rather calibrated way, but I think it is terribly hard. Very regrettably, much of the problem we are talking about today is the problem of our big mouth.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you.

Professor Dreyer?

Ms. DREYER. I would like to speak to a point made by Professor Robinson, a point with which I basically agree. I refer to Professor Robinson's statement that one of the reasons we will want to maintain friendship with China, including the sale of certain arms perhaps to China, is to maintain some input into the process of modernization and military modernization. While I agree with the sentiment, I think we have to think carefully about the degree to which it might be expected to work.

Let me take a case in point. In World War II, we thought that by giving the Chinese a certain amount of money and a certain amount of arms, we were going to get Chinese cooperation against Japan. In fact, what we did was finance the Chinese Nationalists to fight the Chinese Communists.

Again, all of you in this gathering remember Stillwell's problems with Chiang Kai-shek. Stillwell told Chiang how he should build a modern army, and tried to end certain practices he felt were deleterious to army morale. Chiang Kai-shek was very angry about this and resisted Stillwell's advice. It might be argued that this is just a quirk of Chiang's, but I think it is not. If we put ourselves in the same position and imagine the Chinese or the Soviets or whoever coming in and saying, "you can't run an army this way, you have to run it our way," you will see the dilemma the United States is going to get into.

So, obviously, it is better to be friendly with China than not to be friendly, but there is also a degree to which familiarity will breed contempt and annoyance. So, although we maintained exaggerated hopes for years and years about the future of the Chinese market in economic terms, we must be careful not to maintain exaggerated expectations as to what a modest degree of military cooperation will get us in terms of input and ability to frame the future of Chinese defense.

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Robinson, did you have a comment?

Mr. ROBINSON. I am willing to agree, and to say that if we are going to get into this relationship, perhaps in addition to walking on cat's feet we ought to walk on pins and needles, too. [Laughter.]

Mr. SUTTER. Captain Patton, did you have a comment on that point?

Captain PATTON. Yes; I agree with Professor Dreyer's point, but cannot let the analogy of China in World War II go by unchallenged. There were 1 million Japanese soldiers tied down in China that we never had to face in the Philippines or in New Guinea or anywhere else. A lot of them were tied down by the coalition between the United States and China, if not directly by our aid.

There is a point, though, that I would like to raise before we break this up. It occurred to me in hearing some of the papers read today that there is a void by way of a statement of American foreign policy vis-a-vis China, but more importantly, there is a void by way of an American statement of foreign policy vis-a-vis Asia and the Pacific during a time of enormous flux.

I mentioned yesterday a "Pacific Charter" as an analogy to the North Atlantic Treaty, which was drafted during just such a time of flux in the Atlantic European region, and I wonder whether anyone around the table who has even reflected on this would suggest in response what they think the likelihood is that we could begin to generate an initiative toward a multilateral arrangement that might be called a "Pacific Charter" or anything else.

Mr. SUTTER. Would anyone care to comment on that issue? Professor Robinson?

Mr. ROBINSON. There is a lot of work on this, and a lot of people and groups are gathering together on this subject. I think the only point of relevance to the subject at hand is, if there is going to be some Pacific Charter or Trans-Pacific Charter or Pacific Basin document, whatever the term is, the Chinese ought to be invited in from the beginning.

To the extent that they will respond to that, on the other hand, is another question. I think that they will take long in considering their response, and it may not be positive.

Mr. SUTTER. We will have Professor Whiting, Professor Dreyer, and Mr. Garrett, and then I would like to open this up for general discussion.

Mr. WHITING. Let me make a point of differentiation between the Atlantic Charter, which was a bilateral document concluded between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt during World War II—it had nothing to do with the postwar collective security programs of NATO which came later in a different context, with a different presumed enemy—and Professor Robinson's references to a Pacific community. To my knowledge, all of the discussions and papers on a Pacific community, Pacific Basin, and others, are specifically nonstrategic, nonmilitary, and have nothing to do with collective security agreements.

I support all of those studies. I think this is a long and difficult road, but I would differentiate that very clearly from the Captain's reference to a Pacific Charter, which he put in the context of a collective security system.

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Dreyer.

Ms. DREYER. I think that, obviously, if any discussions are held on collective security, the Chinese should be welcomed, urged, prodded, whatever, to attend and participate. I have the feeling, though, that any attempt to get a meaningful agreement out of this would result in failure, since there are such profound differences of opinion on so many points. The discussions might allow the Soviet Union to see more of our querulousness and differences of opinion coming out than they would contribute to actually developing a strong collective security arrangement.

I think one example of how upset countries are going to be about things like an Asian collective security arrangement may be seen in the recent resignation of the Japanese foreign minister over so small a matter as having referred to the security treaty as an alliance. So, when you talk about getting a meaningful collective security arrangement, I think you have to take all of those tremendous areas of sensitivity into account, and while I agree it would be a good thing to do, I am not sure it is going to be feasible in the near future.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Garrett, and then Mr. Werner, please.

Mr. GARRETT. I will just note that I was recently in the Soviet Union at a conference where the Soviet scholars expressed extreme anxiety about the possibility of a Pacific community becoming an alliance involving all the Pacific allies of the United States and possibly China against them. All the Americans who were there, many of whom had studied this question very closely, felt that it was completely out of the question to get that kind of an agreement among our Pacific allies, much less including China, so there was a real difference of perceptions. The Soviets really see a plot under way to create such an alliance, which seems to me rather farfetched at this point.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Werner?

Mr. WERNER. I will be short and direct. Although the idea is old, I guess I was the one responsible for floating it up here in 1977. The motivation of the people I was working with was totally economic. I think the concept of collective security in Asia ought not to even be addressed. I think it is doomed to failure in the current situation. The ASEAN nations are still very skeptical even of an economic community because obviously of their own vested economic interest. The notion of trying to introduce a security community into that would fragment us into so many different ways and different problems that we would be a decade digging out of it.

The last point that was just made, I think, is also precisely true from limited discussions with visiting Soviets and at the Oriental Institute in Moscow. I tend to think that the Soviets can tolerate rather easily what is going on right now between America and China, although as everyone has said they will watch it with extreme caution. However, if you embark on a concept of a collective security arrangement, you will have heightened Soviet paranoia to extreme states.

Mr. SUTTER. Professor Robinson. Then we definitely will open it up for general discussion.

Mr. ROBINSON. The only excuse for a collective security system in Asia is against the Soviet Union, so let the Soviet Union be the

driving force of that system. We can react, but I do not think we should construct it ahead of time.

Mr. SUTTER. We will now open this up for general discussion. Is there anyone from the audience? Mr. Doak Barnett.

Mr. BARNETT. I seem to have a compulsion to get into this at this time. I want to express a little more skepticism than has been expressed so far to the answers given to Mary Locke. It is an illustration to me of the complexities and built-in dilemmas of getting into arms transfers at all. I think a clear case can be made that it is in our interests and China's interests to have better antitank defenses. I think that would contribute to stability rather than to instability.

However, as I tried to think about this concrete case, the issue that has been posed, that is to say, Congress has to approve or not approve, I would ask a lot of questions. First of all, what kind of transfer would this be? If we are really talking about enough antitank weapons for China's defenses in a short time to be dramatically improved, we are talking, I would think, about a rather substantial and rather dramatic transfer of weapons to China.

If we are talking about a small number that they can reverse engineer, and over time develop their own antitank weapons, then it seems to me we are not going to improve their defenses soon. We are going to have some of the liabilities of an open transfer of arms, and also provocations without much military benefit to China itself.

I am driven back to the position, and Roger discussed this briefly, which is a fundamental one, and there are very different views on it. Roger was arguing that people in our military, with some justification, are more wary about transferring technology than they are about transferring hardware. Some people have made the case that the Soviets in a fundamental sense may be more worried over the long run about a steady upgrading of China's defense technology than may result from some shortrun arms transfer, but I think the political and psychological effects of that all the way around on our bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union on Japan and on other Asian nations are quite different.

If we have a policy of transferring dual technology and some defense technology that does gradually help the Chinese over the next 5, 10, 15, or 20 years develop more credible defenses, which is what we are interested in, it seems to me that that is much more likely to be absorbed without significant costs and shocks than any sort of arms transfer that is dramatic.

Even one thing like antitank weapons could have a big and dramatic effect, I think, on the area and on a lot of other countries.

I will just make one final point. I also would agree that if that were posed as a concrete issue, in fact, in the background there would be a list of 30 others and before we sell even such a logical defense system as antitank weapons, it seems to me we have to have a well thought through framework as to what our objectives are, what the limits are, and so on. The worst sort of thing would be for this one decision to be made, to come and be presented to the Congress, to be made the touchstone of our relationship with China.

So, even this, which I would say is about the most logical kind of thing to transfer to China, requires an awful lot of thought before anybody rushes into it.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Sullivan?

Mr. SULLIVAN. It seems to me that this articulates better than any other comment we have had in the last couple of days the catch-22 element here. We end up with either a weapons sale to China which is going to be effective in promoting China's ability to defend itself, in which case we don't want to do it because that would be dangerous, or else it is not going to be effective, and therefore there is no point in doing it.

I think that in discussing it in those terms, we are overlooking the symbolic value of this in the deterrent—in the deterrent context, and more importantly, we are neglecting the symbolic significance of our refusing to transfer any kind of weapons to China, having a policy of treating China, as I said, as a pariah or as an enemy, and I think it is not all cost and no benefit.

If the United States, out of deference, and this is what it really boils down to, out of deference to Soviet concerns, says that it is not going to sell any arms to China because it is afraid to, then, in fact, we have been deterred when the objective of our policy should have been to deter the Soviet Union. We will in effect have recognized special Soviet rights in China, as we did in Hungary.

Now, in Hungary, we could get away with it, because we have indeed recognized the Soviet Union has special rights in Eastern Europe, but I say that the security of the United States is in deep jeopardy if we recognize such rights in China.

Mr. SUTTER. Mr. Frank Romance?

Mr. ROMANCE. I would make two very quick points, one on the atmospherics of the relationship with China, and two, with regard to what Ambassador Gleysteen mentioned earlier about Asian allies' opposition to arms sales with China.

First, the latter subject. I think we would be well advised to consider why it is that certain Asian allies have expressed opposition to arms sales with China. It might very well be as simple a matter as their fear that there aren't enough U.S. arms to go around. We saw that in recent years, where tank sales, as an example, to a Middle Eastern country possibly would have had to come out of arming inventory.

Well, I think it is an important question to ask the basis for Asian allies' opposition to U.S. arms sales.

The second point is on atmospherics. We are after all attempting to deal with China and with the Chinese. What concerns me is the caution that many have emphasized appears not to have included caution in public statements. Many of our higher officials who are in the business of implementing China policy are not themselves China specialists. I believe it was Professor Whiting who alluded to the Secretary's comment on possibly supplying arms to China if the Soviets invaded Poland. This runs directly contrary to what the Chinese have been telling us from the beginning of the relationship on how they conceive the relationship, strategic, long term, and multifaceted.

In my opinion, there is nothing that would retard the relationship quite so much as public statements suggesting that we regard the relationship as expedient, tactical, and short range.

That is all I have to say.

Mr. SUTTER. Thank you very much.

I think on that note we will move toward the conclusion of our proceedings.

Senator Hayakawa.

Senator HAYAKAWA. Thank you, Dr. Sutter.

I am very sorry that other commitments prevented me from participating fully in your sessions. I am told that they have been lively and informative.

In yesterday morning's session I understand that there was a consensus that the Chinese armed forces are strong primarily in terms of a large standing army, and are primarily in a defensive posture, and that there are many weaknesses, for example, a small navy, a limited air force, lack of mobility, shortage of technical personnel, poor logistics, out-of-date equipment, poor command and control systems, and so on. There was also agreement that it was highly unlikely that Chinese Armed Forces could be modernized sufficiently to match the Soviet threat in the next decade.

Inhibiting factors appear to be the government priority on industrial and agricultural development, lack of foreign exchange, inadequate industrial infrastructure, and conflict within the leadership on civilian versus military needs. Thus, any improvement in China's capability will be limited and necessarily gradual.

In the afternoon session on alternative strategies there was considerable discussion of the Soviet perception of the Chinese threat, the Chinese perception of the Soviet threat, whether these were short or long term, and what the Chinese or Soviet intentions might be. This led to a consensus that Chinese-United States cooperation was built upon a common interest in countering the rapid buildup of Soviet power, that the actual provision of weapons might not be as important to the Chinese as the transfer of technology and the political value of the relationship with the United States itself, and that the Soviet Union is probably prepared to accept some limited form of United States-China military cooperation so long as it does not upset the present imbalance which exists in the Soviet's favor.

The mode of a United States-China military relationship was discussed, ranging from formal multilateral alliances such as NATO and China, or China, Japan, and the United States, bilateral pacts, or unofficial incremental transactions. The majority of the participants appear to favor the latter approach, which I think would be a gradual approach.

This point of view led to a lengthy discussion of the concept of the "slippery slope" as first enunciated by Dr. Dreyer. I understand this term refers to the danger of incremental ad hoc transfers leading to subsequent transactions involving higher levels of technology and a greater quantity of weapons. There was some disagreement as to whether U.S. military cooperation with China to date, including intelligence sharing and technology transfer, indicated that we were already on the slippery slope, or whether our

repeated promises to the Chinese have remained largely unfulfilled.

Since I wasn't present for that discussion, Dr. Dreyer, what is your opinion? Are we already on a slippery slope?

Ms. DREYER. I have been convinced by Mr. Sullivan that it is actually an uphill slope, and we are falling backward. [General laughter.]

Senator HAYAKAWA. But then that is the nature of slippery slopes, isn't it?

The question also was asked as to whether our repeated promises to the Chinese have remained largely unfulfilled. In any case, there was strong agreement that the United States should avoid rigid solutions which might involve us in actions with the PRC beyond our original intentions, and perhaps not in our own national interest.

This morning, I understand you have been looking at the advantages and disadvantages of closer United States-China military ties. Some of the advantages mentioned have been to counter the Soviet military buildup by threatening them with the possibility of a two-front war, NATO in the west and China in the east. Second, it might be damaging to our world anti-Soviet stand and our relations with the PRC to back out now that we have made the overture. Third, military cooperation could lead to policy coordination in other areas. Four, external pressures on China can only be relieved by military cooperation with the United States. These seem to be the principal advantages.

There are also disadvantages. Soviet reaction could possibly lead to further military buildup and intransigence on other world issues. Second, it may take a long time to modernize China's forces, and could cost a lot of money. Third, the Chinese buildup could threaten Taiwan and Southeast Asia.

I understand that you have had a thorough discussion of the relative merits of these and other arguments. Furthermore, there seems to be general agreement that limited incremental military cooperation with the PRC is in the national interest of both countries.

While it is clear that we have not settled all of the issues raised here, it is important in my opinion that they have been raised and have been discussed. A dialog has been started which should be continued in the Congress, in the Executive, in the media, in academic circles, and in our many public forums.

As you all know, there have been many problems in the AWACS issue, which is what kept me away from you yesterday, both as to the administration's handling of the matter and the public understanding of the various factors involved. I hope that the question of arms sales to China will not become known as the Chinese "AWACS." That is a real nightmare to think about. To the extent that this can be avoided through this seminar and similar discussions which I hope will follow, a real public service will have been rendered.

For your contribution, therefore, I wish to extend my sincere thanks and appreciation. I would also like to thank Dr. Robert Sutter for chairing this seminar during my absence. I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Sutter and his associates at the

Congressional Research Service, and to Mary Locke of the Foreign Relations Committee staff for making the arrangements for the seminar. They are to be highly commended for their foresight and their hard work.

If there are no other comments, and I would ask now, are there any?

[No response.]

Senator HAYAKAWA. I shall therefore declare this conference closed. Thank you all very much.

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the workshop concluded.]

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